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ABSTRACT
DIALOGUES BETWEEN FEMINISTS AND JACQUES LACAN ON
FEMALE HYSTERIA AND FEMININITY

By
Katerina (or Catherine) Daniel
May 2009

Dissertation Supervised by Bruce Fink, Ph.D.
This theoretical dissertation aims to initiate a dialogue between Lacan and
Irigaray, Butler, and poststructuralist Anglophone feminists on the relationship
between hysteria and femininity. The very existence of hysteria has been called into
question by the majority of Anglophone feminists, who have criticized its diagnostic
proliferation, claiming that it has negative implications for social change and has
played a central part in women’s oppression.

The Anglophone feminist tradition

views Lacanian psychoanalytic theories of sexuation and hysteria with a critical eye,
arguing that Lacan’s oeuvre is another version of patriarchal discourse, another
reductionistic paradigm of female suffering, and another essentialist scheme that
theorizes the subject within the normative realities of sexual difference and
psychopathology.

I argue that Anglophone feminism theorizes the unconscious

superficially and fails to conceptualize how women’s unconscious desires sustain
rather than subvert patriarchy. Whereas feminists challenge traditional assumptions
about women’s subjectivity and make a substantial contribution to our knowledge
about the oppressions brought on by patriarchal discourses, they misread Lacan’s

iv

revisionist approach to Freud and undermine Lacan’s theoretical contributions
regarding the role of unconscious desire and the real in the constitution of
subjectivity.

Hence, they fail to explain how the female hysteric, as a victim of

patriarchal discourses, preserves the dominance of patriarchy. In this dissertation, I
elucidate the structural differences between female hysteria and femininity.

I

assume that the subject has a particular structural relationship with the Other, and
take Lacan’s and Irigaray’s oeuvres as points of departure to articulate an ethics of
feminine desire and jouissance and the differences between how a woman maintains
her victimhood by being dominated by the law and how a woman achieves her
emancipated potentialities by realizing her infinities in relation to the law.
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Introduction
For centuries, the concept of hysteria has been intertwined with conceptions
of sexual difference. Certain feminists understand hysterical symptoms as protests
by women against patriarchal norms. Other feminists see hysteria not as a female
revolt against patriarchy but rather as a declaration of defeat. Such views seem to
assume that hysteria and femininity are the same and that a woman‘s subjectivity is
limited to patriarchal norms. A number of Anglophone feminists use Lacanian theory
selectively to support their views on the role of language and culture in psychosexual
development and distress, and to articulate the ways in which females are more
prone to hysteria because of their subjugation to patriarchy.
Since hysteria was originally defined by the wandering womb, many feminist
theorists insist that hysteria constituted a fundamentally female disorder (Showalter,
1985).
―invalid‖

For centuries, the female reproductive system seemed to be naturally
and

puberty,

menstruation,

pregnancy,

childbirth,

and

symbolized the pathology of the female body (see Appendix A).

menopause
In addition,

feminine nature was considered to be determined by the female reproductive
system, which in turn was linked with sickness and mental instability (Malson, 1998).
Showalter (1985) maintains that the discourses of hysteria played a central part in
woman‘s oppression.

They determined her proper social role and served as ―a

cultural bar to education and suffrage for women‖ (p. 136).

The diagnosis of

hysteria was used when women resisted their gender roles, wanted to vote, sought
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education, and filed for divorce. The conceptual paradigms of hysteria quite literally
reinforced misogynistic power.
The conceptual history of hysteria brings today for some researchers and
scholars an unequivocal need for a solid epistemology at the beginning of the 21st
century.

The word ―hysteria‖ is currently used informally in our discourse and it

usually refers to negative characterological traits, often more than other clinical
entities do.

The female hysteric has been attributed the negative aspects of

femininity and has been compared with the mythical figure of Medusa.

The male

hysteric, on the other hand, has been conceptualized as being non-masculine and
having infantile qualities (Mitchell, 2000).

Although the historian Micale (1995)

makes the points that nobody really knows why hysteria has disappeared from sight
today and that the disappearance of hysteria in the psychological and psychiatric
milieu is a theoretical illusion, other authors argue that the inconsistent clinical
formulations of hysterical phenomena, which usually do not have good theoretical
bases, and the unflattering equation of hysteria with femininity have been important
reasons for its disappearance.
There are profoundly problematic and conflictual notions about the nature of
femininity and hysteria.

Mitchell (2000) contends that there is an ideological

slippage between the feminine—which is conceptualized as involving passivity,
infantile helplessness, feelings of envy, and emptiness—and the hysterical condition.
Mitchell says that ―women and hysteria are found synonymously unattractive‖ (p.
333); hysteria has been feminized, and when a man shows hysterical symptoms, he
is ideologically defined as feminine. As the feminine has been repudiated in society,
hysteria vanished from the clinical picture at the time when we increasingly found
hysterical men.
There was a significant problem with the studies of hysteria done before
Freud‘s time, and there is a similar one with many studies done since Freud‘s time.
2

Theoretical

formulations of hysteria

have

uncoordinated‖ (Micale, 1995, p. 11).

been

―disparate,

fragmented, and

Hysteria has been primarily linked to

femininity and theorized almost exclusively in relation to female sexuality (Mitchell,
2000).

Hysteria has been understood differently at different times, which has led a

number of researchers to the conviction that it did not exist.

The link between

hysteria and femininity has also sparked feminist reactions to its negative
implications for social change.
Some feminists contend that feminism and hysteria are violent reactions
against male-dominated societies (Showalter, 1985; Cixous in Cixous and Clément,
1986) and that hysteria is a form of feminism. Other feminists find that hysteria is
―a cry for help when defeat becomes real‖ (as cited in Malson, 1998, p. 68; Clément
in Cixous and Clément, 1986). In other words, these feminists perceive hysteria as
a failed form of feminism.

Feminist epistemology is widely controversial within

psychoanalytic circles and, because of its diverse theoretical orientation, it is even
controversial within the various feminist groups.
In general, feminists are renowned for their critiques and interrogations of
psychoanalytic theories of sexuality and conceptualizations of femininity and
women‘s distress.

They suspend ontological certainties and challenge the power-

relational cultural constructions of femininity.
psychoanalytic theories of sexual difference.

They raise critical questions about
Their aim is to challenge and bring

forward alternative ways of thinking about sexual subjectivity.

Feminist critiques

open dynamic dialogues between contemporary psychoanalysis and feminism in
regard

to

sexuality,

sexual

oppression,

and

women‘s

distress.

Feminist

interrogations of psychoanalytic theories of sexual difference and hysteria provoke
readers to engage in a dialogue between feminism and psychoanalysis.
Within the Lacanian psychoanalytic circle, Irigaray, Butler, and other major
Anglophone

feminists

are

controversial.
3

Lacanians

critique

feminists

for

misinterpreting

Lacan‘s

psychoanalytic

unconscious of the sexual subject.

theory

and

failing

to

formulate

the

They also critique them for prescribing how

gender is supposed to be and for not describing how subjectivity is structured.
Although Irigaray is critical of certain theoretical elements in Lacan‘s opus,
she also gives primacy to his psychoanalytic theory when she elucidates women‘s
distress, women‘s unconscious in our culture, and the ethics of sexual difference.
Irigaray formulates the differences between the sexes by both incorporating and
deviating from Lacan‘s theory.

Butler and other Anglophone feminists, however,

with their post-structural orientation, critique the psychoanalytic theory of sexual
difference, arguing that it reverts to conventional patriarchal and essentialist
ideologies.

Anglophone feminists view Lacan‘s psychoanalytic interpretations of

hysteria and femininity with a critical eye. Their questionings and critiques are such
that, as Rose (1990) puts it, the dialogue between feminism and psychoanalysis
―constantly slides away from the point of a possible encounter‖ (p. 128).

For

feminists, Lacanian theory is another version of patriarchal discourse, another
reductionistic paradigm of female suffering, and another essentialist scheme that
theorizes the subject within the normative realities of sexual difference and
psychopathology.

For Lacanians, on the other hand, Lacan‘s theory is not what

feminists refer to in their critiques. Instead, they describe Lacan‘s theory as an open
system—a theoretical system that is more anti-essentialist and anti-patriarchal than
any other psychoanalytic theory.
As a reader of feminism and Lacan, the following questions have troubled me:
―What makes the encounter between these two theoretical paradigms impossible?‖
―If there is no bridge to connect these theories, why do I find that both theoretical
paradigms make major contributions to formulating sexuality and psychopathology?‖
The purpose of this dissertation is therefore to engage the reader in the dialogue
between feminists and Lacan on hysteria and femininity. Since feminists critique and
4

question

Lacan‘s

psychoanalytic

theory,

my

purpose

is

to

take

feminist

psychoanalytic skepticism and Lacan‘s psychoanalytic descriptions as my guides, as
my methods of engaging with a theoretical ethics of the relationship between
femininity and hysteria—an ethics that excludes neither feminism, with its purpose to
change the politics of patriarchal oppression, nor Lacan‘s psychoanalysis, with its
purpose to describe the subject as a structure, as an effect of language. It is my aim
to dialogue interrogative feminism with descriptive Lacanian theory.
It often seems to me that Lacan‘s theory is both a mystery and a nuisance to
feminists.

Lacan has introduced us to a way of thinking that is extraordinarily

different from the kind of thinking we are used to in academia and in our daily lives.
The aspect of Lacanian theory that feminists accept is primarily Lacan‘s argument
that subjectivity is an effect of language. For Lacan, subjects‘ utterances come from
somewhere else, from the locus of the Other as language; subjects emerge in the
field of the Other.
jouissances

The subject disappears under the Other‘s desires and

the Other being the locus of speech, ―the phantom of Omnipotence ….

bridled by the Law‖ (Écrits, p. 689/814).

Feminists accept Lacan‘s notion that no

subject exists without the appearance of the signifier. Therefore in the theories of
feminism and Lacan, subjectivity is conceptualized as neither an agency nor a
substance nor a pre-given content, but an effect of language.
Nevertheless, Lacan goes beyond not only biological but also socio-cultural
theories of subjectivity. In Écrits, Lacan argues that his emphasis on man‘s relation
to the signifier has nothing to do with socio-cultural theories of language. Hence, he
is not of the same mind as feminist theorists when he discusses the effects of
language on subjects. Lacan contends that the woven effects of speech resonate in
humans, but these effects cannot be understood by mainstream psychological or
socio-cultural theories (Écrits, p. 578/689).
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According to Barnard (2002a, 2002b), Lacan‘s oeuvre differs from feminism
substantially. Whereas feminists refer to gender as an imaginary-symbolic construct
within socio-cultural idealized norms of embodiment and behaviors, Lacan formulates
sexuation in terms of the impossibility of symbolization and the failure of meaning.
The reason why Lacan‘s concept of sexuation cannot be grasped via feminism is
because feminist theorists do not incorporate the role of the real into their work.
Indeed, Lacan‘s main thesis on sexuation is that the sexual subject is caused by ―the
[traumatic] gap between the real and the symbolic.‖

His attempt is ―to trace the

impact of this trauma … on the functioning of the symbolic itself‖ (Barnard, 2002a, p.
4). As we will see throughout this dissertation, a theory about the gap between the
symbolic and the real produces a different form of knowledge about the relationship
between the subject and the Other.

Lacan‘s oeuvre provides a kind of knowledge

that cannot be grasped in the same way as in feminism or other fields, e.g., positive
science.
The process of understanding Lacan‘s psychoanalytic theory does not simply
entail assimilation of new meanings.

Following Fink‘s (1995) assertion that ―‘true

understanding‘‖ is a process ―which goes beyond the automatic functioning of the
symbolic order and involves an incursion of the symbolic into the real‖ (p. 71), I
argue that Lacan‘s analytic knowledge requires the reader to work between
consciousness and unconsciousness, recognize subjective ruptures, and accept that
imaginary wholeness and consistency are illusions.

This acceptance is obviously a

challenge, not to mention traumatic in certain situations, for the subject. A reader of
Lacan‘s work encounters a theory that runs counter to the utopian and idealistic
ideas of mainstream psychological, political, and positive sciences.

To understand

the manifestations of the gap between the real and the symbolic in symbolic
functioning itself means to be confronted by the deceptions of the reality we live in.
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For Lacan, structural subjectivity is real (Copjec, 1994). Lacan understands
structural subjectivity as the subject‘s internal failure to be wholly realized in
language, which does not point to a substantial existence.

In other words, the

subject is in itself a failed whole. Anglophone feminists formulate gender as being
constructed by language and they see the function of language in positive terms as
what constructs beings.

Lacan, however, sees language in terms of both: the

subject comes to be within language and is subjected by the Other, eclipsed by the
Other. The subject is not simply a sedimentation of meanings, it is also realized in
the forged links between signifiers (Fink, 1995). The signifier, which is irreducible to
the signified, has a double (splitting) function: it unifies an image and institutes
discontinuity.

Lacan‘s descriptions of sexual and clinical structures presuppose

exclusion, an empty set, and discontinuity of a unified and stable specular image.
Whereas

contemporary

Lacanians

often

pinpoint

the

shortcomings

of

Anglophone feminist theories of sexuality and subjectivity, they also acknowledge
feminists‘ contributions to social change. In Soler‘s (2006) words,
What is certain is that, today, there is no field to which women do not
have access. Although this movement has not yet accomplished its
goals completely, its effects are becoming more and more general, and
its triumph seems irreversible to me …. There are still, of course, a few
bastions of male supremacy …. Concerning this evolution, [Lacanian]
psychoanalysis as such does not have to take a side.
Its
consequences for both sexes must not, however, be misunderstood.
(pp. 158-159)
Soler suggests that the feminist movement has succeeded in changing the roles of
women in relation to men. In Western societies, women‘s jouissances are no longer
confined to the home, as they were for centuries. Nowadays, women are freer and
more equal to men under civil law.

Aside from their enduring (and perhaps

endearing?) married and maternal realities, they also enjoy plenty of opportunities to
obtain knowledge and power.
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Soler, however, warns us that women‘s equality to men does not necessarily
mean that women are liberated from oppression. Several feminists also make the
same argument. While feminism stands for the empowerment of women, feminists
must deal with the question whether or not women are liberated from male
oppression when women compete in the same ways as men do (Soler, 2006; Walsh,
2001) and when women become aware of the power structures in ―benign‖
discourses.

The subsequent questions that arise are, ―How do women understand

their differences from men?‖ ―How do they understand their femininity, when they
adopt the pre-existing norms and assimilate to men‘s belief systems, values, and
practices for equality purposes?‖1

―How are suffering women able to accomplish

change?‖ These questions are not answered in feminist movements today.
Whereas Anglophone feminists have succeeded in empowering women to
some extent and challenging patriarchal ideologies, they have failed to conceptualize
what is different and particular about femininity. These feminists end up reinforcing
masculine values in the lives of women. Lacanian theory, however, is a theory of
difference. It recognizes the alterity and otherness of the subject. It is the theory
that

surpasses

the

dominant

social

paradigm

of

similarities,

dichotomies,

comparisons, and analogies. Nonetheless, it seems to me that Irigaray‘s, Butler‘s,
and other Anglophone feminists‘ interrogations of psychoanalytic theory can make
major contributions to the evolution of Lacanian psychoanalytic articulations of
sexual difference and suffering. They can also make major contributions that would
allow Lacanians to expand their articulation of what constitutes an effective change
in the relationship between the feminine subject and the Other (patriarchal culture).

1

Walsh (2001) brings up the example of the former British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, who
claimed that she was an exception. Thatcher encouraged other women to take her as an example.
However, Thatcher‘s widespread descriptions of herself were that she was ―the best man in the Cabinet‖
and the ―honorary man.‖ Thatcher safeguarded her success by assimilating to the androcentric norms and
by doing little to promote the careers of other women (pp. 67-103).
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These are some of the reasons why I chose to write my dissertation on the dialogue
between feminists and Lacan on female hysteria and femininity.
In chapter 1, I provide detailed descriptions of Irigaray‘s and Butler‘s critiques
of the Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalytic theories of hysteria and femininity.
Irigaray and Butler challenge ontological certainties and interrogate psychoanalytic
theories of women‘s subjectivity. Whereas Butler has misformulated major Lacanian
psychoanalytic concepts, such as the phallus, foreclosure, and sexuation, the reader
may find that she provokes psychoanalytic theorists to respond to her critical
questions and provide clearer formulations of these concepts. I subsequently lay out
feminist descriptions of female hysteria. Unlike Freud‘s and Lacan‘s technical use of
language, feminists, such as Irigaray, Cixous, and Clément, use rich and poetic
language to describe how the female hysteric truly suffers from the abuses of
patriarchy.

Feminists, however, are not clear on the question whether or not the

hysteric contests or conserves patriarchy.

They thus leave this question open

without providing a rigorous response to it.

Finally, I show how Anglophone

feminists misread Lacan‘s notion of the symbolic and fail to conceptualize his theory
of the subject‘s relationship with the symbolic Other.
unconscious superficially.

Feminists theorize the

Insofar as Anglophone feminists are committed to an

epistemology which overvalues conscious negotiations of subjective positions, it
makes it difficult to see how women‘s unconscious desires sustain rather than
subvert patriarchy.
In chapter 2, I elaborate on what it means to approach the question of a
woman‘s desire, since it is often raised as an unresolved question by feminists. In
approaching the issue of feminine desire, I describe Lacan‘s theory of the phallus and
provide reasons why I think Anglophone feminists have misinterpreted that concept.
I make a distinction between female hysteria and femininity based on Irigaray‘s and
Lacan‘s theories and argue that Anglophone feminists may not realize that the
9

Lacanian woman is the plurality and multiplicity of discourses; she is the force that
transcends men‘s dichotomous logic and monologue. I also argue that one cannot
agree with Irigaray‘s concept of speaking as a woman without first exploring Lacan‘s
distinction between hysteria and femininity and his theories of sexuation and
psychoanalytic ethics. In order to explore a woman‘s desire, one must not approach
hysteria and femininity as sociopolitical discourses but as structures.

Lacan, thus,

makes a major contribution to the theory of the subject‘s desire in relation to the
Law.

When one conceptualizes Lacan‘s distinction between having desire vis-à-vis

the Other and being the cause of desire, one is also able to realize what it takes for
the subject to be liberated from the oppressions of external reality.
In chapter 3, I describe Lacan‘s theories of identification and repetition of the
symptom in order to exemplify further Lacan‘s anti-essentialist approach to
subjectivity.

I lay out the differences between Lacan‘s structural theory and neo-

Freudian psychodiagnostic formulation. My aim is to explain to feminist readers that
the Lacanian subject cannot be inscribed as a stable meaning within language
because, as Lacan explains, the unconscious subject is always in conflict with the ego
and with discourses that promise self-coherence, unity, and satisfaction. I discuss
how Lacan‘s concept of the real shifts psychoanalytic description to a substantively
different kind of logic—a logic which is not fully comprehended by neo-Freudian and
feminist theorists.

I describe how Lacan‘s structural descriptions of hysteria differ

significantly from the neo-Freudian reductionistic and essentialist psychoanalytic
formulations of hysteria as a personality trait.
In chapter 4, I present a Lacanian case formulation of a female hysteric whom
I refer to as Sofia. Although Sofia consciously understood herself as a feminist and
was adamant in expressing her views on women‘s sufferings owing to patriarchy, I
show how she unconsciously participated in being the oppressed victim in relation to
men.

I provide a detailed discussion of Sofia‘s unconscious signifiers which arose
10

from fantasies and dreams.

Sofia consciously challenged the Other‘s patriarchal

ideals but unconsciously was situated in self-defeating ways. By being the imaginary
phallus for men, Sofia upheld the Other‘s patriarchal authority over her destiny.
Finally, in chapter 5 I argue that, in order to have a further dialogue between
feminism and Lacan on women‘s experiences, feminists need to read Lacan‘s work
more closely. I conclude that the Lacanian theory is an analytic discourse and not a
sociopolitical one.

I conjecture, however, that if feminists engage with Lacanian

theory more rigorously, both epistemologies will evolve. If feminists were to speak
the Irigararian feminine language—a language that is similar to Lacan‘s concept of
the analyst‘s discourse—they would succeed in questioning subjects‘ enunciations
instead of designating truths at the level of the ego. Anglophone feminists criticize
psychoanalytic theory in a passive way and they speak instead the hysteric‘s
discourse.

Speaking the feminine language on issues related to oppression is the

same technique that Lacanian psychoanalysts use with their analysands to question
their unconscious desire and the etiologies of their symptoms. I conjecture that if
feminists used Lacanian theory, they would succeed in motivating subjects to ask
more questions about themselves.

It is well known that oppressors and the

oppressed live and act without asking etiological questions about themselves.
Furthermore, if feminists engage with Lacanian psychoanalytic theory rigorously,
neo-Lacanian psychoanalysts will be inspired by feminists to elaborate further
Lacan‘s own concepts, which at times seem to be treated as pre-given and remain
theoretically static.

Neo-Lacanians will provide deeper theoretical clarifications to

questions, including to the question that is often raised by feminists in regards to
how the subject relates to the Other in various sociopolitical settings.
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Chapter 1
Feminists on Women and Hysteria

1.1

Irigaray‘s Theory of Femininity and Psychoanalytic Critiques
Is hysteria a feminine neurosis? Isn‘t it─today, on a privileged basis─a
―sufferance‖ of the feminine? In particular in its inarticulable relation
to the desire for the mother? For the woman-mother? Which does not
mean that it is found simply in women. (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 137)

Irigaray

is

best

known

for

both

embracing

and

challenging

Lacan‘s

psychoanalytic theory. She accepts Lacan‘s concepts of enunciated and enunciation.
The author‘s analyses of hysterical, obsessive, and psychotic use of language
coincide with Lacan‘s theoretical formulations (Irigaray, 2000).

When it comes to

the issue of sexuality, however, Irigaray is critical of Lacan‘s re-reading of Freud.
Irigaray2 deconstructs Freud‘s and Lacan‘s psychoanalytic theories of female
sexuality and comes to the conclusion that in these theories femininity is reduced to
―masculine parameters‖ (1985b, p. 23).

She points out that sexuality is

appropriated by masculine norms and that psychoanalytic theories perpetuate
dominant cultural fantasies (Whitford, 1991).
Irigaray interrogates conceptualizations of sexual difference in terms of
genitality, the phallus, and Oedipal relations that situate the category ―woman‖ as

2

When Irigaray published her book, Speculum of the Other Woman (1974⁄1985a), Lacan could not accept
it. Irigaray was suspended from teaching at the Department of Psychoanalysis, which was chaired by
Lacan at the University of Paris at Vincennes (Irigaray, 1977⁄1985b, p. 167).
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both an object of patriarchy and a rebus. The category ―woman‖ is implicated in the
patriarchal male-female opposition, which normalizes the male to subjugate the
female. Femininity also is conceptualized as exceeding the signifying chain. Unlike
Freud, who situates the mystery of femininity in terms of the girl‘s difficulty resolving
her Oedipal complex, Irigaray asserts that what is inarticulate about femininity is the
relation of woman to woman, of the maternal-feminine, of daughter to mother.
There is a physical and cultural separation of daughter from mother ―in order [for
her] to enter male families or male institutions‖ (Irigaray, 1994, p. 7).
Irigaray sets out to look ―for the phantasies that haunt‖ (Whitford, 1991, p.
34) psychoanalytic discourses. She aims to change these discourses and shift the
linguistic phenomena of the feminine subject so that the feminine subject does not
speak as a man; she does not speak about other women; she rather speaks as a
woman.

To illuminate Irigaray‘s theory of female sexuality, it is worthwhile to

discuss briefly the ways she understands the phantasmagoria of Freud and Lacan,
and how, based on these understandings, she formulates her theses on women‘s
sufferings and speaking as a woman.
Irigaray (1985b) asserts that psychoanalytic designations of femininity as
enigmatic perpetuate discourses that define it as ―lack, deficiency, or as imitation
and negative image of the subject‖ (p. 78).

For Irigaray, what psychoanalytic

theorists should focus on is how to signify the ―disruptive excess‖ that is possible for
femininity.

To reconceptualize femininity means to challenge and contest the

historically embedded patriarchal ideologies in psychoanalysis.

Irigaray suggests

that

representations—

we

need

psychoanalytically.

to

read

psychoanalytic

language—its

In other words, as readers of psychoanalysis we need to

examine its imaginary configurations and, above all, ―what it does not articulate at
the level of utterance: its silences‖ (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 75). To re-signify femininity
also means to speak as a woman, that is, to find continuity between hysterical
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psychosomatic expressions and the speaking of feminine desire.

For Irigaray, to

speak as an hysteric is to preserve, in suffering, that which one does not articulate
with words.

Irigaray (1985b) asks, ―[D]oes psychoanalysis offer any cure to

hysterics beyond a surfeit of suggestions intended to adapt them, if only a little
better, to masculine society?‖ (p. 137).

Whereas the psychoanalytic talking cure

helps the hysterical woman to speak in language, it also re-imposes patriarchal
norms in the guise of a cure.
Speaking as a woman is not simple.

It is not a production of discourse of

which a woman would either be the object or the subject.

Feminine syntax

transcends the privileged ―oneness‖—the oneness of the male sex. It goes beyond
proper masculine meanings, names, and attributes. To speak as a woman means to
speak to other women and not about other women.

Feminine speaking obviously

occurs within the available signifying system, which is patriarchal. But if a woman
cannot speak outside the already established signifying system, how can she speak
to other women? Following Chisholm's (1994) interpretations of Irigaray, speaking
as a woman occurs concentrically; it exposes the structural abyss that is concealed in
male-dominated theories.3 It shows the blind spots of the psychoanalytic paradigm,
or any other philosophical paradigm, so that other women can get in touch with their
own unrepresented and unacknowledged sense of difference. It presses women to
feel the limitations of dominant discourses and begin to invent collectively different
metaphors of self-representation.

§
Freud‘s theory of femininity in the early 1930‘s (see Appendix B) implies, for
Irigaray, inadequate representation of what it means to be feminine. Freud‘s inquiry
3

Chisholm (1994) writes that for Irigaray a woman can either speak concentrically, exposing thus the con
(in French con means cunt, female orifice) and the phallic lack, or ex-centrically as if she is an outsider
from phallocentric discourse.
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into how a woman comes into being with a bisexual disposition—his belief that
becoming a woman is ―more difficult and more complicated than becoming a man‖—
appropriates notions that are regulated by male values and masculine paradigms
(Irigaray, 1985a, p. 22). For Irigaray (1985b), femininity remains in psychoanalysis
the ―Dark Continent‖ (p. 48). Irigaray (1985a) contends that when Freud theorizes
that libido is masculine, he implies that sexual difference is a function of sameness.
He understands women in the same way as men. He characterizes women as the
others of the same, as the negatives of males, as defective men.
Irigaray questions Freud‘s argument that the little girl is a little boy.

She

finds Freud unreasonable for believing the clitoris alone to be erotogenic and for
arguing that the little girl‘s sexuality is incomplete and impoverished.

Irigaray

(1985a) raises the question, ―Why, when discussing the little girl, give the name
phallic to this moment when her discovery of erotogenic sensitivity is, or is supposed
to be, so incomplete and impoverished?‖

(p. 29).

For Irigaray, when Freud

describes the little girl‘s ignorance of the vagina as an erotogenic zone, he
understands female genitalia as defective male genitals and gives primacy to the
penis.

A woman is represented by Freud as ―a man minus the possibility of

(re)presenting oneself as a man‖ (p. 27).

If we leave Freud‘s arguments

unchallenged, the theory of female sexuality remains fragmentary and reduced to
the margins of a dominant patriarchal ideology.

Freud‘s arguments fail to

conceptualize the multiple loci of female pleasures and desires; they fail to formulate
her sexuality as plural.

For Irigaray, a woman is not forced to choose between

clitoral activity and vaginal passivity; her whole body is her pleasure.
Freud‘s examination of the girl‘s preoedipal phase in the early 1930‘s relies on
the same patriarchal presumptions he had in the early 1900‘s, regardless of his claim
that the early attachment of the little girl to her mother is a new addition to his
theory.

Irigaray (1985b) points out that Freud continues to believe in the early
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1930‘s that the libido is masculine in males and females.

According to Irigaray

(1985b), Freud‘s concept of the preoedipal, which describes the little girl‘s love for
her mother, is another patriarchal version of reality. The little girl, as a little man,
loves her phallic mother; her love is thus a masculine love.

The specific relation

between daughter-mother and girl-woman receives ―very little attention from Freud‖
(p. 37).
As I also illustrate in Appendix B, because Freud goes so far as to identify
early signs of the Oedipus complex during the preodipal phase, he seems to deny the
exclusiveness

of

the

mother-daughter

(Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973).

relationship

in

the

preoedipal

phase

Therefore, in Freudian theory, the Oedipal complex

predominates over the preoedipal in the etiologies of sexual difference and neuroses.
The subject‘s sexual maturity depends on the subject‘s perceptions of what it means
to have or not to have the phallic organ. For the little girl, full entry into the Oedipal
complex presupposes the development of penis envy. It also presupposes that the
little girl blames/hates her woman-mother for being castrated and desires instead
her man-father to give her the phallus.
Irigaray points out that, in Freudian theory, in order for the little girl to
become feminine, she has to transform her active masculine libido to passive libido.
In other words, she has to transform her masculine sadistic pleasures to feminine
masochistic ones.

Irigaray finds that Freud‘s ideological system encourages a link

between normal femininity and masochism. Within that ideological system, Irigaray
interprets Freud‘s theory of the beating fantasy as the little girl‘s desire to be beaten
by her father, because she is sexually inferior to her brother. Her brother has the
superior penis and she instead has the inferior clitoris, which is the equivalent of an
under-developed male organ. Irigaray (1985b) calls into question Freud‘s views and
asks instead, ―Or does masochism constitute a sexual deviation, a morbid process,
that is particularly frequent in women?‖ (p. 45).
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For Irigaray, hysteria—the neurosis of passivity, masochistic obedience, and
psychosomatic pain—is prevalent in women.

Hysteria is the neurosis in which

women remain silent and speak only in the mode of bodily symptoms.

Their

psychosomatic symptoms exhibit desires, revolts, and refusals. The woman-hysteric
unconsciously refuses to be the maternal corporeal, a reproductive body for the
benefit

of

her

patriarchal

society.

She

unconsciously

revolts

against

the

appropriation/exploitation of her body, especially when her body is situated in the
system of economic and sexual production.
In Freudian theory, Irigaray says, the concept of normal femininity is reduced
to the economy of sameness in the ideologies of masculine standards, of one sex. In
Freud‘s work, normal women remain objects of exchange in men‘s sexual imaginary.
Indeed, for Irigaray, these women are not normal but hysterical. Hysterical women
mime and reproduce masculine language. When they speak in masculine language,
they produce caricatured and deceitful words about their own bodies and desires.
They envelop their subjectivity in the needs, desires, and fantasies of men.

§
For Irigaray (1994), masculine language is the language of mastery and
action. Masculine speech endorses competition in order to produce ―consumable and
exchangeable goods (even in most leisure time)‖ (p. 48). With masculine speech,
man distances himself from himself, from his concrete and living environment; he
enters instead into an environment that reinforce exchange skills—possession,
combat, and waging war. For the sake of possession, wealth, and competition, the
masculine subject is allowed to be disrespectful of nature and humanity, abuse
human rights, disrespect life, and misrecognize intersubjectivity; he is legitimized to
respect order, calculations, and reductive discourses; he is approved to obey the civil
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written law and, simultaneously, lose interest in life, in the oral law, in spirituality,
and in the unpredictable possibilities of human relations.
Masculine language fails to represent women as subjects who can be
addressed. It privileges the male interlocutrix. The interlocutrix, il (he), is present
everywhere.

The interlocutrix, elle (she), is erased when it is present with the il

(he): il + elle = ils (they; masculine).

The married woman becomes ils (they), the

family being designated by the masculine plural, because it consists of mother,
father, and children. The woman loses her status as an existing interlocutor. When
the woman uses I as the subject of the sentence, she often addresses another man
and not another woman. In her speech, she cannot represent herself and respect
her mother and other women as other than herself.
One of the major theses of Irigaray‘s oeuvre is the idea that a hysterical
woman, who speaks masculine language, mimes patriarchy.

The woman-hysteric

struggles

power.

with

the

repressions

imposed

by

patriarchal

Patriarchy

subordinates feminine desire and constrains a woman to silence and mimicry. The
hysteric-woman suffers, impotent to say what disturbs her. Hysteria is a necessary
remainder of a muted, frustrated, and mad response to patriarchy. Hysteria is ―the
nonsymbolization of her desire for origin, of her relationship to her mother‖
(Irigaray, 1985a, p. 71). The hysteric is this hole, this deficiency in the signifying
economy. She borrows signifiers from the patriarchal order, but ―she cannot make
her mark, or re-mark upon them‖ (p. 71).

Hysteria is the hole in the dominant

representations of mother-daughter, woman-to-woman relationship.
Irigaray reverses the psychoanalytic theory of the preoedipal motherdaughter relationship.

She takes issue with the Freudian notion of the oedipal

triangle that sustains the little girl's separation from the mother.

She also takes

issue with the Lacanian concept of the phallus―a concept that I will discuss in later
chapters—that situates the feminine in an economy of sexual difference that
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privileges the masculine subject.

Irigaray asserts that what is inarticulate in

psychoanalytic theory is the relationship between mother-daughter and female
speech. In female speech, women speak about themselves to other women, without
the interference of men. In order for a woman to speak to another woman with love,
psychoanalysts need to go beyond the conventions of the Oedipal triangle and
explore further the relationship between daughter and mother.
For Irigaray, in order for women to stop suffering they need to differentiate
from patriarchal expectations and values. Women need to learn to love themselves
and other women. But this love should not be confined to passionate relationships at
the individual level. Rather, love for femininity must take a public form. The task of
symbolizing love in the collective arena entails representation of femininity as a
different sex.

This difference needs to be embodied in language, socio-cultural

practices, civil laws, symbols, and religion (Whitford, 1991).

The coming-to-be

feminine transcends merged relationships with the mother and other women.
Irigaray sees the merged relations of women-to-women as oppressive, as static
relations that prevent women from having any real effect on the wider society, on
the society that is hom(m)osexual 4—an economy of the same, in which only
masculinity is recognized.
§
In her essay, ―And the One Doesn't Stir Without the Other,‖ Irigaray (1981)
narrates the daughter‘s own experiences with her mother. She uses the ―I‖ in order
to address the specific ―you,‖ the mother.

Irigaray describes the infant‘s early

experiences with its mother by using a rich and poetic language that represents the
infant‘s sensations of the mother‘s body. Irigaray elaborates on the merging of the
daughter-mother. She represents this merging as both erotic and suffocating. The
4

Irigaray here seems to mimic Lacan‘s hommosexuelle, which is a play on homme (man) and
homosexual. Lacan (1998b) states that the hysteric is hommosexual, because she loves herself by what
she finds in the Other (p. 84-85/78-79). She loves the Other for what the Other recognizes in her.
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eroticism between the infant-mother is described by Irigaray as when the infant and
mother ―taste each other, feel each other, listen to each other, see each other‖ (p.
61).

The mother nourishes her infant.

The mother-infant metamorphosize each

other into the One with the sharing of fluids: ―To let nothing pass between us but
blood, milk, [and] honey‖ (p. 62).
The infant, however, feels suffocated by the mother‘s attempt to fill up its
mouth.

This filling up signifies the mother‘s attempt to assimilate her infant in

accordance with her own mirages, in accordance with her desire to transform her
infant into an inanimate object and turn to a man‘s validating gaze.

When the

mother attempts to assimilate her daughter to her ideals, the daughter wants to
abandon her. The daughter wants to undo this paralytic relationship—a relationship
that is suffocating and deadening when it leaves little space for subjective difference.
The daughter turns away from the mother and turns to the father, to the male figure
who appears to nourish this difference and thus be more alive.
When the mother assimilates her daughter blindly to her mirages, or when
the daughter and mother are reduced to the disguises of being and doing in
accordance with the social ideals of femininity, or when the mother remains faceless
and invisible due to her surroundings, the daughter is imprisoned by her mother‘s
masculine desires; she feels trapped in her mother‘s single function of patriarchal
mothering; she is frozen, immobilized, by the mirrored images of her mother.
Where are you? Where am I? Where to find the traces of our
passage? …. Imprisoned by your desire for a reflection, I became a
statue, an image of your mobility ….With your milk, Mother, you fed
me ice. And if I leave, you lose the reflection of life. And if I remain,
am I not the guarantor of your death? Each of us lacks her own image
…. My paralysis signifying your abduction in the mirror (pp. 65-66).
I‘ll turn to my father. I‘ll leave you for someone who seems more
alive than you …. Farewell, Mother, I shall never become your likeness
(p. 62).
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§
Irigaray knows that there is no purely female language, a language that is not
mediated by masculine interference (Whitford, 1991). However, Irigaray encourages
her readers to reflect on the idea that if women speak the language of sameness, the
language that men have spoken for centuries, they then become absent from
themselves; they speak mechanistically; and they become enveloped by proper
names that make women feel that these names are not their own. Irigaray points
out that the exclusion of women is not merely an exclusion from opportunities equal
to those of men, but rather an exclusion of women‘s subjectivity.

Women‘s

unsymbolized relation with their mothers has the consequence of alienating them
from language and self.
If women are to gain a language of their own, they need to develop/create a
language that would articulate female love. Irigaray (1985b) portrays speaking as a
woman by describing her love of another woman.

For Irigaray, to love another

woman is not to love equality. When the two lips cannot articulate more than one
word, a word outside of sameness, then women become mute and closed off.

In

sameness, women are trapped in the dichotomous thoughts: virgin/deflowered,
innocent/experienced, pure/impure, and so on.

They are subordinated, paralyzed,

by the words of men.
The articulation of female love embodies female difference. Women‘s lips are
not simply open or closed upon one truth.

They express multiplicities of truths.

They resist the language that is formed ―of a single thread,‖ a single pattern (p.
209). The you/I—the we—are not open or closed. Between the lips of you/I, there
are several ways of speaking, there are multiple tones and voices. Female language
is not the language of rigid definitions, images, and metaphors that stabilize
meanings.
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§
According to Irigaray (2002), psychoanalytic theory and practice rest upon
whole, ahistorical, and absolute foundations.

Freud and the first psychoanalysts

used their psychoanalytic practice to uncover a new knowledge.

They listened to

their analysands as though their analysands had the knowledge to contribute to the
evolution of psychoanalytic theory.

Once the psychoanalytic ―science‖ was

established and the psychoanalytic theory of the unconscious was determined,
psychoanalysts no longer questioned further the workings of the unconscious, but
perceived psychoanalytic science as complete. Nowadays, psychoanalytic theory is
reduced to ―a pre-established corpus, a pre-existing knowledge, a pre-determined
law‖ (p. 84).

In this pre-established system—in the system of codes that have

already been articulated and fixed—the psychoanalyst complies with an a priori
Other, an a priori psychoanalytic science.
unconscious still remains veiled.

Hence, the Truth of a subject‘s

Contemporary psychoanalysts analyze patients

without seeing any real difference between the sexes.
Psychoanalysts often find that women, after an analytic session, are ―shut in,
closed up, withdrawn‖ (p. 99). They often interpret these women as bisexual and
hysterical.

Asserting that contemporary psychoanalysts fail to evaluate their

theoretical assumptions, Irigaray (2002) asks the following questions:

―But is

bisexuality not both inscribed on the body and a process of identification? …. How
does [identification] differ in men from in women?‖ (p. 223).

The psychoanalytic

theory of sexuality formulates identifications as a ―double polarity within the
economy of one sex and one sex alone‖ (p. 223).
Within the psychoanalytic frame of mind, women are theorized as identifying
with the other, masculine or phallic, but, ―When she has become the other—
masculine or phallic—where are her own desires and jouissances to be found?‖
Women end up speaking men‘s language, a language that separates them from their
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mothers and other women. They speak language without speaking it. Women‘s love
and desire for other women and between women are still beyond the articulations of
language.

Being

exiled

from

feminine

speech,

women

experience

various

psychosomatic symptoms and other symptoms related to their non-differentiation
from other women and their mothers—from the maternal flesh, which is not fully
recognized but is only reduced to a reproductive body.
Irigaray (2002) argues that women are reduced to the theory of the Oedipal
complex that establishes a law of ―the non-return of the daughter to the mother,
except in the doing like [faire comme] of motherhood‖ (p. 224). Women are then
conceptualized not within a process of becoming but in a process of dependency on
the masculine Other. The feminine Other is annulled. Both sexes cannot strive to
realize their powers; instead, they are reduced to fictions.
Irigaray (1985a) asserts that the dominant fantasy of the mother is the
maternal reproductive, ―a mute soil, a mystery beyond metaphor‖ (p. 228).

She

represents castration and death; she is the inconceivable heterogenous Other. Her
reproduction of a child is associated with an unrepresentable secret remainder, the
maternal fluids:

―Blood, but also milk, sperm, lymph, saliva, spit, tears, humors,

gas, waves, airs, fire‖ (1985a, p. 237).
Yet, the woman-Other is undefinable, unformulated, and unformalized. She is
beyond the individualization, the dichotomies of activity/passivity, or the closed
volume (container)—the support of reproduction and discourse. The woman-Other
touches a new ground with her body, superseding the repeatable shape that has
already been established in the social realm (Irigaray, 1985a). She is ontologically
an un-closed container. She is inside the placenta and mucous membranes that hold
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the child, but she is also outside of those. She is the place that contains containers
and gaps, intervals, between these containers.5
Why are women always dissatisfied? What do women want? Irigaray (2002)
replies that they want more. They want something that overflows the small, finite,
and numerical within the closed fields of codes and numbers. They seek the place
they have lost, which is the undifferentiating place of the womb.

They want to

supersede their sexed determination; they want to become the feminine with their
never-completed potentials.

The daughter-woman is clothed in the mother-Other.

When the daughter is missing the woman-mother‘s identity, her speech is mimetic.
It expresses only the desire of that feminine Other. Since the hysteric‘s language is
mimetic, her verbal exchanges become impossible.

The woman-hysteric becomes

the fragments of the woman-Other, ―of discourse, of silences, of blanks that are still
immaculate‖ (1985a, p. 228). She struggles to thrust the body within which she has
been imprisoned so as to fracture the enveloping discourses that represent her as
finite, whole, and unified.

1.2

Butler‘s Theory of Femininity and Psychoanalytic Critiques

In Bodies That Matter (1993) and Gender Trouble (1999), Butler interrogates
prominent theories of sexuality and subjectivity with the intention to suspend
ontological certainties. She aims to destabilize exclusionary gendered/sexed norms
that foreclose multiple enactments of sexual desire.

For Butler (1993), it is not

enough to say that human subjects are constructed—such a theory does not allow us
to understand what is excluded as constitutive outside.

Discursive and reiterative

sexual practices open up gaps and fissures that show their ―constitutive instabilities‖
5

I further describe Irigaray‘s theses on woman as place and woman‘s unlimited boundaries of
embodiment in chapter 2.
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(p. 10).

It is also not enough to say that the materiality of the body escapes

language, because when we refer to materiality we speak of a signifying process.
Butler inquires into the kinds of erasures, exclusions, foreclosures, and disruptions
by which any construction of the subject operates.

Any construction of gendered

subjectivity gains its authority by citing the status quo of regulatory sexual regimes,
especially of heterosexuality. The subject is subjected to the norms of sex. Whereas
the subject appears as the author of discursive effects, agency is located as ―a
reiterative or rearticulatory practice, immanent to power, and not a relation of
external opposition to power‖ (p. 15).
Butler formulates the notion of performative gender.

She describes

performative gender ―not as a singular or deliberate act, but, rather, as the
reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces the effects that it
names‖ (p. 2). Butler argues that performative gender is not the same as gender
performance. The subject is not an agency by which he/she can choose gender as
actors choose parts in plays. In other words, Butler does not represent gender as a
theatrical or singular act. Rather, gender is ―a reiteration of a norm or set of norms‖
(p. 12).

When gender performativity becomes an act, this act again conceals the

status quo and repeats the conventions of heterosexuality. Within the matrix of the
regulatory laws of sexuality, the subject is neither an agency nor a passive recipient
of discourses. Gender identification is cited and resisted by compulsory normative
sexual discourses. Discourses open up spaces of resistance, and so the subject does
not conform to all the ideals of gender categories.
Yet, the process of reiteration or citation allows the heterosexual sexual
categories to be performed again and again.

With the repetition of gender

performatives, the subject assumes authority over his/her sexuality.

Gender

performatives iterate interpellating codes in such a way that the gendered subject is
always subjected to a normative identity.
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The paradox, however, is that whereas

gender

categories maintain

an

authoritative law

because

of their repeated

performativity, they also reinstitute the possibility of their own failure. Repetition of
gender performativity offers the possibility of subverting and re-articulating identity.
It offers the possibility of re-articulating the codes and the laws with a difference.
Hence, citational performativity is not fixed and goes beyond the dichotomies of
sexual difference.
As Butler argues, unlike the psychoanalytic grand narratives of gender as a
unitary entity, gender is a set of cultural codes, rather than a core aspect of essential
identity. Gender is a site of a double movement: identification with and resistance to
regulatory norms.

Butler‘s reiterated gender is not the same as the predominant

feminists‘ concept of gender as socially constructed.

The author contends that

contemporary feminist movements mobilize the subject with certain identity
categories in order to change the specific laws that concern the equality of the sexes.
However, these feminist theories undermine the importance of the subject‘s
persistent disidentifications with regulatory norms.

Butler encourages feminists to

look at cultural situations that foreclose and exclude multiplicities of gender
performatives.
Butler (1993) defines foreclosure, a concept which she allegedly borrows from
Lacan (2006), as the mechanism that founds the unconscious subject by producing
―sociality through a repudiation of a primary signifier‖ (p. 243, n. 2).

Foreclosure

threatens the subject with psychosis. Butler (2004) argues that Lacan‘s concept of
foreclosure implies that there is always a lack of self-understanding for any subject.
Since foreclosure founds the unconscious subject, the subject cannot know his or her
origins, cannot undo the operations of the unconscious. 6 In other words, in Bulter‘s
interpretation of the psychoanalytic concept of foreclosure as the founding moment

6

The psychoanalytic theory of foreclosure is different from Butler‘s formulation of foreclosure (see
Appendix B). Butler seems to confuse Lacan‘s foreclosure with repression.
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of the subject, the sexual subject is fixed. If the subject seeks to undo foreclosure,
the subject also loses him/herself. Butler says that, in Lacan‘s theory, if the subject
becomes undone, the subject also becomes psychotic.
Butler believes that foreclosure produces a coherent subjectivity.

The

foreclosure of homosexuality, for example, inaugurates the heterosexual subject.
But when ―homosexuality returns as a possibility, it returns precisely as the
possibility of the unraveling of the subject itself‖ (2004, p. 333). The possibility of
homosexuality leads the subject to think that if he or she was homosexual, he or she
would be undone. Butler, however, asserts that, in contradiction to Lacanian theory,
it is ―possible sometimes to undergo an undoing‖ (p. 333). The Lacanian concept of
foreclosure is not necessarily ―a founding act,‖ but ―a temporally renewable
structure.‖

While the subject is socially constituted in certain limited ways—

constituted through exclusions and foreclosures—the subject is not stable or fixed.
The subject is open to the possibility to alter his/her limitations. According to Butler,
subjectivity should be thought of as a dynamic site. Although the subject never goes
beyond foreclosure, it is possible to alter the subject‘s thematizations and limitations
to some degree.
Hence, the author finds that both psychoanalysis and feminism represent
sexual difference within the ideologies of heteronormativity. She formulates the idea
that gender drags—lesbians, gays, transsexuals, bisexuals, and the inter-sexed—
destabilize sexual categories and norms.

Drag queens, transfags, and queers

transgress the ideals of femininity and masculinity. The enactments of gender never
fully approximate the norm. Gender is cited by the norm, but this citation always
produces remainders and violent exclusions in the subject‘s constitutive identity. In
other words, the subject lives in ways that are irreducible to the norms by which
he/she is constituted.
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§
Butler critiques various psychoanalytic texts.

She finds that descriptions of

sex and sexual difference imply an unexamined framework of phallocentric
essentialism and heterosexual normativity. Like other feminists, such as Grosz 7 and
Gallop, who critique Lacan, Butler believes Lacan‘s descriptions of sexual difference
and his key concept of the phallus to be symptomatic. Citing Gallop, Butler argues
that the Lacanian aim to situate the phallus at the center of language shows an
―inability to control the meaning of the word phallus‖ (Gallop, as cited in Butler,
1993, p. 57).

In other words, it evinces an inability to restrain the power of

patriarchy.
In Gender Trouble, Butler (1999) reflects on Lacan‘s opposition between
being the phallus and having the phallus. Butler writes that being and having the
phallus connote for Lacan ―divergent sexual positions, or nonpositions (impossible
positions, really), within language‖ (p. 56).

Being and having the phallus are

ontologically specific for femininity and masculinity respectively, since they describe
their desires and demands. In Butler‘s reading of Lacan, by having the phallus, the
masculine subject appears to be autonomous and self-grounded; he ―appears to
originate meanings and thereby to signify‖ (p. 57).

With his autonomy, the

masculine subject shows certainty and conceals the possibility of his own
ungrounding.

Whereas men appear to have the phallus, originate meanings, and

7

In her book called, Jacques Lacan: A Feminist Introduction (1990), Grosz provides detailed discussions of
Lacan‘s theories of subjectivity and the unconscious. She encourages feminists to appreciate Lacan‘s
theoretical relevance to socio-political theories, because Lacan‘s theory is based on language. Grosz,
however, critiques Lacan‘s concepts of the phallus and jouissance. She argues that the phallus is not
simply a neutral term that functions to position both sexes in the symbolic order. The phallus, as the
word suggests, privileges masculinity and, specifically, the penis (p. 122). Thus, for Grosz, the theory of
the phallus is itself part of patriarchal discourse. Grosz also argues that when Lacan discusses women‘s
jouissance as being the jouissance beyond the phallus and discourse, no less than Freud, Lacan conveys
the message that women are passive (p. 139). The author points out that although Lacan helps us to
understand women‘s oppression in relation to the Other, he ―does not acknowledge the structure of
patriarchal oppression‖ and he does not challenge the patriarchal dominance in the law. According to
Grosz, Lacan advocates the idea that the socio-linguistic law of the father is unchangeable (p. 145).
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signify, they cannot be it; their penis is not equivalent to the Law and therefore men
cannot symbolize the Law fully.
By being the phallus, on the other hand, the feminine subject appears to be
the object of a heterosexualized masculine desire.
phallus.

Woman does not have the

She is rather what a man is not; she is ―the essential function‖ of the

masculine subject (p. 45). Butler finds that in Lacan‘s understanding of femininity as
being the phallus, power is yielded by the feminine position. Woman reconfirms the
autonomy and power of a man. She is what a man is not in order to reconfirm his
identity.

Being the phallus is signified by the paternal law.

Yet, it is always

dissatisfying, because she ―can never fully reflect that law‖ (p. 58). It often requires
her to renounce her desire for a man.
Butler finds Lacan contradictory when he theorizes these ontological sexual
positions as comedic failures to fully symbolize the paternal law. In her reflections
on Lacan‘s contradiction, Butler asserts that both positions enact repeated
impossibilities to occupy the reality of heterosexuality (p. 59). Women and men are
involved in a heterosexual comedy; they are reduced to the play of masquerades
(appearances) and to the performative productions of patriarchal society.
For Butler, Lacan‘s ambiguous structural positions of the sexes in terms of the
phallus and his concept of masquerade raise the question whether masquerade
conceals a femininity that might be understood as authentic or whether masquerade
produces femininity. Butler (1999) asks, ―Does masquerade construct femininity as
the reflection of the Phallus in order to disguise bisexual possibilities that otherwise
disrupt the seamless construction of a heterosexualized femininity?‖ (p. 61). Does
masquerade conceal feminine desire so as to protect the authority of masculinity?
For Butler (1993), Freud‘s and Lacan‘s theories of the phallus—Freud‘s
argument that the erotogenic zones of the body act as substitutes for the genitals
and Lacan‘s designation of the phallus as the signifier of sexual difference—fix the
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meaning of the phallic signifier. Butler finds that Freud‘s analysis of psychosomatic
symptoms is awry when the body becomes equated with the erotogenic drives and
male genitals.8 The author writes that Freud produces ―a pathological discourse on
sexuality that allows figures of organic disease to construct figures for erotogenic
body parts‖ (p. 64).

According to Butler, the subject‘s unconscious guilt—Freud‘s

leading cause of hypochondria—has its roots in the subject‘s resistance to the social
ideals of conventional heterosexual polarities. In contrast to Freud, Butler contends
that the subject‘s unconscious guilt is not rooted in the individual‘s narcissism or
refusal to love others. Instead, it is the prohibition of homosexuality that generates
the pangs of guilt.
Homosexuality is thus the performative of gender that destabilizes and
reterritorializes heterosexual norms. Queer and drag do not oppose heterosexuality
but

rather

are

―the

allegorization[s]

melancholia‖ (1993, p. 237).

of

heterosexuality

and

its

constitutive

Drag exposes the failures and dissimulations of the

heterosexual regime.9 To that extent, the seemingly coherent normative discourses
fall apart when, for example, no one is listening to those discourses anymore. In the
same vein, Butler says, Lacan‘s opposition between having and being the phallus
cannot be attributed to an ontological difference between the sexes. The phallus, as
a primary signifier, is displaceable.

That means that it is possible for men and

women both to be and have the phallus and both to suffer from castration anxiety
and penis envy.

The phallus as a privileged signifier gains its privilege from

8

Butler refers to Freud‘s text, ―On Narcissism: An Introduction‖ (1989), where Freud discusses the ―notion
that certain other parts of the body—the ‗erotogenic‘ zones—may act as substitutes for the genitals and
behave analogously to them‖ (p. 552). Freud explains that hypochondria links to ―damming-up of libido in
the ego‖ which is experienced as unpleasurable. According to Freud, when the ego is cathected with libido
excessively, the individual must love in order not to fall ill. If the individual falls ill, it is because he/she is
unable to love. The individual struggles to master internal excitations. In analysis, the individual works
over these internal excitations and drains them away towards an outward discharge. Discharge is often
experienced as undesirable.
9
Butler, however, acknowledges that because heterosexual norms are ―taken not as commands to be
obeyed, but as imperatives to be cited, twisted, queered,‖ drag is not necessarily subversive of sexual
ideals.
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reiterations and citations.
sexual subject.

This reiteration, however, does not establish a fixed

The very force of repetition shows the ongoing possibility of

variation, plasticity, and deprivileging the master signifier.

1.3

Feminist Descriptions of Female Hysteria and the Question of
Feminine Desire

Cixous: Dora [seems] to me to be the one who resists the
system …. Yes, the hysteric with her way of questioning others
(because if she succeeds in bringing down the men who
surround her, it is by questioning them, by ceaselessly
reflecting to them the image that truly castrates them to the
extent that the power they have wished to impose is an
illegitimate power of rape and violence), the hysteric is, to my
eyes, the typical woman in all her force.
Clément: Yes, it introduces dissension, but it doesn't explode
anything at all; it doesn't disperse the bourgeois family, which
also exists only through its dissension, which holds together
only in the possibility or the reality of its own disturbance,
always reclosable, always reclosed.
(Cixous & Clément, 1986, pp. 154 & 156-7, italics added).

Cixous and Clément reflect on whether a woman‘s hysteria is a revolutionary
act against socio-political and familial patriarchal power or a manifestation of
powerlessness. Cixous argues that a hysterical woman, a ―typical woman in all her
force,‖ disturbs or even dismantles oppressive structures, challenges men‘s abuses,
and destabilizes a system of silences and hypocrisy.
Clément, on the other hand, sees nothing revolutionary about a hysterical
woman; she argues, instead, that she is a passive victim, whose pathology is an
obstacle to bringing about meaningful change when she is pitted against a rigid and
powerful patriarchal system.

For Clément, Dora provokes and disturbs oppressive
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dynamics but fails to transform these dynamics because she is predominantly caught
up in the imaginary realm—the realm that inhibits the circulation of satisfaction and
knowledge.

Clément argues that whereas Dora contests and introduces some

dissension into her familial context she does not lead to positive or satisfactory
changes within her family in the end.
Cixous fervently supports Dora for being the one who defies men‘s views,
including the views of her father, her father's friend, Herr K, and her analyst, Freud
(see Appendix B).
Cixous

and

many

constructions

of

Cixous disagrees with Freud's interpretations of Dora‘s case.
other

feminist

male-dominated

writers

who

narratives

accentuate
challenge

the

Freud‘s

sociopolitical
theoretical

assumptions about femininity and the repercussions that these assumptions have on
his conceptualization of hysteria.
Cixous‘ book, called Portrait de Dora/de Hélène Cixous/des femmes, written in
1976, is also an expression of the French feminist movement against patriarchy
(Gallop, 1982).

It is associated with the publishing house ―Psychoanalysis and

Politics.‖ From the title of Cixous‘ book, we see the substitution of one woman for
another, so that the reader is able to link the hysteric portrait of Dora with the
portrait of Cixous and with the portrait of all women in general (Gallop, 1982).
Cixous argues that women with hysteria protest against the phallocentric system in
which their bodies become ―despised, rejected … once they have been used‖ (Cixous
& Clément, 1986, p. 154) and serve as a medium of exchange between men.
The discussion of hysteria, especially in feminist literature, is key in
discourses on femininity and politics. While Cixous and Clément differ about whether
the female hysteric contests patriarchy heroically (as Cixous argues) or preserves
the existing system by being a victim within patriarchy (as Clément asserts), both
writers discuss hysteria in terms of women's oppression under patriarchy.

Like

Cixous and Clément, many other feminist writers either view hysteria as a male
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construct that defends patriarchal notions of femininity and female sexuality 10 or as a
female disease in patriarchal culture.11

These arguments raise complex questions

about the theory of hysteria: Is hysteria caused by patriarchal power? Is hysteria
related to femininity?

Is the hysterical, distressed subject able to challenge social

structures?
Some feminists tackle these questions by concentrating on the psychoanalytic
theory of the unconscious and psychical reality. Their main purpose is to use some
of Freud‘s concepts to describe sexual difference and the effects of patriarchal power
on the subject‘s unconscious. They provide an analysis of the relationship between
psychoanalytic discourse on hysteria and socio-political discourse on femininity.
However, they often end up discussing Freud‘s theories of hysteria and femininity by
emphasizing Freud‘s inability to understand the essence of femininity and preoedipal
desire for the mother. They question Freud‘s overemphasis of the Oedipal complex
and privileging of the father. They focus, instead, on the dynamics of the preoedipal
mother-child relationship.
Ramas (1990), for example, conceptualizes hysteria as a form of compromise
between preoedipal sexuality and heterosexuality.

She asserts that Dora protests

against relationships between men and women that are structured in terms of
dominance and submission, respectively.

According to Ramas, Dora understands

heterosexuality as a power relation. She argues that Dora preserves her preoedipal
love for the mother and wishes to retain access to the maternal/female body. Dora‘s
admiration for the Madonna suggests a preoedipal fantasy—a fantasy in which the
―mother/child dyad could exist undisturbed by the implications of sexual difference‖
10

For example, men have frequently misused the diagnosis of hysteria in their attempt to explain
women's biological make-up, psychological conditions, and resistance to conform to the status quo of
heterosexuality and to their roles as mothers and wives.
11
Hysterical symptoms (hypochondria, psychosomatic pains, irritations, and nervousness) have
predominantly been observed in females in past and present times. The most common explanation of this
phenomenon has been that females are looked to to represent gentleness, submissiveness, serenity, and
domesticity. Females disavow hostility and sexuality and transform their repressed aggressive and sexual
desire into physical symptoms.
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(p. 173).

Ramas contends that Dora‘s identifications with men indicate a protest

against post-oedipal femininity. Dora is confronted with the inequality of the sexes—
with masculinity as activity, sadism, and power and femininity as passivity,
masochism, and powerlessness.

Ramas critiques psychoanalytic formulations that

present the phallus (the signifier of desire) as the symbol of protection and freedom
from a devouring, preoedipal mother. She argues that the girl‘s escape from mother
to father is not liberating at all. The girl‘s relationship with her father is imbued with
patriarchal social meanings and is thus fraught with imprisonment and dependency.
Ramas sees Dora‘s hysteria as a compromise formation: Dora is in the midst of
complying

and

not

complying

with

the

patriarchal

laws

of

femininity

and

heterosexuality. Her compliance with feminine roles is a conscious attempt whereas
her non-compliance is an unconscious revolt against patriarchy.

Ramas concludes

that Dora‘s unconscious belief is that ―femininity, bondage, and debasement [are]
synonymous‖ (p. 176). Her hysterical symptoms indicate a wish to reconstitute her
identity within the patriarchal system and reclaim her freedom.
Rose (1990), who is conversant in Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, however,
contends that while many feminists critique Freud for describing normal femininity
within the confines of drive theory and the Oedipal complex, they also make their
own mistake when they base their explanation of Dora‘s sexuality on preoedipal
attachment to her mother.

Rose contends that these explanations are inadequate

for understanding Dora‘s hysterical identifications with men and women. In the case
of Dora, the question about her feminine sexuality is the question about her desire
and being a woman within discourses. Rose (1990) writes,
I want to conclude with this, not because I think it answers anything
but because I believe it to be a necessary caution to certain current
developments within feminist theory. What seems to me to need
attention is precisely this movement of psychoanalysis away from
sexuality as content (preoedipal or otherwise) to a concept of sexuality
as caught up in the register of demand and desire (p. 146).
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To this day, the question of feminine desire remains unresolved in feminist texts.

§
Whereas for centuries, men have asked the question, ―What does a woman
want?‖—today this question is posed by women themselves. It is a question about
feminine identity and the dialectic between feminine desire and social recognition.
According to Mills (1991), when a woman is confined to the family, her desire
remains subject to a man‘s desire.

When she is an active heterosexual lover and

mother, she is perceived ―as deadly by the male‖ (p. 127). The man proceeds to
castrate the woman psychically, because he fears castration from her. This psychic
castration is effectuated by social domination.
Feminists argue that the Western patriarchal Other does not impose its power
on women directly. It rather imposes it in subtle ways. It manifests itself in hidden
and repressed meanings. In other words, patriarchy is not a totalizing or monolithic
system in which all men dominate all women directly and thus all women know that
they are victims of men (Walsh, 2001). Rather, the masculine hegemony is diffuse;
it is embedded in interpersonal discursive practices and institutions that are
historically associated with men.

These institutional ―discourses maintain their

dominance because they are organized around practices of exclusion, often involving
speech rituals‖ (Walsh, 2001, p. 17).

For example, religious, judicial, therapeutic,

and political discourses ―determine both the particular properties and the stipulated
roles‖ of the speaking women-subjects (Foucault, as cited in Walsh, 2001, p. 17).
The positioning of women as excluded others or as ―outsiders within‖ circulates
within these masculine discursive or institutionalized systems and forms a complex
matrix of power relations between genders.
When women do as well as men do, these women identify with masculinity.
Femininity is thus devalued through the overvaluation of masculine discourses and
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practices.

Women are generally required to understand their identity by adopting

and assimilating the pre-existing male dominated norms and practices.

They are

asked, in other words, to be somehow more masculine. According to Soler (2006),
when women identify with masculinity their jouissance is determined by the phallic
function.12

Women‘s identification with masculinity positions women as wholly

hemmed in by the symbolic order of competition and exchange value.

Therefore,

with the notion of equality we eradicate the differences between the sexes, and when
we eradicate these differences women passively follow patriarchal values.
How does inequality between the sexes lead to hysterical symptoms? Cixous‘
and Clément‘s The Newly Born Woman (1986) is, in my estimation, an outstanding
Francophone feminist text that describes the hysteric‘s sufferings within the
patriarchal system and the hysteric‘s provocations which destabilize the rigidity of
that system. For Cixous and Clément, the woman-hysteric is oppressed by the rigid
patriarchal system. The authors present patriarchy as the tarantula—―the invisible
yet powerful insect of patriarchal lore, lure, and law‖ (p. xi).
bites, the hysteric dances madly.

When the tarantula

The tarantula bites cause depression, paralysis,

coughs, pains, dizziness, and migraines. The hysteric is bitten by the rigid masculine
hierarchical oppositions of masculinity and femininity.

A woman does not exist in

man‘s precise calculations. Her subordination to a man‘s domination preserves the
functioning of the masculine order. She holds her marriage together and promotes
patriarchal values.
A woman, however, transcends the rules of language; she steps outside her
function as sign.

Feminine rhythm consists of uncontrollable flow; it is close to

unruly nature. Man‘s law is overly possessive. The woman-hysteric suffers from the
males (father, brother, brother-in-law, and husband) who act like sexual aggressors.
12

In Lacan‘s work, the phallic function refers to ―the alienating function of language,‖ that which
institutes lack and desire (Fink, 1995, p. 103). As I explain in chapter 2, each sex has a different relation
to the Other as language, to the ways he or she is used by language.
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She cries and cries and speaks words of agony. Her words are blown to bits by rage
and suffering.

She demolishes discourse.

offstage, she cries out.
castration.

When masculine power pushes her

She complies with harassment and repeated attempts at

And when the repressed of her culture comes back, it is an explosive

return, ―absolutely shattering, staggering, overturning, with a force never let loose
before‖ (p. 95). Each hysterical attack permits a return to the man‘s promised love.
She manifests in her body what she cannot represent with words.
ambiguous.

Her role is

With her symptoms, she provokes, revolts, and shakes up the public

realm, institutional laws, and order. She destabilizes familiar bonds and introduces
disorder into the well regulated system. With her struggles, she desires. Inequality
leads her to desire. Without desire, she is inert; she feels dead. When her desire is
not heard, she breaks loose and releases lions with her symptoms.
articulates the words she cannot speak.

Her body

Her body is the theater, the spectacle.

Doctors examine her word-body and attempt to domesticate it again within the
patriarchal order. When the hysteric-woman is calm, she returns to her social life of
marriage and motherhood; she returns to the masculine world.

1.4

The Feminist (Mis)use of Lacanian Theory

Anglophone feminists deconstruct Western cultural values of femininity with
the intent to subvert imaginary views of sex and social ideals of sexual roles and
heterosexuality. They make a useful contribution to our knowledge about the ways
we are alienated in the Other and the ways we are psychologically and physically
affected by this alienation.

Using discourse analysis as a method of qualitative

research, feminists elucidate the ways in which subjects are alienated in the Other‘s
ideals.

Analyses of subjects‘ discourses challenge our assumed roles as sexual
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individuals; they help us resist conformity to cultural taboos and change oppressive
stereotypes.
Let us consider the case of anorexia nervosa, which is the most frequent
psychosomatic symptom in women today. Malson‘s (1998) deconstructive study of
anorexia nervosa elucidates the ways in which anorexia is not simply an individual
female pathology.
within

a

Rather, Malson‘s work allows readers to understand anorexia

framework

that

transgresses

the

individual-society

dichotomy

and

acknowledges the complexities of multiple socio-political and patriarchal discourses
of gender.

Malson analyzes the discourses of female participants who share their

experiences of being anorectic and female. The purpose of Malson‘s study is to show
readers that patriarchal discourse and practices constitute and regulate women‘s
experiences of gender and embodiment.

Malson‘s readers become aware of the

ways participants are subjected to social pressures to be thin and the ways they
conform to and resist men‘s desires.
Malson uses Foucauldian theory of discourse and Lacan‘s concept of the
symbolic order to explain how language constitutes and decenters subjectivity. The
larger purpose of her study is to change the discursive constructions of anorexia
nervosa and femininity that oppress women. The author envisions women‘s freedom
from patriarchy by subverting patriarchal discourses and privileging instead women‘s
voices about their subjective experiences.
However, Malson reaches a theoretical impasse when she implies that
subjects change when they change their own language/discourse. The feminist view
that if we change discourses about femininity then women will be liberated from
men‘s oppression—and they will thus not suffer from hysteria—ignores the dialectic
of desire in subjects‘ unconscious.

Burr (1995), a renowned feminist social-

constructionist, also finds that the feminist theory of desire is problematic.

Burr

points out that the subversion of social taboos does not necessarily mean that
38

subjects are able to live happier and more satisfied lives. Subjects may conform to
or rebel against social taboos. Their conformity or rebellion says nothing about how
they sustain their unconscious desire.

To say that subjects are negotiators of

positions and that their subjectivity is formed by discourse does not inform us
adequately how subjects are willing or able to make positive changes in their lives.
It fails to explain why subjects who understand that power relations and discourses
impact their identity and decision-making still do not feel free to make better choices
for themselves.
Subjects are conflicted. They know, for example, that when they make dire
choices, they have negative consequences. In the 1970‘s, Chodorow struggled with
this issue too, and described this kind of feminist theoretical deadlock.

Chodorow

found in her own research that some women knew that motherhood and sexual
relations with abusive men would oppress them, but still they wanted children and
got involved with abusive men (as cited in Burr, 1995). In other words, we often see
subjects identifying with discourses even when they consciously know that these
discourses are harmful to them or that they have the choice to identify with other
better ones.

Even when feminists understand the implications of discourse and

power relations for identity, they often fail to explain why subjects do not choose an
alternative way of life and how subjects‘ unconscious desires are the same as the
Other‘s desires.
Conversely, Lacan teaches us that unconscious desire should not be confused
with conscious desire (Fink, 2004). What seems to be abnormal/enigmatic on the
conscious level has significance on the unconscious level.

A subject‘s choice to

remain dissatisfied and go on desiring serves a purpose; desire emerges as a
transgression of, rather than a conformity to, the law.
When Anglophone feminists cite Lacan, they often interpret the symbolic as
an order that constructs identity and makes the subject conform to the status quo.
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When they describe the symbolic construction of the subject, they confuse it with
Lacan‘s concept of the imaginary.

Feminists misconstrue Lacan‘s thesis on split

subjectivity and misunderstand his conceptualization of the subject‘s real and
symbolic relationship with the Other.
Malson‘s study on anorexia nervosa in females is a prime example of how
Anglophone feminists have a propensity to apply Lacan‘s concepts of the symbolic
order and real erroneously. Malson, for example, writes,
Lacanian theory emphasizes that masculinity and femininity do not
arise from the real of the body but from the way in which male and
female bodies are signified within a Symbolic order. This concept of
the Symbolic order, central to Lacan's thought, moves psychoanalytic
theory further in the direction of the social because the Symbolic order
is primarily a linguistic (and therefore social) order (see Saussure,
1960). (Malson, 1998, p. 16)
Malson‘s emphasis on the signified and her reference to Saussure‘s Course in
General Linguistics shows us that she is unaware of Lacan‘s subversion of the
Saussurian theory of the sign.

In Lacan‘s work, and in contrast to Saussure, the

signifier (word) and the signified (meaning) are not complementary.

As Lacan

(1998b) writes, ―the signifier is posited only insofar as it has no relation to the
signified‖ (p. 32/29). In addition, Lacan‘s major thesis on sexuation, as I indicate in
chapter 2, is that sex is real.
To Lacan‘s mind, the ego (consciousness) is an imaginary function whereas
the unconscious is a symbolic function.

The unconscious is structured like a

language. It is not, however, structured in the same way as spoken English. With
the unconscious, we do not construct meaning and make sense of the world or
ourselves as we do on a conscious level.

The contents of the unconscious are

signifiers, which do not obey the same set of grammatical rules as the language we
speak ordinarily.

No specific signified harmoniously binds or restricts a signifier.

Lacan understands the function of the signifier inscribed in the unconscious as
polyvalent and ambiguous, whereas he considers norms to be imaginary. He says
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that meaning is imaginary and so the reality that we construct with our words on the
conscious level is a fantasy; we conceptualize ourselves and this world as whole
(tout) (Lacan, 1998b, p. 43). With our ego talk, everyday conscious talk, we echo
the belief that the reality lying behind language is reliable and unfailing.
It seems to me then that Malson confuses Lacan‘s theory of the symbolic
order with his theory of the imaginary.

Malson‘s analyses of her participants‘

statements lead her to a variety of often contradictory statements, which she
nevertheless interprets in imaginary terms—that is, in terms of the ego, in terms of
how participants recognize or rather misrecognize themselves.

Malson concludes

that the female anorexic body allows for a multiplicity of meanings. She writes that
anorexia is both a manifestation of traditional femininity that seduces men and a
manifestation of masculinity that resists female roles. The anorectic imitates superthin female models and wants to be the object of men‘s attention.

However, she

also imitates men by looking boyish. She resists female sexuality, reproduction, and
her social role as a woman. Her refusal of food is a refusal to have breasts, have a
belly, or menstruate.

Malson sums up her findings by stating that discourses of

sexual difference produce multiple and conflictual meanings and thus the thin body
both resists and embodies patriarchal gender identities.
Malson interprets these discourses in imaginary terms because she theorizes
the ways in which her participants assimilate the Other and resist the Other.

In

Lacan‘s theory, however, when subjects are subjugated by the Other and demand
that the Other supply ideal answers about their identities, they remain dissatisfied
and stuck on their demands. Lacan formulates the idea that when subjects evaluate
their sense of self on the basis of conscious meanings, they engage in an ego/egoideal dialectic and produce empty speech. In the dialectic of ego/ego-ideal, subjects
internalize and assimilate the Other‘s ideals (Fink, 2004). Subjects become further
alienated in the Other when the Other provides meaning about their existence and
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needs. Alienated subjects are often betrayed by the certainties of meanings, empty
speech, and demands. They are conflicted and come to realize that the Other is not
a guarantor of ideal answers about their being. Subjects‘ desires are set into motion
when the Other is experienced as failing to provide a reason for their being. Lacan
(2006) writes,
Let us ask ourselves instead where this frustration comes from. Is it
from the analyst‘s silence?
Responding to the subject‘s empty
speech—even and especially in an approving manner—often proves, by
its effects to be far more frustrating than silence. Isn‘t it, rather, a
frustration that is inherent in the subject‘s very discourse? Doesn‘t the
subject become involved here in an ever greater dispossession of
himself as being, concerning which … he ends up recognizing that his
being has never been anything more than his own construction
[oeuvre] in the imaginary and that this certainty undercuts all
certainty in him? (p. 207/249).
Lacan here argues that unified/fixed discourses consist of empty speech—a kind of
speech that arouses frustration when we fail to articulate unconscious desire.
Malson neglects to theorize the speech of the unconscious. In other words,
she does not theorize how her participants‘ anorexia, their self-deprivation, is a way
to sustain their desire.

This omission has much to do with the fact that feminists

conceptualize feminine identity only as a construct of the Other, of the patriarchal
social order.
From a Lacanian perspective, this assumption is incomplete.

When Lacan

says that man's desire (is the same as) the Other's desire, he indicates that the
subject also recognizes the fallibility, the incompleteness of the Other. The Other‘s
desire is indeterminate and this very indeterminacy causes the subject to desire
continually. The subject‘s recognition that the Other is lacking causes him or her to
seek a representation of his or her being beyond the image that the Other presents.
We need to keep in mind here that the Other gives answers with signifiers. But the
Other‘s answers always fall short, because as I mentioned earlier, signifiers resist
signifieds, have no unequivocal meaning.
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Between the lines of the subject‘s statements there is the enunciation of
desire.

Desire results from the subject‘s splitting by the signifier.

It inclines the

subject to resist the signifieds that the social order provides as answers about his or
her being at the imaginary level. The desiring subject finds the Other to be lacking.
The split subject, however, especially the hysterical subject, is the one who is
dependent on the Other‘s dissatisfied desires. The anorectic hysteric finds his or her
image, as presented by the Other, to be inadequate, lacking. By refusing food, the
anorectic challenges the Other‘s demands of her and motivates the Other to desire.
How can we then listen to the enunciation of desire in a subject‘s discourse?
To answer this question, we can take as an example one of Malson‘s (1998)
participants who described her experience of being an anorexic:
MICHELLE: I remember having lots of chats about her (a supermodel)
with my dad (.) and my mum and everything (.) and um my dad was
saying: oh she's she's terribly thin. /H: right hu / You know: I hate
hate women that look so thin an' (.) / H: mm/ you know she should,
she doesn't really look like a woman an' hu (.) / H: (laughing) right/
But I admit I didn't really agree with him and I don't think (.) if there
were ever any women in the room (.) when (.) he was saying this I
don‘t think they would either … Yeah she was very um (.) I don't know
how to put it really (.) um. She was kind of dignified really … I think
yeah /H: mm/ I could be like her (pp. 112-113)
At the semantic level, Michelle is obsessed with thin bodies and issues of
femininity.

Michelle associates a thin body with dignified femininity.

Following

Malson‘s interpretations, Michelle struggles with the male (her father‘s) opinion of
femininity and thus struggles with ―the multiple competing meanings of the thin
female body‖ (p. 113).
From a Lacanian perspective, to understand her discourse, it is important not
to get mesmerized by the manifest meanings, the conscious/preconscious meanings
of her words.

Malson‘s point that Michelle expresses a conflict over competing

discourses on femininity and sexuality is insightful.

Michelle here embodies the

Other‘s failures to represent femininity and sexuality adequately.
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We can argue,

however, that Michele is aware of, or at least preconscious of, the influences that the
Other has on her. In other words, it is on the level of her ego that Michelle sees the
thin body as dignified femininity.13 What she is not aware of is not the ―signifieds‖ of
sexuality and femininity (p. 118) but rather the signifiers that represent her desire.
Lacan (2006) prompts us to take desire literally (pp. 518-37/620-42).

For

Lacan, the symptom of anorexia is the metonymy of desire. Despite the fact that we
do not know Michelle‘s personal and family history or the cause(s) of her symptom,
we can argue that her anorexia is linked to her unconscious desire.
As opposed to her father, who believes that curvy women are feminine, for
Michelle, anorexia, lack of food, represents dignified femininity. For one reason or
another, Michelle rebels against the parental Other. Michelle refuses to be fed or get
stuffed by the Other and identifies with incompleteness.

Michelle wants to be the

dignified feminine. We can decipher in Michelle‘s speech that lack of food is replaced
by the dignified feminine—the feminine of which Michelle tries to find adequate
meaning from the Other. Dignified connotes exaltation of femininity and can be read
as the lack of signifieds.
Michelle tells us that the supermodel represents the feminine. The Other, as
culture, however, does not provide an adequate representation of dignified
femininity. Nevertheless, the Other makes dignified femininity desirable. Michelle‘s
desire to be a dignified woman enunciates the Other‘s failure to represent femininity
sufficiently. Her desire to be feminine remains an unsatisfied desire. Michelle is not
interested in being the object of the Other‘s jouissance (satisfaction)—the object of
the jouissance of her father, for example, who likes women with curvy bodies, but

13

Based on my clinical experience with anorectic patients, anorectics often seem to be aware of their
experiences of being influenced by the media, which encourages the symptom of anorexia in women. My
patients told me that they knew how modern society encouraged them to be thin; they wanted to feel
happier with how they looked; and they even admired other women who were confident with their body
and sense of self and were not anorectics. In fact, one of my patients adored the singer, Amanda Palmer,
for her singing and admired her for being comfortable with her body, despite her chubbiness. Yet, despite
my patients‘ sufferings and insights regarding the culture of thinness, they could not stop not eating.
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who perhaps reduces women to certain meanings.

In feminist interpretations, her

refusal to be the object of the Other‘s jouissance would be construed as unconscious
resistance to male-dominated views of femininity.
As I explain in subsequent chapters, the hysterical woman is interested in
being the object of the Other‘s desire.

Her being depends on the Other‘s desire.

This desire is articulated in the void, abyss, and emptiness. Michelle desires to be
feminine in relation to patriarchal desire. She is captured and frozen by imaginary
social ideals of thinness and by the signifiers of desire that point to the rejection of
femininity. Michelle desires to be the dignified feminine but, at the same time, she
rejects femininity.

Instead, she is involved in an endless circle of self-hatred and

self-loathing. Michelle‘s unconscious rejection is the same as the Other‘s rejection of
femininity.

Therefore, in contrast to Malson‘s interpretations of Lacan, Michelle

desires to be thin not because the Other wants her to be feminine, but because the
Other desires a representation of femininity. The Other‘s desire is metonymic and
always demands a new satisfying representation. Michelle is swayed and spoken by
the Other‘s dissatisfactions and rejections of her feminine being. The Other‘s desire
captures, enslaves her. The Other‘s gaze disapproves of the possibility of becoming
feminine and annihilates her existence. She incarnates the Other‘s desire, which has
a destructive character.
nothingness.

She is trapped in the desire to desire that points to

Michelle is not aware of this trap; she is not aware of the ways her

desire functions as the metonymy (cancellation) of her being.

1.5

Towards a Dialogue between Feminism and Lacan
Feminist interrogations of the psychoanalytic theory of women‘s hysteria, and

I would go so far as to say, even feminist misinterpretations of Lacanian
psychoanalytic theory, are vital forces for engaging in a dialogue between feminism
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and Lacanian theory on the relationship between women and hysteria. The following
questions can help us begin a dialogue between these two different theoretical
paradigms:

A) How can we conceptualize Lacan‘s psychoanalytic theory in relation to
feminist critiques of patriarchy? How would Lacan respond to Irigaray‘s thesis
on speaking as a woman, Butler‘s theory of gender as performative, and to all
the

feminists

who

critique

his

psychoanalysis

as

another

version

of

essentialist and patriarchal discourse?
B) Following Rose‘s argument that the unresolved issue in feminism is feminine
desire, in what ways can feminists use Lacanian theory to advance their
theorizations of femininity and women‘s distress?
C) According to Lacan, Irigaray, and Butler, does the hysteric contest or
conserve patriarchy?

In what ways can the hysterical woman be liberated

from oppression by the patriarchal Other?
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Chapter 2
The Ethics of Feminine Desire and Jouissance

2.1

What Do a Woman and a Tortoise Have in Common?

Zeno‘s paradox of Achilles and the tortoise invites us to theorize sexual
difference and the ethics of feminine desire and jouissance. Zeno‘s paradox goes as
follows: Suppose you have Achilles, the fastest man and the hero of the Trojan war,
race a tortoise.14 Suppose also that Achilles decides to do the tortoise a favor and
allow her a head start. After the tortoise gets a certain distance ahead, Achilles finds
out to his surprise that he cannot get ahead of the tortoise, which leads her to win
the race.

Had Achilles not allowed the tortoise a head start, Achilles would have

obviously been the winner; thus a competition of this kind would have been
unnecessary, which of course would have led Achilles not to have any relationship
with the tortoise whatsoever.

In Zeno‘s logic, the reason why Achilles cannot win

the race after deciding to give her a ten-meter head start is because when Achilles
runs the ten meters, the tortoise goes one meter further; when Achilles runs one
meter, the tortoise goes one decimeter further; and when he runs one decimeter,
she goes one centimeter further, and so on. Zeno argues that the sum of an infinite
series of numbers is infinite.
14

Tortoise is a feminine noun in some spoken languages, for example, in Greek (η χελώνα) and French (la
tortue).
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Nowadays, we know that this paradox is not valid. We know that Zeno only
takes into account space and ignores time. Since Achilles is faster than the tortoise,
Achilles will overtake the tortoise in the race despite her head start because time is
finite and time makes space finite too. Hence, Zeno‘s paradox is false because if, for
example, Achilles is able to run ten meters per second the tortoise will run five
meters per second, and so eventually Achilles will pass her. Assuming that Achilles
does not become like Aesop‘s rabbit—the rabbit who lost the race to a tortoise
because he devalued both the tortoise‘s capabilities in the race and the finitudes of
time and thus gave up his efforts to go on running—one can conclude that Achilles
will overtake the tortoise before she reaches the finish line.15
In Encore, Lacan (1998b) briefly mentions Zeno‘s paradox to argue that the
tortoise is not wholly inscribed within the symbolic order and that whereas Achilles is
fast enough to ―pass the tortoise—he cannot catch up with it. He only catches up
with it at infinity‖ (p. 8). In other words, in Lacan‘s logic, the tortoise‘s emancipated
potentialities are not reducible to a man‘s reason.

Although we know today that

Zeno‘s paradox is false, strangely enough, its falsification tells us something about
how ―the feminine is experienced as space,‖ with the connotation of infinity, while
―the masculine is experienced as time‖ (Irigaray, 1993, p. 7). As Barnard (2002b)
also puts it, Achilles‘ relation to the tortoise is such that his phallic jouissance is
limited by a remainder which ―forever escapes‖ and ―eludes his pursuit‖ (p. 177).
In An Ethics of Sexual Difference, Irigaray (1993) elucidates that a woman
who has discovered her infinity dismantles men‘s certainties and the closure of
opposing

terms—terms

such

as

ignorance

versus

wisdom,

mortality

versus

immortality, poverty versus wealth, ugliness versus beauty, and so on. Her mystery
lies in the paradoxical notion that she shows that what seems to be most assured is

15

The details of Zeno‘s paradox were taken from
http://www.suitcaseofdreams.net/Paradox_Achilles.htm#A, August 2008.
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indeed inadequate and useless.

And thus she is capable of undoing conclusive

works, denouncing the already established truths, and allowing space for new
becomings to occur in life. Irigaray (2001), however, tells us that both sexes realize
their differences and potentialities when they accept their own embodied boundaries
and limitations.

Their becomings are thus not ―abstract, neutral, fabricated, and

fictitious,‖ but rather ―concrete‖ and ―corporeal‖ (p. 26). Both sexes appropriate and
step out of their static identities and assimilations of sameness, when they re-think
the relations of space and time and ―of the interval between‖ (p. 7). Irigaray locates
sexual difference and new becomings in one‘s transformative thinking about desire,
power, infinity, limitations, and sameness.
In Seminar XX, Lacan (1998b) suggests in his theory of sexuation that
whereas the masculine subject is wholly inscribed in the finitudes of the phallic
function, the feminine subject is both alienated in the phallic function and a
remainder which exposes the contingency and the failures of the Law.

A woman‘s

relation to the contingency of the Law, however, does not make her a passive object
of a man‘s desire or force her to give up her own desire. Although Butler criticizes
Lacan for saying that a normal woman is a woman who is the phallus for a man and
who reconfirms male power and patriarchal significations, Lacan provides instead a
theory which differentiates the hysterical from the feminine subject.

Whereas the

female hysteric is the phallic signifier for the masculine Other, the feminine
actualizes her own desiring cause, overcomes the automatic law-like symbolic
functioning, and engenders something new in the social realm.

For Lacan, the

feminine subject inhabits the symbolic but, because she accepts her castration, she
also has a mysterious presence in it—a presence which unveils the impotence of the
Law. As I will discuss further, although the hysteric exposes the Other‘s impotence,
she is not inhabited by the symbolic function in the same as way as the feminine is.
The hysteric restricts herself to the limitations of symbolic functioning and becomes
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the phallic object for the Other.

The feminine subject, on the other hand, has a

relation to infinity which unveils the Law‘s strangeness and contingency.

She

triumphs over repetitious dissatisfactions and engenders change.
One can see from Zeno‘s paradox that time and space are interrelated. Men
and women are subjected to the finite logic of phallic competitions, yet within this
finite logic, there is always something unsettling and infinite.

According to Lacan,

both sexes are alienated in the symbolic order, but each sex has a different
relationship with infinity. Similarly, Irigaray describes sexual difference in terms of
how a man and a woman come to discover their infinity regardless of their own finite
identifications with sociocultural ideals. In this chapter, however, I will argue that
one cannot clearly grasp Irigaray‘s notions of speaking as a woman and of a
woman‘s potentiality to discover the infinite place within herself without first
understanding Lacan‘s theories of sexuation and psychoanalytic ethics. By following
Lacan‘s and Irigaray‘s works, one is able to see that Zeno‘s paradox is a call for us to
theorize how the masculine finite logic of temporality excludes the feminine logic of
infinite pace/place and how both sexes discover their infinities 16 when they realize
their own structural limitations in relation to the symbolic Other.

16

In psychoanalytic theory, neurotics are restricted to the alienating effects of language when they are
spoken by a symptom that causes them to suffer. When neurotics are spoken by a particular symptom,
they want to get rid of it, but they cannot. They feel that it is out of their control when they repeat their
symptom compulsively. Thus, when I refer to finitude, I refer to the subject‘s state of suffering. In
Lacan‘s theory, the symptom retroactively gives meaning to the master signifier. As Fink (1995) explains,
the subject‘s symptom is organized around a unique and rigid master signifier, S1, which is pronounceable
but yet opaque to the analysand and which ―always seems to put an end to associations instead of
opening things up‖ (p. 77). The subject, therefore, who is represented and fixed through the effects of
one signifier (S2) for another (S1) is castrated and finite, because it is presented by the Other and is
dependent on winning ―attention and recognition from the Other‖ (p. 73). On the other hand, the
analyzed subject is the one who has dialectized master signifiers and is no longer inhibited in its pursuit of
satisfaction. As Fink (1997) further explains, the fully analyzed subject enjoys and seeks out its
satisfaction without being inhibited by an unsatisfied desire. As I discuss in this dissertation, the hysteric
is limited by her alienation within language in her attempts to be the phallic signifier for a man‘s desire.
The feminine subject, on the other hand, who is a fully analyzed subject, may have access to limitless
Other jouissance. Feminine jouissance is not limited to the jouissance of the organ as a man‘s phallic
jouissance (Fink, 2004, p. 161). Her whole body enjoys. The feminine subject also loves and enjoys by
her act of speaking. As opposed to man‘s finite logic of deriving satisfaction only in sexual intercourse, a
woman makes love by speaking about love and engaging in ―the act of love‖ (p. 162). The feminine
subject, thus, is not pinned down by the castrating effects of signifiers. A woman enjoys when she speaks
of love.
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One could argue that Achilles and the tortoise are capable of attaining their
potentialities if they both see the paradox that there is infinity within finitudes.
Achilles does not really need to race a tortoise to prove to himself or others that he
is fast. But in order for Achilles to have access to love and realize further his infinity,
he will have to allow himself to be surprised by the tortoise‘s infinite potentialities at
her pace. He will be able to do so if he also accepts the finitudes of time and does
not become like Aesop‘s rabbit.

And in order for the tortoise to realize her

emancipated potentialities, overcome dependencies, subvert dominant views, shift
away from her victim role, and transcend the win vs. lose binary, she will have to
accept her structural limitations in relation to Achilles and realize her cause. These
realizations, however, are not matters of conscious awareness but kinds of analytic
working through.
One may wonder, however, if the use of these analogies is anything but
idealism. Anglophone feminists have raised serious questions about the dialectical
relationship between the oppressor and the oppressed between the sexes—questions
that are claimed to be far from idealistic.

They ask:

What does it mean to be a

woman in an oppressive and unfair patriarchal society—in a society which does not
make it easy for a woman to succeed or have equal rights to a man, which violates
her psyche and misuses her body, and which causes her hysterical fits and
outbursts?

How are men victimized by the social ideals of being aggressive and

having to meet high social expectations—expectations to be the primary providers
for the family, to be warriors for their country, to be invulnerable and detached, and
to maintain a certain status quo male identity?
Anglophone feminists thus would not consider looking at the internal logic of
Zeno‘s paradox to formulate an ethics of sexual difference.

Being primarily

influenced by Foucault‘s works, Anglophone feminists concentrate instead on
discourses which affect women‘s oppression in patriarchy and men‘s enslavement to
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meet social and at times dehumanizing expectations.

They argue that men and

women are implicated in the complexities of discourses and that institutions function
to compare, hierarchize, homogenize, exclude, and normalize.

Since, as Foucault

(1978) contends, discourses qualify, classify, and punish, Anglophone feminists have
done an outstanding job developing methods to question the ―tactical productivity‖
and the ―political strategy‖ of a subject‘s use of a certain discourse (p. 102).
Feminists, however, misconstrue sexuation and theorize it only as an imaginary
discursive representation. They thus ignore the psychoanalytic theory of the ethics
of human tragedy—a tragedy seen in the subject‘s realization of his or her
unconscious desire, which goes beyond his or her conscious perceptions of
personages, and which manages to suspend, destroy, and interrupt the continuity
and fixed mirages of the ego.
But if we concentrate on the ethics of femininity, some questions remain
unresolved from the Foucauldian and Anglophone feminist analyses of political
strategies of oppression:

In what ways can women realize their own unconscious

desires so they do not fall victim to patriarchal oppression? Is it possible that social
oppression is not only an external force exercised upon subjects, but also that
subjects, by inhabiting the symbolic, participate in preserving this oppression
unconsciously?

As I discussed in chapter 1, when we become aware of the social

and power relations of discourses, we do not necessarily change our structural
position in relation to the symbolic Other.
In this chapter, I explore the ethics of feminine desire and jouissance
primarily from a Lacanian psychoanalytic perspective and explicate similarities and
differences between Lacan and feminists. Lacan does not provide easy answers to
questions. In his seminars and writings, Lacan allows readers to interpret his theory
by requiring them to work through his difficult texts to grasp his internal logic. If
readers are motivated enough to read him, they will realize that his theory is about
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the unthinkable and infinite paradoxes of life and about the unknown and strange17
potentialities of one‘s ex-sistence.

In order for a woman to discover her infinite

potentialities, she will need first to realize what it means to be a Woman18 vis-à-vis
the symbolic Other.

I should specify that a Woman is not free from conflicts or

struggles—of course, no one is really free from experiencing constraints and
conflicts.
achieve

I will argue, however, that, unlike the female hysteric, she is able to
her

emancipated

potentialities

and

overcome

patriarchal

discursive

oppressions.

2.2

Sexuation

In my attempt to formulate an ethics of femininity, I would like first to
provide a feminist reason why one should concentrate on feminine desire. By doing
so in this section, I will also describe Lacan‘s theories of the phallus, castration, and
sexuation, and show some of the similarities and differences between Lacan and
feminists.
A woman often posits herself in relation to a man as powerless, weak, needy,
irresistible, or as a person who is without limits and pursues aimless pleasure.
Cixous and Clément (1986) assert that women have been associated with the
eternal-natural, because she is beautiful, but passive; a desirable, but dependent
nonentity; unreasonable, but adorable; a threatening force to the social order, but

17

Lacan (1998b) writes, ―Strange is a word that can be broken down in French—étrange, être-ange,‖
which means ―angel-being‖ (p. 8) and implies, eternity or infinity.
18
I do not intend to use woman under erasure like Derrida. Derrida puts all words under erasure (sous
rature) to indicate that there is always a lost presence in them. For Derrida, ―Word and thing or thought
never in fact become one‖ (Spivak, 1997, p. xx). As Derrida also contends, every signified functions as a
signifier. Every word renders its meaning undecidable and so there is never a univocity of meaning
attached to a word. Lacan expresses the same idea with his theory of ―there is no Other of the Other‖ or
―there is no metalanguage‖ as I explain in chapter 3. I am referring to Woman (La femme), however, the
same way Lacan does in Seminar XX. My software does not allow me to write it as it appears in Lacan‘s
work. The feminine subject, for Lacan, is not a signifier, not a word under erasure. It is rather a
structure that has a specific relationship with the Other, that relates to a particular failure to be inscribed
in language.
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mysterious; dangerous, but easily domesticated; devouring, but longed for;
excessive, but unreasonable and forbidden. Irigaray (1993) also elucidates that in
the masculine economy the female becomes an immobile container, an inseparable
envelope for the man and the child whom she loves. A man longs for the maternal
which has been forever lost, and ends up loving a woman whom he imagines can
mother him and envelope him (p. 60).

He longs for the maternal home which

provides boundless possibilities for future creations. He thus experiences a woman
as the indefinite ―series of one plus one plus one‖ (p. 61). However, he cuts himself
off from feminine spatiality and situates himself as durational time.
infinity with his concrete creations.

He defers his

He creates a woman with his tools and

achievements.
A woman, on the other hand, sets out her infinity into space and loses time.
She does not measure time in the same way as a man does, and thus, being
occupied by the man whom she loves, she offers herself up in the here and now to
an expansive jouissance (p. 64). Linear time is questionable for a woman. Temporal
relations are circular in the feminine realm.

Her circularity of time is bounded by

the eternal. A woman delves into the pleasurable abysses of the here and now and
comes up against the masculine attitudes of timing, which are grounded in the adage
of ―never more and not yet‖ (p. 64).

By extending herself infinitely into space, a

woman is thus in the intermediate between being verbal and being voiceless. She is
neither passive nor active; she opens up the possibility of taking the course of a
durational time, but her capacity to present or represent finitude is questionable.
She is subjunctive and infinitive, because she is formed in an endless circular
movement. When a woman is left to do only minor acts and is unable to generate
full effects for her own cause, Irigaray (1993) calls her infinity ―abyss and night‖ (p.
7).
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Irigaray challenges predominant assumptions of space and time. In her way
of establishing an ethics of sexual difference, Irigaray interrogates issues related to
―pure space,‖ ―ecstatic time,‖ presence, absence, and the ―place which gathers and
protects everything‖ (Chanter, 1995, p. 149). Irigaray argues that all philosophical
paradigms neglect to theorize how a woman‘s body serves as a receptacle for a man
and is used as a kind of envelope in order to help a man sets limits and boundaries.
A woman thus does not have a place for herself but is rather a place of others. She
is the one who gives shape to forms; she is the envelope through which a man draws
boundaries, articulates limits, and creates coherent wholes (Chanter, 1995).
According to Irigaray, rethinking space means to rethink the mother‘s mucous, skin,
blood, and milk—the amorphous fluids associated with the maternal body.

The

mother‘s protective membrane, blood, and milk, which are essential for the growth
of the fetus, are suppressed in speech. A woman is treated as a place to provide for
others. She is the provider for men‘s comforts to actualize their cause, cut off from
the abstract, and transition to the concrete.
Irigaray adumbrates the thesis that women do not realize that they annihilate
themselves, constitute their own oppression, and lose their own voice in the depths
of their assimilation of sameness. In order for a woman to speak feminine language
and discover her cause and the infinite place within herself, not simply to quest for
infinity, she has to differentiate herself from her mother‘s identity and dis-identify
from the sameness of patriarchal expectations. As I mentioned in chapter 1, Irigaray
maintains that when a woman is undifferentiated from the maternal and blindly
assimilates her mother‘s mirages, she becomes dependent on the masculine Other,
mimes masculine language, and fails to realize her femininity.
When a woman is subjugated by patriarchal oppressions, she becomes a
passive wife and a passive mother and lacks access to her desire. She becomes the
object of a man‘s striving for control and a victim of humiliating forms of submission
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only because she does not realize her own desires. Because of her lack of limits, she
becomes men‘s threatening force and remains stuck with men‘s attempts to
dominate and control her. Benjamin (1990) resorts to the idea that the problem of a
woman‘s desire lies in the daughter‘s undifferentiation from the mother, which
means that the daughter becomes a woman without having desires of her own.
Likewise, her alienating submission is bound up with her fantasy that if she submits
to an ideal man, she will escape from her problem of understanding her needs and
desires as separate from him. By being desirable and igniting the passion of others,
she ends up becoming more of an object used by a man than a subject who can
realize her own cause.

Because of the fact that she is not active in desiring

something for herself, her power then ―consists not of the freedom to do as she wills,
not of control over her own destiny, but at best control over others‖ (p. 456). Using
Freud‘s psychoanalytic theory of the girl‘s psychosexual development, Benjamin
(1990) concludes that penis envy should be seen as the organizer of a woman‘s
assimilation to masculine ideals, of ―female masculinity,‖ and not as the organizer of
femininity (p. 469). A grown woman who has not resolved her penis envy resorts to
love relationships with men with the hope that she will receive something from them
which she does not have herself.

§
As I describe in Appendix B, Freud understands the girl‘s differentiation from
her omnipotent preoedipal mother by formulating his Oedipal theory: the little girl
realizes that her mother is defective in comparison to her father and turns her love
towards her father in order to get the phallus from him. One should keep in mind,
however, that when Irigaray critiques psychoanalytic theory for failing to represent a
woman‘s difference from masculinity and for conceptualizing the girl‘s differentiation
from the maternal as a means to hate and devalue her mother, she still misses
56

Lacan‘s psychoanalytic point:

the hysterical woman experiences a masculinity

complex and attempts to find the ideal signifier that would represent her sexuality.
Consciously or unconsciously, the hysterical woman depreciates her mother for her
inability to provide her with the phallus.

Irigaray also fails to realize that Lacan

provides a structural psychoanalytic theory to explain sexuation. Although feminists
interpret Lacan‘s concept of the phallus as the male organ and critique him for
privileging the male body, Lacan provides instead a complex description of the
symbolic phallus and lays out its difference from the imaginary phallus. Therefore, if
we look more closely at his concepts of the phallus, the symbolic Other, and
jouissance, we will realize that Lacan‘s psychoanalytic theory includes and expands
further on Irigaray‘s notion of sexual difference and Butler‘s theory of gender.

2.21 The Phallus

Throughout his work, Lacan tells us that the phallus ―is the signifier that has
no signified, the one that is based, in the case of man, on phallic jouissance‖ (Lacan,
1998b, 81).

In Écrits, Lacan (2006) contends that the phallus is not a ―concrete

idea‖ or a ―symbol‖ (p. 579/690).

When feminists understand the phallus as the

same as the penis, they disregard Lacan‘s thesis that the phallus is a signifier which
designates the gap between a word and the desired image that the word represents.
The phallus does not depict positive and visible properties.

It rather represents a

reason for the subject to desire. As a signifier, the phallus generates meaning and
fixes the subject to an imaginary identification. The image associated with a word,
however, only partly represents what it is supposed to represent, because there is
always something lacking in that image.
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Lacan prompts us to conceptualize the

phallus in terms of its function in subjectivity and not in terms of stable meanings,
fantasies, or symbols.
When Lacan explains his deviations from Saussure‘s theory of the sign, he
shows in the ―Gentlemen and Ladies‖ example that the drawings of a man and a
woman on the restroom doors are two signifiers that have no particular meaning on
their own (Lacan, 2006, pp. 416-417/499).

As Žižek (2002) points out, it is as if

these restroom doors are reproduced twice. At the level of the imaginary, subjects
understand their gender identity only by way of cultural images. Yet, these gender
binaries are inherently unstable and illusory. As Butler (2004) also points out, we
mostly observe this instability in drag queens, transfags, and queers whose gender
performativity transgresses the sociocultural ideals of sexual difference. At the level
of the symbolic, the difference between a man and a woman is mediated by the
phallus.

The signifier ―man‖ makes sense only in its difference from the signifier

―woman,‖ and vice versa.

Sexual difference is not translated here into a set of

symbolic meanings either. The phallic signifier does not provide stable or satisfying
meanings to describe the precise nature of that sexual difference. One cannot, for
example, describe adequately men‘s and women‘s concrete aims, goals, wants, and
aspirations, because the desires of each sex are elusive; there is no specific object,
goal, or aim to define their differences. We could very well say that desire is unisex.
However, what Lacan means when he says that the phallic signifier (the signifier of
lack-of-being) designates sexual difference, he is saying that men and women have
a different relation to the symbolic Other, a relation that shows that the symbolic
order cannot be sustained within meanings. As Barnard (2002b) and Copjec (1994)
explain, men and women have a different relation to the limits of language.
It is worth mentioning here that Lacan‘s logic of sexuation cannot be
compared to the deconstructionist logic of gender.

Whereas Butler understands

gender within the dimension of language and views sexuality as performative and
58

manipulated in the interplay of various discursive practices, Lacan presents us with
the paradox that subjectivity cannot be grasped in terms of sociopolitical discourses.
Subjectivity is rather a site that points to the limits of signification. Hence, Lacan‘s
sexuated subjectivity is not a substance, but rather a site of resistance to meanings.
As feminists too have observed, subjects‘ discourses give rise to competing and
conflictual meanings.
The function of the phallic signifier is to give access to the Other‘s desire and
differentiate the subject from a primordial state of oneness with the maternal.
Submitting to the phallic law means that one submits to difference.

The phallus

marks the Other as lacking. It signifierizes some of the subject‘s renunciation of its
jouissance from the maternal Thing and transforms the Other into someone who has
a desire that is not directed solely at the subject‘s being. The Other as desire is the
one who cannot provide a stable reason for the subject‘s being.

The ―Other that

allows for the absence of a reason‖ is the one who takes on a multiplicity of
meanings and cannot guarantee how the subject will enunciate his/her unconscious
desire (Fink, 2004, p. 123).

The phallus, thus, designates the lack in the Other,

S(A)19; it designates the fact that there is not an ―objective‖ or neutral discourse that
can guarantee what the subject will enunciate in speech.
desire is enunciated in the very act of speaking.

The subject‘s cause of

The Other cannot explain the

unpredictability of the subject‘s desire or how the subject is led to over-identify with
one ideological discourse and dis-identify with another ideological discourse.

In

other words, there are no objective truths to describe subjects‘ causes.
Lacan (1960-1961) clarifies that signifiers themselves do not lack anything.
He writes, ―There is no such thing as a missing signifier. At what moment can the
lack of a signifier possibly begin to appear?

19

In the subjective dimension which is

My computer software does not allow me to generate the symbol the way it should appear, as it is seen
in Lacan‘s (1998b) Seminar XX.
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called questioning‖ (chapter 17). In fact, what one cannot express in language, one

does not experience.

Lacan thus tells us that the signifier itself—an object, for

example, which the subject identifies with in order to satisfy the Other‘s desire—only
has an effect on the subject when the subject is involved in the dialectic of desire, a
kind of dialectic which elevates the object to the status of presence-absence and
makes the object desired. Lacan (1961-1962) thus indicates to us that the mother‘s
breast becomes the phallus, the signifier of desire, when the infant identifies with the
absence of mama and places its libido in language whose metonymies may relate to
the mother‘s breast.

The child, for example, may make its mama reappear by

playing with a transitional object, such as a blanket or a button.

As I will explain

further on, when the phallus is positivized, it becomes the signifier of castration in
the sense that it names the lost primordial objects—the breast, the feces, the
absence of the mother, and the absence or threat of absence of the penis; yet, this
naming is the name of its own lack (Ragland, 2004). In other words, the symbolic
phallus, Φ, gives a positive existence to the threatened lack of jouissance (Fink,
2004). The phallic signifier is then that which signifies ―presented absence‖ (Lacan,
1960-1961, chapter 17).
The phallus is an important concept in Lacan‘s work, and misunderstandings
of that concept also lead to misinterpretations of Lacan‘s internal logic.

The

Anglophone feminist (or poststructural) research method of discourse analysis
reaches its own impasses, for example, when it concludes that the subject‘s speech
is contradictory because the subject both resists and embodies a dominant
discourse—a discourse which appears to be benign but is in reality oppressive. With
this conclusion, feminists attempt to provide an external reason for the subject‘s
enunciations of these contradictions and hope change will occur when the subject
realizes that. However, clinical experience shows that subjects do not change in this
way.

When other discourses are adopted, the subject still remains engulfed and
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oppressed by the new ―benign‖ discourses. If feminists understood Lacan‘s logic of
the phallus as the signifier of desire and the signifier of the lack in the Other, S(A),
they would realize that in order for the subject to be flexible in its identifications with
various ideologies and to overcome the Other‘s dominance, the subject first needs to
develop a transference towards an Other, who no longer gives a new sign (a new
explanation) for the subject‘s being, but provides instead an enigmatic signifier that
puts the subject‘s desire into question, into motion.

Feminists would then realize

that subversion occurs only when the subject‘s fantasy and identification with a
certain discourse is called into question, and not so much when the discourses
change. As Žižek (1989) and Stavrakakis (1999) point out, calling into question an
ideological discourse and elevating it to the level of the signifier means to interrogate
the utopian and idealistic fantasies that come with it; it means to expose its dystopia
and lacking nature, to make subjects think that they cannot really be represented in
a single discursive image so that they may indeed be what they exclude or eliminate
from their conception of the good—in other words, so that they also identify with
what was supposed to be impossible and unrepresentable for them.
On the one hand, feminists acknowledge that the Other is lacking.

By

challenging dominant sociopolitical discourses, practices, and ―benign‖ assumptions
about subjectivity and sexuality, feminists succeed in rearranging the old signifying
order and reshaping subjects‘ knowledge.

Feminist epistemology succeeds in

naming and conceptualizing certain discourses and bringing to light how subjects
position themselves and are positioned within these available discourses. By shaking
up the existing signifying order, feminists reform laws and institutional practices.
Because of feminism, a vulnerable population—a population that has been abused or
harassed, discriminated against due to its low socioeconomic status, diagnosed with
an illness and given medication, and made to feel ashamed to communicate
subjective experiences in various social contexts—is empowered and made more
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aware of how discourses legitimate and perpetuate oppression and exploitation
(Willig, 1999).

By naming a certain discourse, feminists articulate an experience

which had not been previously articulated.
On the other hand, because of feminist misinterpretations of the phallus, the
real, and the symbolic, feminists cannot explain how hysteria functions, not as a
sociopolitical discourse, but as a symptom in relation to the Other. Hysteria is not an
organized discourse which can be understood at the level of the enunciated
(consciousness) but can only be formulated at the level of the enunciation
(unconscious). As Žižek (1989) points out, an ideological discourse, which might be
a rigid designator that stops the metonymic sliding of meaning, is still not an
absolute guarantee or meaning that one can use to make a fixed point of reference.
It rather ―represents the agency of the signifier within the field of the signified. In
itself it is nothing but a ‗pure difference‘ … in short it is a ‗signifier without the
signified‘‖ (p. 99).

What lies beyond the enunciation of an external discourse to

explain subjective experiences is nothing but its ―inability to master the central
impossibility, the constitutive lack around which human experience is organized‖
(Stavrakakis, 1999, p. 129).
Lacan‘s psychoanalytic theory also demonstrates the following paradox:
When the subject is dissatisfied with the prohibition imposed by the Law, the subject
does not simply feel pain but, rather, feels pleasure in pain,20 which Lacan calls
jouissance.

The reason the subject repeats symptoms and cannot transgress his

superego radically, even after he is given the choice to do so, is that his symptoms
unveil an unrepresentable desire for a lost object, which is imagined by the subject
as a source of total satisfaction.

The neurotic, whose desire remains dissatisfied,

20

In Lacan‘s theory, jouissance always implies pleasure in pain. In his theory of sexuation, the masculine
subject experiences phallic jouissance which is subservient to the superego, Law, and castration. The
feminine subject experiences both phallic jouissance and the Other jouissance. The feminine subject, who
loves beyond what one can articulate about it, who wants the abyss, suffers when she relates to other
desiring subjects with their lack-in-being (see, Soler, 2006, p. 18).
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desires only when he is subjected to prohibition. His desire transgresses the moral
prohibition but not for the sake of radically altering this prohibition.21

As Lacan

(1997) says, a commandment such as, ―Thou shalt not covet‖—not covet one‘s
neighbor‘s partner, house, or servant—makes the subject covet all kinds of things
merely because he is told not to. In other words, Lacan tells us that the desiring
subject experiences jouissance due to prohibitions, because he desires to go on
desiring infinitely.

Prohibition is a recipe for having desire—a kind of desire,

however, that makes the subject alienated and lack infinitely.
Lacan (2007) writes, ―[T]he law remains something that is, first and
foremost, inscribed in the structure‖ (p. 43).

The hysterical subject organizes her

discourse around her symptom in relation to the Other—the Other as Law or Master.
Her symptom itself is structured around the Other‘s hole, lacuna, or failure to
represent her sexuality. As I will explain shortly, it is an unnameable trauma, which
has not been articulated in words. The hysteric positions herself as the imaginary
phallus—as the object of the Other‘s desire—aiming to repair the Other‘s deficiencies
in his articulations of a truthful law.

The hysteric is dissatisfied with the Other‘s

jouissance and articulations of truth and, because she wants to be understood within
language entirely, she is trapped in her desire to relate to an infallible Other
(Master). She thus has the fantasy that there is an omnipotent Other who possesses
ultimate knowledge about her sexuality. Her desires and symptoms are structured
around this fantasy, and thus, regardless of her transgressions of the law, she

21

Although Foucault also sees power and resistance (the subject‘s refusal to obey it entirely) as linked, he
differs from Lacan regarding the conceptualization of desire. Foucault sees the imposition of the law as a
positive construction, as that which produces the norm (reality) and leads the subject to resist abiding its
oppressiveness (Copjec, 1994). Lacan, however, shows that in every affirmation of a statement, there is
an internal negation to it. For Lacan, the split subject aims at coherence but his/her unconscious desire
imposes discontinuities and impasses in every coherent discourse. Thus, for Lacan, the imposition of the
law accentuates the subject‘s lack-in-being; it makes the subject desire something which is not articulated
in any discourse.
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remains an unrepresentable void in her attempts to be desired by an infallible
Master.
I should mention here again that Lacan‘s logic differs significantly from the
poststructural conceptualization of gender and the Other. Whereas Butler recognizes
that the subject is constituted through exclusions, she still tries to theorize this
absence of meanings with her mistaken understanding of foreclosure. As I indicated
in chapter 1, Butler assumes that, because homosexuality is ―foreclosed‖ as a
subjective possibility, the subject remains a victim of patriarchy. Thus, she suggests
that only drags and queens are able to disrupt phallocentric views. Using this logic,
Butler views the psychoanalytic theory of the phallus as patriarchal. Lacan, however,
leads us to a different kind of logic.

He shows us that the sexuated subject,

regardless of its sexual orientation, disrupts the reality of dominant discourses by
exposing the limitations of language. He also shows that the hysterical subject, who
is unconsciously bisexual, mimes masculinity, as Irigaray also argues, only because
she is phallicized, which means that she tries to be entirely within the symbolic
order—an attempt which, of course, fails and which leads her instead to constitute
herself as a void, as a voiceless subject whose desires remain dissatisfied.
Lacan insists that the concept of the phallus is multileveled and polarized. Its
polarization involves two dimensions of language—the imaginary and the symbolic.
It also involves two structural dimensions of subjectivity—the castration complex and
castration. By differentiating between Lacan‘s notions of the castration complex and
of castration, we are led to differentiate between the hysterical and the feminine
subject.

In other words, we can distinguish between the subject who is alienated

within language, subjugated by the Other‘s desires and demands, and mortified by
the phallic fantasy—a fantasy which involves the idea that there is an omnipotent
Other who can provide ideal answers to subjects‘ questions—and the subject whose

64

desire is purified and whose jouissance exposes the Other‘s powerlessness and lack
in subversive ways.

§
According to Lacan, whereas the imaginary phallus represents the subject‘s
alienation within language, the symbolic phallus represents the subject‘s separation
from the Other as demand.

At the outset, the child identifies with its mOther‘s

desire (the mOther‘s want-to-be) by trying to be the phallus in order to complete
her—in other words, the child is the imaginary phallus when it strives to be the
object that would presumably give the mOther jouissance. In the preoedipal phase,
however, the mother is not experienced as lacking by the child but as omnipotent.
The child learns to speak and the child‘s being is represented by signifiers.

The

mother is the one who comes and goes and breastfeeds, and whose loving gaze,
voice, and touch seduce the child.

The child becomes a passive object of her

jouissance and its whole body is taken ―as an erotic doll‖ (Soler, 2006, p. 131).
Lacan (2006) though also points out that the child refuses to satisfy the
mOther‘s demand that the child be her erotic love object, because in order for the
child to desire and become something more than what it is, the mOther needs to
have a desire for something else too, and not only for the child (p. 524/628). When
the mOther desires something more than the child, she also shows that she lacks,
that she is not whole.

The mOther then leaves a memory trace of completion in the

child‘s mind. The grown-up subject desires to refind this lost satisfaction in speech,
possessions, and accomplishments.

The mother‘s partial corporeal objects—the

breast, the gaze, the phoneme, the feces, and the urinary flow (or, since Irigaray
also identifies these objects as fluids and air, mucous, milk, saliva, blood, gas, and
tears) produce a real rem(a)inder in one‘s articulations of speech: a rem(a)inder
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which fell away as a fragment of the mother‘s body. Lacan calls this remainder objet
petit a—the object which elicits the subject‘s desire.
Lacan does not focus on good or bad mothering or on the mother as a
totalized person. Lacan rather insists that maternal omnipotence is interrupted by
the intervention of a third term—the phallic signifier. As Soler (2006) argues, the
Freudian oedipal structure divides two functions:

―on the one hand, there is an

object of primary satisfaction and on the other a limit-function‖ (p. 111).

Freud‘s

theory, however, has been distorted by other psychoanalytic theorists who have
conceptualized the subject‘s misfortunes as a result of a bad or defective maternal
love.

Feminists, of course, express their criticisms of these neo-Freudian

psychoanalytic theories, arguing that the notion of bad mothering gives legitimacy to
the power of the father and, thus, to patriarchy. Soler (2006), however, brings to
our attention another important point in Lacan‘s theory. She writes:
It is not the lack of love but too much of it that is harmful and that
calls for a necessary effect of separation.
This is why Lacan
accentuated the mother‘s desire. This is to be understood as the
desire of a woman in the mother, a specific desire to limit maternal
passion, to make her not completely mother: in other words, not
completely concerned with her child, and even not completely
concerned with the series of children, the sibling rivals. (p. 120)
We see here that Lacan‘s theory regarding the daughter‘s differentiation from the
maternal and the mother‘s desire to be a woman is the same as Irigaray‘s. Irigaray
argues that the hysterical woman is someone who has not been differentiated
adequately

from

her

mother‘s

alienating

and

patriarchal

desires.

Irigaray

understands this differentiation as the daughter‘s recognition of her mother‘s
Otherness. A woman, for Irigaray, is more than a mother. A woman is not reduced
to the external demands to care for others, but is rather someone who asserts her
singularity.

She has an expansive jouissance, because she also transcends the

expectations of patriarchal norms.
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According to Lacan, from the moment that the mother appears to have a
desire of her own—a desire which is not directed towards the child but elsewhere—
she is experienced as deficient and incomplete.

Language then functions to name

the mother‘s desires and this process of naming occurs when the Name-of-theFather as a signifier intervenes in the symbiotic dyad of mother-child. The Name-ofthe-Father ―creates a rift in the mOther-child unity and allows the child a space in
which to breathe easy, a space of its own‖ (Fink, 1995, p. 58).

Here, the reader

should realize that Lacan differs from what we occasionally find in Irigaray‘s romantic
theory of establishing a harmonious mother-child dyadic relationship (Ragland,
2004).

In the dialectic of desire, Lacan argues, there is no signifier that can

establish a direct rapport between two subjects. The child‘s initial identifications with
images that form its ego are detached from the mother‘s desires.

When the child

enters into the symbolic, he or she couples with the signifier of the Other‘s desire,
not with another human being, and his or her desires are subjected to various
displacements.

In other words, each subject partners with his/her own Other

(unconscious) and not with the concrete other.
Lacan theorizes that the little girl undergoes two kinds of experience of lack
during the Oedipal complex: privation and castration. With his concept of privation,
Lacan attempts to theorize more rigorously the Freudian theory of penis envy.
According to Lacan, privation is ―the real lack of a symbolic object, the symbolic
phallus, and it applies exclusively to women‖ (Chiesa, 2007, p. 75). When the little
girl perceives the penis as absent, it is because she has the notion that it should be
there. What is lacking in her mind, however, is the symbolic object (the symbolic
phallus). Her vagina does not lack anything in the real. The male organ, thus, turns
into the symbolic phallus only because it involves the opposition of presence and
absence in the dialectic of desire.

Lacan (1993) argues that a woman does not

realize her sex ―by identification with the mother, but on the contrary by
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identification with the paternal object‖ (p. 172). Because there is no symbolization
of the female organ—in other words, at the level of desire (at the symbolic level) she
cannot assume her lack by identifying with her mOther‘s lack—she identifies with the
man, who is the bearer of the penis.
The feminist criticisms of the above argument are well-known.

By arguing

that Lacan is patriarchal, Irigaray (1985b) even goes so far as to contend that even
though a woman does not have a penis, she has ―two lips‖ (p. 28). Hence, Irigaray
argues that her metaphor of the ―two lips‖ implies that a woman‘s sexuality and
identity are plural; a woman‘s pleasure is not located in a single male organ and is
not even located in her vagina or clitoris.
whole body.

Her feminine pleasure comes from her

Where one of her identities ends, another one begins.

A woman‘s

sexuality is locatable in the multiplicity, ambiguity, and fluidity of discourses.

A

woman goes beyond dichotomous discourse. She is the remainder of what the rigid
patriarchal discourse fails to represent of her. But, if we were to imagine what Lacan
would have responded to Irigaray‘s metaphor of the ―two lips,‖ we can be sure,
based on his Encore seminar, that he would have said—―yes, indeed, that is
Woman!‖ Lacan‘s Woman does not differ from Irigaray‘s. Since the feminine subject
is someone who transcends the finite logic of patriarchal discursive dichotomies,
Anglophone

feminists

are

also

in

sync,

without

realizing

it,

with

Lacan‘s

psychoanalytic theory of the feminine subject.
Like Irigaray, Lacan is clear that hysteria is not the same as femininity. In
Seminar XVII, Lacan (2007) argues that the hysteric is someone who suffers from
her frustrations of being deprived of the phallus. Lacan (2007) writes,

Isn‘t it to this experience, however much it could have altered his
attitude subsequently, that we owe the fact that Freud observed …
that everything he was ever able to do for hysterics ends in nothing
other than what he pins down as Penisneid? Which means, explicitly,
when it is spelled out, that where this ends is in the girl‘s reproaching
her mother for not having created her a boy, that is, in carrying
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forward onto the mother, in the form of frustration, what, in its
meaningful essence, and in such a way that it gives the hysteric‘s
discourse its place and its living function with respect to the master‘s
discourse, is divided into, on the one hand, the castration of the
idealized father, who yields the master‘s secret, and, on the other
hand, privation, the assumption, by the subject, whether feminine or
not, of the jouissance of being deprived. (p. 99)
In Seminar III, Lacan (1993) contends that the hysteric, who has not resolved her
penis envy, ―literally uses the penis as an imaginary instrument for apprehending
what she hasn‘t succeeded in symbolizing‖ (p. 178).

With her symptoms, the

hysteric asks the question, ―What is a woman?‖ and attempts ―to symbolize the
female organ as such‖ (p. 178). This theory seems to be even more confusing when
we read from Lacan and post-Lacanian theorists that Lacan does not reduce
castration to the missing male organ, as Freud did. It has been argued that Lacan‘s
castration refers to the subject‘s realization that the Other (man or woman) does not
have the phallus22 and to renunciation of the subject‘s attempt to be the phallus for
the mOther.

The subject‘s renunciation to be the phallus for the mOther involves

giving up a certain jouissance—jouissance that is ―squeezed out of the body [and] is
refound in speech‖ (Fink, 1995, p. 99).

By sacrificing a certain jouissance to the

Other as language, the subject lets this jouissance circulate in the Other and
attempts to gain it in the form of knowledge, possessions, talents, achievements,
and so on.

Thus, unlike Freud, Lacan conceptualizes the Oedipus complex as

revolving around the dialectic of being versus having the phallus. When the child,
for example, begins to notice that she is not the sole object of her mother‘s desire,
because the mother enigmatically desires other things, she begins to inquire as to
who has the phallus—in other words, who has the object of the mother‘s desire. One
answer is that the mother‘s partner has the phallus. The child then concludes that
the phallus is a number of possessions and qualities which the child does not have
22

Since the phallus is the signifier of desire, there is no subject who has a specific quality or attribute that
would ensure his/her omnipotence or infallibility.
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but the mOther‘s partner does. Up to this point, it is no wonder that Grosz, Butler,
and other feminists find that the phallus is not a neutral term, because it also refers
to the male organ.
To go on a bit further with the ambiguity of the term, the hysteric thinks she
is deprived of the phallus. Hysterical deprivation is not seen as the dispossession of
materials or talents but, instead, as deprivation of knowledge about her sexuality.
Parenthetically, I should mention here that, day in and day out, psychoanalysts
witness the fact that there are many hysterics who are rich in possessions and
talents, but regardless of these possessions, they are still dissatisfied.

What is

particular about the hysterical subject is that she understands the Other‘s desire (the
Other‘s lack-in-being) as what she lacks as an unconscious subject, as a subject of
the signifier. As I will explain further in the subsequent chapters, the hysteric feels
the void, suffers from her lack-in-being, and desperately searches for being.

As

Soler (1995) also explains, one of her strategies is to get herself loved and desired
by the Other. She has a sense of being when she knows that she has a place in the
Other. When she encounters her lack-in-being, she questions the Other‘s desire and
tries to make the Other incomplete so as to be the sole loved object for the Other.
Because the hysteric is an effect of the signifier—is represented by the
signifier—she suffers from reminiscences.

Without knowing why, she doubts and

desires to know the true cause of her being in relation to the Other. She sees that
the Other is incomplete—the Other cannot provide adequate signs for her being—and
constitutes herself as the object that can make the Other desire. The hysteric thus
covers over her castration (-φ), her separation from the Other, by both divining the
Other‘s power, mastery, and desire for knowledge and by constituting herself as an
object with the fantasy that she can complete the Other‘s void with her being. Thus,
the hysteric cannot really exist without relating to a Master. She desires as if she
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was a man. Her desire is the same as a man‘s desire. For the hysteric, the Master is
usually a man, a doctor, or a professional who is imbued with power and knowledge.
What exactly does the hysterical subject cover over and what does it mean to
say that she is deprived of phallic jouissance? Lacan tells us explicitly that, because
she wants to be the cause of the Other‘s desire (and in the preoedipal phase, she
wanted to be the loved object of her mOther‘s desire), she covers over her
castration, which means that she covers over that which has not been represented in
language, which is her sexuality. In Lacan‘s theory, the hysteric is not adequately
separated/differentiated from the maternal.

Inadequate differentiation from the

maternal is translated here into inadequate symbolic intervention of the paternal
function in the mother-child imaginary dyadic unity.

As one sees in Freud‘s case

studies of hysteria, the hysterics‘ fathers were either villains or ill (Verhaeghe,
1999). Lacan (1960-1961), however, also reassures us that his terms castration and
penis envy are signs, metaphors (substitutions) (chapter 3). The father is thus not
approached as a totalized person, but is understood as a linguistic function. In the
case of little Hans, for example, we see that Hans‘ father, who was a good guy, did
not adequately intervene to separate Hans from the engulfing and devouring erotic
desire of the imaginary Other (Hans‘ mOther).

When one understands lack and

castration as metaphors and the paternal function (the phallic signifier) as a
linguistic function, one may also realize that there are case studies in which the
biological mother instates the Law in the child‘s subjectivity and the biological father
functions as the engulfing imaginary Other.
By being insufficiently separated from the imaginary Other, the hysteric is
caught in onerous bodily and emotional pain. The hysteric repeats symptoms and
her symptoms revolve around something that is unnameable, unrepresentable with
words. What is unrepresentable is an early experience of sexual trauma by which
the hysteric reacts with ―disgust or revulsion‖ (Fink, 1997, p. 117). The traumatic
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event is evoked by analogous subsequent memories and events.

With her various

symptoms, the hysteric circles around this unrepresentable black hole. The hysteric
desires to give a name to that hole. Every signification that fails to name it leads the
hysteric to develop some kind of superficial and dissatisfying speech. One could say
that the hysteric‘s speech is cut off from her symptoms.

Her body and emotions

depend on the Other‘s significations to name this traumatic lacuna.

As I explain in

chapter 3, the hysteric‘s solution to her impasse is to become the object of the
Other‘s desire, which means, to become a sign (a meaning at the imaginary level)
for the Other—a kind of sign that ends in nothing. The sign fails to symbolize what is
experienced by the hysteric as extremely painful jouissance. Being the object of the
Other‘s desire is the hysteric‘s method to avoid castration.
Because of the fact that the hysteric has not symbolized this hole, she has not
been able to grasp it as a loss and, thus, to have a desire different from the Other‘s
desire.

As Fink (2004) explains, when something is not symbolized, it is not

experienced as a loss by the subject. When we name the absence of something, the
subject becomes aware of her loss.

She gives up some of her symptomatic

jouissance and, with words, she ―drains away its onerous charge‖ (p. 139). Giving
up jouissance and symbolizing one‘s being with words is, for Lacan, castration.
When the hysteric symbolizes an absence or a lack, she gives a positive existence to
it. Lacan symbolizes this positivization as Φ. Φ is the phallic signifier that gives the
power of signification, the signifier which ―sublates the loss into something positive‖
(Fink, 2004, p. 139). The subject names the absence and becomes more the master
in her own house, so to speak. She is able to talk about the trauma without feeling
pleasure in pain. When she puts herself into words, she is able to separate from the
Other‘s lack—from the Other‘s inability to name her lack-in-being.

She is able to

have access to language in such a way that language itself does not mortify her,
does not petrify her with those meaning effects which, in any case, had failed to
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signifierize her lack-in-being.

In Lacan‘s theory, only then is the hysteric able to

become a woman with ―two lips.‖ More specifically, to use Lacan‘s terminology, only
then is she able to move from having a symptom in relation to the Other to
becoming the symptom of the Other (see Soler, 2006, pp. 62-66), the symptom of a
man‘s finite and dichotomous logic.
Psychoanalytic experience shows that the hysteric suffers from a primal
experience of sexual disgust. Disgust is her onerous, painful jouissance, caused by
an early traumatic event. As I indicate in chapter 4, for the hysteric, her own body
image is disgusting, fragile, and vacillating—her feminine organ is desexualized, as if
it were lacking something at the imaginary level. Because she desires to find a sign
that would establish her own femininity, she devotes herself to repairing a deficient
symbolic Other with her symptoms, at the expense of her own and the Other‘s wellbeing. Her method is to devote herself to receiving the sign of femininity. She ends
up becoming masculinized, becoming the imaginary phallus for a man‘s desire.
What she receives in return is something she does not want. Lacan‘s notion of the
hysteric‘s endless desire to receive the phallus from the Other is similar to Freud‘s
notion of Penisneid and to Irigaray‘s notions hysterical ―abyss and night‖ and of the
hysterical incapacity to create or to discover her femininity and her infinity.

2.22 Masculinity and Femininity

In Seminar XX, Lacan (1998b) provides a diagram to describe sexuation. On
the masculine side of the diagram, Lacan formulates men as being subjected to the
phallic function. He provides two contradictory statements to describe masculinity in
regard to the phallic function: an affirmative statement and a negation. Fink (2002)
describes these statements in the following way:
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All of man‘s jouissance is phallic jouissance. Every single one of his
satisfactions may come up short. Nevertheless, there is the belief in a
jouissance that could never come up short, the belief in another
jouissance. (Fink, 2002, p. 38)
Lacan tells us here that the phallic function is limited and finite and the
masculine subject comes to be wholly inscribed in that finitude. In Étourdit, Lacan
prompts us to understand the inscription of the phallic function as that with which
subjects try to make sense and positivize with words the absence of a sexual
relationship. Man‘s pleasure is determined by the phallic function—in other words, it
is limited to the interplay of signifiers. The masculine subject, however, fantasizes
an exception to his inscription—an exception which points to infinity.

As Barnard

(2002b) maintains, this exception makes him not identify fully with castration.
Although he is wholly subjected to the rules of the signifier, he also maintains some
distance from it by believing that the Symbolic Law cannot inscribe his jouissance
entirely. In a man‘s logic of finitude there is always something which escapes—this
exception exposes the impotence of the functioning of the symbolic Law. In other
words, the masculine subject is fixed by the exclusion of the phallic inscription and
relies on this exception to realize that there is a limit to the law.
The masculine subject has a relationship with object a, which Lacan places on
the side of the feminine in the aforementioned diagram. As I indicated earlier, for
Lacan, object a is the real remainder, the leftover of what one attempts to represent
in language. In one‘s articulations of speech, what is left out is a rem(a)inder. The
subject desires to understand what seems to be incomprehensible about femininity
and the maternal fragments.

As Žižek (1989) points out, the masculine subject

seeks out ―maternal substitutes.‖ However, his fantasy of the maternal ―is reduced
to a limited set of (symbolic) features‖ (p. 119). As soon as he comes close to the
maternal Thing, he feels anxiously suffocated.

Ragland (2004) further points out

that a man loves a woman with his fantasy that there is ―a totalized essential
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Woman—a kind of Ur-mother—who is thought (in Kleinian fashion) to contain the
object(s) that Lacan says cause desire—the gaze, the breast, the urinary flow, the
feces, the voice, the (imaginary) phallus, the nothing, and the phoneme‖ (p. 3).
Thus, a man understands the cause of his desire via the fantasy that there is a
complete Woman.

This fantasy situates him in a finite and fixed logic.

Yet, as

Barnard (2002b) elaborates, although a man is wholly alienated in the symbolic
function, he still takes exception to it in a certain way by also believing that there is
something ungraspable about a woman.

It seems to me, then, that when a man

becomes surprised by an encounter with a woman‘s infinity, he is able to realize that
the automatic and law-like functioning of the symbolic order is an illusion. When a
man relates to a hysterical female subject, he feels suffocated by her symptomatic
dissatisfied desire and makes every effort to control her. The hysteric also validates
his fantasy that there is a signifier to describe femininity. Thus, the hysteric plays an
important role in his fixed and finite constructions of reality.
On the feminine side, Lacan understands woman as being ―not wholly‖ (pas
tout) inscribed in the phallic function. As Fink (2002) puts it:
Not all of her jouissance is phallic jouissance …. All the jouissances
that do exist are phallic, but that does not mean there cannot be some
jouissances that are not phallic—it is just that they do not exist: they
ex-sist. The Other jouissance can only ex-sist, it cannot exist, for to
exist it would have to be spoken. (p. 39)
Unlike the masculine fantasy that there is a representable Woman, Lacan‘s Woman
proves that this fantasy is impossible, or even ridiculous. When Lacan (1998b) tells
us, ―Woman cannot be said,‖ ―Woman has a relation with S(A),‖ ―woman does not
exist, woman is not whole‖ (pp. 7 & 81), he means that the masculine fantasy about
a woman is erroneous, treacherous.

Lacan (1998b) goes so far as to say that,

because a woman is the impossibility and the inconsistency of the symbolic order, a
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rem(a)inder that emerges in language from within, she is indeed the one who
possesses a man and he is the ―one who obeys orders (à la botte), not her‖ (p. 73).
In his sexuation diagram, Lacan shows that woman couples with the symbolic
phallus (with Φ, not with –φ) and triples with the signifier of the lack in the Other,
S(A).

As Barnard (2002b) elaborates, although woman inhabits language, she

inhabits it not as ―a simple absence but as a mode of presence.‖ She has, in other
words, ―a strange form of positivity‖ (p. 178). Unlike the hysterical subject, who is
inhabited by the Other‘s lack and void, the feminine subject unveils something that is
excessive, unlimited, and destabilizing in language.

By having a relation to the

contingency of the effects of the signifier and the failures of a rigid discourse, woman
is able to engender something new in the automatic law-like functioning of the
symbolic order.

Woman ―exhorts from and returns to the Law a certain strange

corporeality‖ (Barnard, 2002b, p. 179).

In her relation to the Other, she has an

unpredictable and ―mysterious presence to the Law‖ which exposes its impotence (p.
178).
The masculine subject is wholly inscribed in the phallic function. However, as
I indicate in chapter 3, language itself is failing.

In every affirmation, there is a

contradiction, an exception. No subject can fully say what he intends to say because
the word itself misses its referent—it cannot describe the lost maternal bliss of unity
and fullness.

Following Barnard‘s (2002b) descriptions, the masculine subject

believes in this exception because he desires to know the meaning of the absolute
Woman, but he cannot possess that meaning. One could thus say that as much as
one believes in exception, one is fully caught up in language.

This is because in

every exception, there is an affirmation and in every affirmation, there is an
exception. In other words, every time one tries to give substance to the Other, one
realizes that meaning is a failed meaning; meaning does not have meaning.
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As

Barnard (2002b) writes, ―the phallus is at once both the signifier of enjoyment and
its negation‖ (p. 177).
The feminine subject, on the other hand, is alienated within language without
exception.

With her not whole position, woman is neither inside nor outside the

phallic function; she goes beyond phallic representation.

One can, of course, see

here why a man experiences a woman as adorable and as a threatening force to the
social order at the same time. Woman both is subjected to and escapes the rules of
the signifier. Lacan provides the notation, S(A), the signifier of the lack in the Other,
to indicate that her relation to language is not all phallic. Woman lacks a limit. She
is the absence of the limit, because she is not entirely susceptible to castration
(Copjec, 1994).
To explain this further, woman is the place where meaning slips away.
Instead of looking for a new signifier to fill up the hole that governs the unconscious,
woman experiences an unlocatable jouissance, which transforms sense and logic into
non-sense and non-logic. Unlike the hysterical subject who searches for the signifier
to make sense of her unconscious discourse and who experiences onerous bodily and
emotional pain, the feminine subject is not wholly bounded by the rules of the
signifier. She is not pinned down by the signifier, not explained by it; she is not its
slave. She becomes the real (enjoying body) in the sense that she extracts from the
Law something strange. She shows that the signifier is stupid and cannot sustain its
imaginary hold. Paradoxically, she shows its stupidity by identifying with it—in other
words, by identifying with the signifier‘s impossible representation.
with the impossibility of its representation.

She does not expect to receive that

signifier from the Other, but instead becomes it (ça).
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She identifies

2.3 Ethics

In Seminar VII, Lacan (1997) situates the ethics of psychoanalysis in what he
calls the ―the tragic sense of life‖ (p. 313).

According to Lacan, tragedy has the

cathartic aim of purging the passionate emotions of ―fear‖ and ―pity‖ (p. 247). Lacan
emphatically opposes the term ―ethics‖ to other terms, such as the ―sovereign good‖
and ―morality,‖ in order to emphasize the idea that, in psychoanalysis, we are not
dealing with moral prohibitions and legal codes, but with the ethos of a living person
who has habits, affects, and unrealized desires in relation to the Other.
opposes his notion of ethics to the traditional notion of morality.

Lacan

Lacan does not

conceptualize the ethics of psychoanalysis in the same way as we understand the law
in terms of its coerciveness and oppressiveness.

Ethics does not refer to

prohibitions, taboos, discursive practices, and legal codes.

For Lacan, the ethical

subject is the subject of the drive, the subject who trespasses the mandates of the
Law and is no longer captured by the Other‘s desire (by the Other‘s enigmatic desire)
in assuming its own cause. The ethical subject is the analyzed subject who is able to
assume its own cause without being decentred by the Other‘s desire. It no longer
looks for anOther‘s desire to guarantee its own existence. The subject who does not
act ethically is the one who fears the experience of finding him- or herself in an
entirely different territory—a territory which involves his or her realization of his or
her pure desire (Zupančič, 2000).
Lacan tells us that psychoanalytic practice is not just the practice of
uncovering the unconscious, but is also the practice of transforming the analysand‘s
desire in relation to the Law. Lacan (1997) writes,
What the subject achieves in analysis is not just that access, even if it
is repeated and always available, but something else that through the
transference gives everything living its form—the subject, so to speak,
counts the vote relative to his own law. This law is in the first place
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always the acceptance of something that began to be articulated
before him in previous generations, and which is strictly speaking Atè.
Although this Atè does not always reach the tragic level of Antigone‘s
Atè, it is nevertheless closely related to misfortune. (p. 300)
This Atè, this misfortune, that Lacan talks about is the subject‘s second death—a
kind of death that results in a loss, not the loss of the individual, but the loss of the
individual‘s lack-of-being. The ethical subject gives up her pathos by suspending her
castration anxiety (-φ) and undergoing positivization of her castration (Φ).
Positivization of castration implies that the subject recognizes that the Other has
nothing more to give, that the Other is lacking and has its own desire. The subject
thus no longer covers over her own lack and the Other‘s lack, no longer becomes the
object of the Other‘s desrie. The subject instead sacrifices her own being, the being
which is experienced as jouissance in suffering, and ends the repetitions which
revolve around her past traumas.
Following Žižek (2002), a subject acts ethically when she is not spoken by the
Other. The Other no longer speaks through the subject. The subject does not relate
to the Other‘s hole, lacuna, or failure to represent her traumas, her being.

The

ethical subject ―is the Thing directly, thus excluding herself from the community
regulated by the intermediate agency of symbolic regulations‖ (p. 70). The ethical
subject, in other words, comes to be the real on her own. She becomes the subject
of affect, the subject of jouissance, whose desire no longer works against her own
satisfaction and creativity.
By taking Sophocles‘ Antigone as an example, Lacan (1997) conceptualizes
the ethics of desire as distinct from the ethics of traditional morality.

Lacan‘s

admires Antigone‘s act, an act which ―both attracts us and startles us, in the sense
of intimidates us; this terrible, self-willed victim disturbs us‖ (p. 247).

Her ethical

act is her uncompromised willingness to deviate from the cause of her own desire—a
kind of desire which reveals that she values her own existence or life.
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Her desire

comes into being against the normative order of her community.

Her desire,

however, is not just to do whatever she wants or simply to act against the rules and
the norms of her community. It is also not an act of submission out of fear that she
will be punished by the superego. Her desire reveals instead her subjective truth.
She comes to be what she is. She acts on and pursues her desire.
Following Zupančič (2000), the tragedy of pursuing desire and having access
to jouissance (satisfaction) is to pay the price. This price involves giving up the very
thing that gives the subject happiness and accepting instead the risk of castration.
This acceptance situates the subject at the point where she feels that she has
nothing to lose in realizing her desire even at the expense of sacrificing the goods
and the happiness which captivated her beforehand. The ethical subject as such is
not the subject who demands satisfaction from the Other but the subject whose
desire is no longer compromised by the Other‘s demands.
One could thus end this chapter with Irigaray‘s words about speaking as a
woman:
[T]he issue is not one of elaborating a new theory of which a woman
would be the subject of the object but of jamming the theoretical
machinery itself, of suspending its pretension to the production of the
truth and of a meaning that is excessively univocal …. a disruptive
excess is possible on the feminine side. (1985b, pp. 77-78)
To speak as a woman, and not to be spoken by the Other, not to mime the Other‘s
deficiencies and disorders, means to evoke, not to designate; it means to exceed and
overflow boundaries, restrictions, and oppositions.

It means to discover one‘s

plurality, to blur the borders between science, philosophy, poetry, and fiction.

It

means for a woman to be self-determined as regards her pleasures and definitions.
It means to be able to create new pleasures, new representations, and new
knowledge, to explore new realities and go beyond the dichotomous structures of
knowledge.
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Chapter 3
Lacan‘s Subversions of Neo-Freudian Theories of Hysteria

In the contemporary dominant psychoanalytic milieu in the United States,
Lacanian psychoanalysis has been left out of clinical practice and theory.

Most

clinicians today make a diagnosis on the basis of what they consider to be socially
desirable and adaptive behaviors.
characterological traits.

Hysteria has been reduced to negative

Neo-Freudian psychoanalysts claim that they reject trait

theories and the static attributes that one finds in the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV), because their attempt is to theorize hysteria
on the basis of the more complex and interpersonal dynamics behind the symptoms.
However, neo-Freudian psychoanalytic theories provide many unclear explanations
and constructs that give us the sense that they do not differ much from the
psychiatric nomenclatures.

In mainstream psychoanalysis, hysteria is theorized

based on the analysis of defenses.

Unconscious desire is reduced to the analyst‘s

own demands, ego-identifications, and interpretations of what is real and unreal.
Reading, for example, the chapter on hysteria in Gabbard‘s (2000) wellknown book, Psychodynamic Psychiatry in Clinical Practice, published by the
American Psychiatric Press, we see how hysteria has been theorized by the logic of
current trends in psychoanalysis and psychiatry. Even when neo-Freudians explain
hysteria on the basis of the interpersonal dynamics behind what one sees in the
patient‘s symptoms, their explanations do not differ from the DSM‘s ―atheoretical‖
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listing of overt symptoms and behaviors, when they conclude that hysterics are
orally

fixated,23

primitive,

demanding,

attention-seeking,

flirtatious,

and

manipulative by exhibiting acting-out behaviors24 with narcissistic, masochistic, and
borderline features (Gabbard, 2000). Consequently, psychotherapists focus solely on
the elimination of symptoms without taking into much consideration how these
23

Gabbard concentrates on Freud‘s theory of fixation. In Freud‘s theory, fixation is tied to a particular
developmental sexual stage, because its instinctual component is more powerful than the corresponding
instincts of other sexual stages. In fixation, the individual‘s libido continues to derive satisfaction from
that particular instinct and this satisfaction evolves into a symptom (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973). Lacan
(1998a), on the other hand, reinterprets Freud‘s theory of the drive. For Lacan, the drive is determined in
part by the function of the signifier and refers ―to a strong, or even overwhelming want or requirement
that feels like a necessity, but that is in fact not a matter of survival‖ (Jaanus, 1995, p. 120). Lacan
states that the function of drive is jouissance (satisfaction). It seeks jouissance without moderation.
However, the drive has nothing to do with reproduction, instincts, and biological needs, e.g., hunger and
thirst, because satisfaction of need does not satisfy the drive. Whereas satisfaction of need produces
homeostasis in the organism, the drive, which is a constant force towards jouissance, alters this
homeostasis. In Écrits, Lacan refers to the drive with the notation, S‹›D, and states that it is the result of
the Other‘s demand when the subject vanishes in that demand (692/817). Any demand that comes from
the Other makes the subject experience a lack of full satisfaction. The subject fades in the Other‘s
signifiers. It has to consider the Other‘s demands in order to become satisfied. The aim of the drive is to
rectify an absolute state of satisfaction, which, of course, always falls short. Lacan (1998a) argues that
the drive‘s aim of satisfaction is paradoxical. When satisfaction is defined by the field of the Other, the
subject suffers from symptoms and renounces pleasure.
Gabbard conceptualizes the histrionic subject, who suffers from symptoms of dependency,
helplessness, and separation anxiety, as the one who has not managed to attain ―mature whole-object
relations‖ from both parents (p. 521). For Gabbard, the histrionic‘s mother failed to provide enough
nurturance and the patient failed to resolve the Oedipal complex. In her unconscious mind, the histrionic
substitutes the maternal breast for the paternal penis, but this substitution is not satisfying, because she
longs for the maternal breast. For Lacan, the oral drive, the mouth rim, is an erogenous zone, but there is
no specific object that satisfies it. The hysteric, as a desiring split subject, is dependent on the Other‘s
demands and desires. The hysteric confuses object a—the residue of symbolization—with the object that
she assumes the Other desires and demands. In the case of hysteria, when the drive is connected to the
symbolic Other and the subject desires a representation of the maternal Thing, the subject‘s drive is not
erotogenic, but is linked to dissatisfaction and disgust. When the drive is limited to the symbolic order, in
other words to an unconscious unsatisfied desire, it loses its erogenicity and correlates with death
(Brousse, 1995, p. 114). Lacan differentiates the subject as drive from the subject as demand and as
desire (Écrits, 722-725/851-854; Miller, 1996; Fink, 1997, pp. 207-217). Lacan (1998a) explains that, in
hysteria, the oral drive links to the economy of desire. The hysteric derives jouissance from desexualized
digestive zones, as we see, for example, in reactions of disgust and vomiting. In hysteria, the
eroticization of the mouth is excluded and other desexualized zones become prominent sources of
jouissance (pp. 172-173).
24
According to Gabbard (2000), hysterical patients often act-out in transference. For Gabbard, acting-out
is a defense mechanism that describes hysterics‘ inability to verbalize anxiety and unconscious wishes
towards their therapists. Hysterics act out by engaging in self-destructive behaviors. Lacan (1962-1963)
differs from Gabbard by formulating acting out in relation to the symbolic Other and not to the imaginary
concrete otherness of the therapist, parent, and any other authority figure. Lacan describes acting out as
wild transference but addressed to the Other‘s desire. He points out that if the analyst interprets the
acting out, the analyst then has very little effect on the analysand. The analysand knows what he/she is
doing and resists the analyst‘s interpretation. The analysand questions the remainder of the analyst‘s
interpretation and exposes its impasse. If the analyst prohibits the analysand‘s acting out, the analysand
acts out even more. In reality, the subject does not want to act out, but continues to do so when the
analyst reinforces strengthening the ego in their therapeutic relationship. Lacan suggests that the analyst
needs to occupy the position of the Other and listen to the analysand‘s unconscious desire. Lacan (1992)
also argues that when the analyst interprets on the basis of what is real or unreal for the analysand and
provides a ―premature interpretation,‖ without inquiring further as to the analysand‘s desire, the
analysand is more likely to act out (pp. 79-80). Acting out is not exclusive to hysteria. All patients,
regardless of their diagnostic structure, may act out (see Fink‘s discussion of Kris‘s case of an obsessive
man who acted out by craving fresh brains, 2004, pp. 52-62).
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symptoms correspond to the relation to the symbolic Other—a relation which is
dissymmetrical—and to the gap between language and jouissance.

Whereas in

Lacan‘s theory, manifest symptoms are slippery and have a multiplicity of meanings,
Gabbard‘s descriptions of symptoms, analyses of defenses, and interpersonal
dynamics propagate a form of psychoanalysis that tends to catalogue censored and
marginalized personality traits. It is as if these traits reside inside hysterics or are
parts of their psychological make-up, which determine what they do, think, and say.
It is obviously not surprising to find this banal simplicity in the descriptions of all
personality disorders. We frequently find the same symptoms, patterns, and even
etiological explanations across all diagnostic categories.
Furthermore, psychoanalysts and feminists, who combine British object
relations with Lacan‘s psychoanalytic theory in order to explain hysteria, fail to
conceptualize the substantial differences between these two theories. These authors
provide incoherent and inaccurate structural descriptions of hysteria and reach
theoretical impasses.
An example of this impasse can be observed in Bollas‘ (2000) descriptions of
a hysterical patient who was a transference addict and stayed in a state of
entrenchment—a state in which she remained in limbo with her symptoms.

Bollas

finds that she was untreatable for the reason that her symptoms were expressions of
her erotic life. Based on his reflections on Lacan‘s theory, the author explains that
this patient idealized her analyst by positioning herself as incomplete and the analyst
as powerful, but when the analyst failed to maintain that power, she chose another
one to sustain her entrenchment and eroticism. Based on his reflections on object
relations theory, Bollas interprets the hysteric‘s transference as a repetition of the
internalized maternal object. The general principle of object relations theory is that
the maternal object is construed either as good or bad and is thus experienced as
satisfying or persecutory. Bollas describes the maternal object‘s function in hysteria
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as a split between genital dissatisfaction and performative excitation. According to
Bollas,

the

hysteric‘s

embodied

performative/narrative self is ecstatic.

self

is

sexually

deprived

and

her

In other words, the patient behaved in the

same ways towards her analysts as her mother did towards her at an early age. The
patient eroticized the exchanges of gazes, performances, and narratives with her
analysts and refused satisfaction by genital intercourse with partners. Similarly,
Gabbard describes hysterical and borderline25 patients as lacking self-continuity and
as exhibiting a fragmented and incomplete sense of self which is projected onto
others. Gabbard suggests that ―the therapist‘s task is to connect these fragmented
aspects of the patient‘s self and interpret the underlying anxieties connected with reowning and integrating the disparate self-representations into a coherent whole‖ (p.
445).
A number of points can be made to show how Lacan subverts the above
theories considerably.

Although Bollas‘ and Gabbard‘s observations may describe

some of the overt symptoms of hysteria, we should keep in mind that they diverge
from Lacan‘s formulation of hysteria in relation to the Other. For Lacan, the hysteric
is a split subject. Lacan‘s description of splitting, however, is not the same as Bollas‘
descriptions of the hysteric‘s dissociation between the performative and the sexual
self or the same as Gabbard‘s descriptions of fragmentations with his goal to
transform these patients into whole persons. Instead, the splitting that Lacan refers
to is essentially the splitting between the signifier and the signified.

One‘s

pronunciation of a signifier does not make us understand its signified (meaning) in a
25

Bollas (2000) suggests that the borderline person is different from the hysteric. He argues that the
borderline has experienced the mother as causing excessive turbulence to the self by arousing feelings of
anxiety, rage, shock, and loss. The borderline projects turbulent states of mind onto others (p. 9). The
hysteric, on the other hand, experiences intense maternal love, but ―[w]hat is missing … is an unconscious
sense of maternal desire for the child‘s sexual body—especially the genitals‖ (p. 12). In Lacanian theory,
however, there is no differentiation between hysteria and borderline personality disorder. As Fink (2007)
points out, in Lacan‘s theory, ―neurosis is defined by repression whereas psychosis is defined by
foreclosure … there can be no genuine borderland between neurosis and psychosis‖ (p. 260). Thus, from
a Lacanian perspective, one is diagnosed as either psychotic or neurotic. In Lacan‘s oeuvre, diagnoses are
not limited to descriptions of manifest symptoms but are rather structural and far more rigorous in theory
than the diagnoses we find in contemporary psychiatry and psychoanalysis.
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clear manner. Patients who display various behaviors which are not clear to us at
first become clearer only after they have the opportunity to decipher signifiers which
have been kept out of their consciousness. The symptom is thus articulated by the
signifiers and fixes the subject to a certain mode of jouissance. These signifiers shift
meanings when the patient interacts with a symbolic Other (the analyst) and when
the patient has the opportunity to dialectize them. As Lacan shows in his Écrits (pp.
428-429/515), when the signifier is dialectized, it shows that it is not fixed to a
single representation but rather condenses one configuration of meanings within
another by its metaphoric function and instates ―lack of being [le manque de l’être]
in the object relation‖ by its metonymic function (p. 428/515).

There is thus a

structural disjunction between the conscious meaning of one‘s discourse and the
unconscious desire that is formulated in signifiers (Fink, 2004). One‘s designation of
a referent—that is, of a specific object—that could satisfy one‘s desire is never clear
or constant in one‘s speech.

Desire is thus structurally unsatisfiable, because the

subject is always left to desire something more and something else as soon as one
satisfies one‘s needs.
Following Fink (2004), whereas patients are defensive and transference
addicts, the manifestations of these overt symptoms should not be the pivotal
focuses in analysis.
surface.

Defenses are designed to keep the unconscious under the

In speech, the subject fails to show that he or she is coherent, and

eventually produces various forms of slips, ambiguous idiomatic expressions, and
double entendres. The surface signifiers in one‘s discourse have nothing to do with
one‘s overall personality, and thus when the analyst and the analysand decipher
signifiers, they are not engaged in interpretations of personality characteristics or of
the self.

The analyst is instead interested in the analysand‘s discourse, which

employs ―well-known rhetorical figures to keep from saying certain things and to
keep certain ideas from surfacing‖ (p. 72).
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The subject dialectizes unconscious

signifiers when the analyst adopts a symbolic position and listens from that position.
The analyst thus listens neither from the position of his or her own ego nor from the
position of the analysand‘s ego, but from the vantage point of the subject‘s symbolic
Other. In other words, the analyst does not take it personally how he or she is being
treated by the analysand, for example, ―as a good object or a bad object, as a
punitive parental figure or as a loving one, and so on‖ (Fink, 2004, p. 10).

The

meanings that the subjects produce are not clear, but they become clearer in the
process of deciphering unconscious signifiers, desires, and jouissances (Fink, 1999,
2004, 2007).
Reflecting further on Bollas‘ formulations of the subject‘s internalization of the
maternal—I should note here that Bollas‘ notion of maternal internalization implies
identification and does not have the same meaning as Irigaray‘s notion of maternal
internalization, as described in chapters 1 and 2—one should mention that whereas
the parent may be experienced as good or bad and the subject may identify with
good or bad traits of that parent, identification is partial.

It does not imply

unification, but is rather discreet.26 By identifying with a specific trait of someone,
the subject does not become identical with the other (Lacan, 1961-1962, chapter 4).
The trait that is identified with is a signifier of desire and has different meanings for
each individual. In addition, the meaning of the trait identified with is more likely to
change for the subject over time. Whereas Bollas describes the internalized object
as temporal, constant, and fixed, Lacan formulates it in terms of the subject‘s
relationship to the signifier of desire, which points not to a full meaning but to a cut
and a hole.

The trait that is identified with exposes the discontinuity and

26

Similarly, Freud (1921) writes, the ―identification is a partial and extremely limited one and only
borrows a single trait from the person who is its object‖ (p. 107). Freud provides an example of a little
girl who identified with her mother‘s cough. Her identification signified her love for her father, but
because she felt guilty for having the desire to take her mother‘s place, she imitated her mother‘s
symptom. In Dora‘s case, however, Dora‘s identification with her father‘s cough signified her admiration
of her father and sympathy with his physical ailment. In later years, her loss of voice and coughing
related to her admiration of her father‘s mistress, Frau K. In Lacan‘s reinterpretation of Freud,
identification is conflictual and partial. The ego copies either the beloved or the unloved object. Symbolic
identification is the unconscious desire of putting oneself in the same situation as the Other‘s desire.
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differentiation between subjects.27

By identifying with someone‘s trait, the split

subject also identifies with the Other‘s lack and desires to be the Other‘s precious
object so as to fill the Other‘s lack.
Hence, identification involves not only an imaginary but also a symbolic
dimension.

The object in itself—breast, parent, or transitional object—cannot fully

satisfy the subject. Unconscious desire reveals the gap between the subject‘s aim
for satisfaction and the subject‘s attachment to a particular object. In other words,
Lacan rejects the dominant formulation that the hysteric fails to attain ―mature
whole-object relations‖ (Gabbard, 2000, p. 521), because no object can give total
satisfaction to any subject. Paradoxically, subjects may experience objects as good
and bad at the same time.

For example, the ―good enough parent‖ may be

experienced as devouring by the child when that parent is always on the child‘s back
and does not leave space for its own desire. The bad parent may petrify the child
with the master signifier of being a bad child and this master signifier may have
certain effects on the child‘s sexuality and identity.

However, Lacan (1962-1963)

argues that even when the subject is inscribed in the field of the Other by this
master signifier, she is still something more than what that signifier describes her as.
The unconscious subject ―cuts the Other into slices‖ (chapter 2) and situates the
Other not as absolute but as lacking. As Soler (1995) says, the unconscious subject
27

In Seminar IX, Lacan argues that identification is not unification and that there is no such thing as the
equivalence of two signifiers, e.g., A=A. The signifier A has fecundity and cannot be identical to itself.
For example, we cannot say my mother is my mother, because the signifier, ―mother,‖ cannot have a
tautological value. Tautology makes a false signified, because it signifies nothing. A signifier has a value
only insofar as it is what other signifiers are not. The function of the signifier is difference. In Écrits (pp.
424-435/509-523), Lacan elucidates that the functioning of signifiers in the subject‘s unconscious takes
place by means of metaphorical and metonymical processes. Signifiers are irreducible to the elements of
language we use consciously. The functions of metaphor and metonymy show that there is not any real
resemblance between signifiers, but that two or more signifiers link together through a third term. The
third term is the signifier of desire and links words together by constituting them as similar. For example,
if we say, ―Melina is a workaholic like her mother,‖ we situate the signifier, ―workaholic,‖ as the mediator
between Melina and her mother in order to understand Melina as similar to her mother. Nevertheless, the
signifier, ―workaholic,‖ which combines two other signifiers, ―work‖ and ―alcoholic,‖ is understood in the
chain of many other signifiers and does not have the same meaning in Melina‘s unconscious as in her
mother‘s unconscious. When Melina identifies with her mother‘s trait, she situates her mother as the
Other of authority. Her mOther is not simply understood in terms of her personality qualities but rather as
the bearer of a message. Melina is constituted by that message and the content of this signifier forms her
personality in various possible ways.
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who asks about the cause of her symptoms vacillates ―between petrification and
indeterminacy, petrification by the signifier and indeterminacy within the slippage of
meaning. That‘s what we might call the impasse of the subject of the signifier‖ (p.
48).
The hysteric‘s vacillation between petrification and indeterminacy vis-à-vis the
Other is clearly shown in Irigaray‘s (2002) research study on hysterical grammar of
enunciation.

Irigaray concludes her analysis of hysterical discourse with the

following findings:
a) The hysteric often utters I and you as if both were equal. She pronounces
you more frequently. She relies on you in order for her to make a choice
or take action. The subject in her discourse is always you.
b) She pronounces action verbs, the active voice, and the present and future
tenses more frequently than the passive voice and the past tense.

Her

enunciation is ongoing and not complete.
c) She

continually

questions

the

addressee‘s

message

regarding

its

incompleteness and ambiguity.
It is obvious that Irigaray‘s findings support Lacan‘s theory of hysterical discourse
(Lacan, 2007). From Irigaray‘s findings, we see that the hysteric is alienated in the
Other‘s enunciations but also brings forth the real of these enunciations.

She

identifies with the rem(a)inder of the Other‘s signifiers and constructs the Other not
as a closed system but rather as an open and incomplete one.
Whereas the subject seeks to understand its identity fully and identifies with
socially acceptable ideologies, the subject stumbles upon alienation and lack.
Lacan‘s main thesis is that the subject is what one signifier represents to another
signifier. As Lacan (1961-1962) writes, ―The signifier, as opposed to the sign, is not
what represents something to someone; it is what represents the subject [to]
another signifier‖ (chapter 4). Although we consciously associate subjectivity with
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fixed and stable meanings, Lacan tells us that the psychoanalyst‘s main task is to go
beyond this conscious lure and redirect him- or herself to the logic of the signifier—to
the logic that the subject is caused and divided by the signifier. For Lacan, subjects
derive meanings and coherence from the network of signifiers.

The signifier has

primacy over the signified and the subject is captured by the signifier‘s play of
successive substitutions.

In the ―Seminar on the Purloined Letter‖ (Écrits, pp. 6-

48), Lacan describes the signifier as preeminent over the subject and says that its
displacements and substitutions determine the subject‘s acts and destiny.

In his

analysis of Poe‘s (1912) famous story of the ―Purloined Letter,‖ all of the
characters—some of whom did not know how to find the letter, others of whom did
not know the letter‘s content, and still others of whom did not know how to act upon
the consequences if the letter was revealed—were mobilized and kept in suspense by
the signifier, which took the form of a letter.28
Lacan‘s analysis of Poe‘s story teaches us that the unconscious is manifested
by the displacement and substitution of the signifier, which nevertheless the speaker
and the listener may find unimportant.

In order for the analyst and analysand to

decipher the encoded message of a symptom, they will have to see how the signifier
28

In Poe‘s story, the Minister, who stole a letter from the Queen and replaced it with a fake one and had
the power to jeopardize the Queen‘s status, ended up not using it in any significant way. The letter
constituted him as a personage. As Lacan states, the Minister was constituted as an ―absolute master‖ by
the Queen, because the Queen knew that the Minister was the robber of that letter and knew that he was
capable of abusing his power by having it in his possession (Écrits, p. 24/33). The Minister did not have
control over that letter, but, instead, the letter inhabited, superimposed, and inscribed the topography of
his unconscious. Lacan also reminds us that ―the letter which the Minister addresse[d] to himself,
ultimately [was] a letter from a woman‖ (Écrits, p. 25/35). The Queen, who was powerless to act, was
forced to accept the Minister‘s authority over her own destiny. Lacan writes, ―ladies, as we know, detest it
when principles are called into question, for their charms owe much to the mystery of the signifier‖ (Écrits,
p. 29/40). The Queen, as a woman, was caught in the desire of the Minister and entrapped in his phallic
personage of omnipotence, only to prove later on, that by being totally inscribed within the symbolic
function, she was in some sense outside it.
By yielding the signifier of desire to the Minister, her
subjectivity was mediated by the male Other, but she also situated her existence as indeterminate within
the symbolic order. In fantasy, the Minister existed in the finitudes and pretentions of his powerful
personage, only to find out to his surprise that the signifier represented his limits and inconsistencies. The
Minister became the addressee of that letter, because it concealed a truth: it concealed the flaws of the
meaning which it intended to deliver. The Minister was consciously blinded by the way that letter
maintained his desire and jouissance. He unconsciously turned the letter over to the Queen, in the same
way as the Queen turned the letter over to him, in order to continue having access to the image that was
lacking in him and the jouissance which supplemented that lack.
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constitutes the analysand‘s personage and how its encoded message reveals the
analysand‘s unsatisfied unconscious desire.

In Poe‘s story, for example, we read

that the police used ingenious and mechanical tactics to search for the letter in the
Minister‘s apartment without realizing how the Minister maintained an unconscious
desire in relation to the Queen. When the Minister was gone from his apartment, the
police used objective methods to investigate where the Minister hid the letter, but
the police did not succeed in finding the letter by using these ingenious investigative
methods. The police failed to understand the Minister‘s logic: they failed to realize
how the Minister maintained his unconscious desire in relation to the Queen and how
he did not use the letter as it was commonly expected. The letter rather inscribed a
unique message to the Minister‘s unconscious and incarnated a particular form of
jouissance, and so certainly the letter could not be deciphered when one used
―objective‖ or imaginary techniques without looking at his own symbolic relationship
with the Other.
Lacan also uses mathematics and set theory to show readers that even in the
logic of rigorous and conscious calculations one encounters conclusive impossibilities
and manifestations of the real. As Fink (1995a, 1995b) explains with clarity, in the
Postface to the ―Seminar on ‗The Purloined Letter,‘‖ by using the example of coin
tosses and grouping them by threes, Lacan demonstrates the linguistic structure of
the unconscious and shows how ―the real manifests itself within the symbolic, and
thus point[s] to the limits of ‗literalization‘‖ (Fink, 1995a, p. 153).

Using the coin

toss combinations as an analogy, Lacan shows that the syntax of the signifying chain
allows certain combinations to occur but excludes others (see Fink, 1995a, pp. 153164).
What we learn from this analogy is that, when a subject repeats a symptom,
the subject itself is not only a construction of the Other‘s signs, but also a failure to
represent the object of a ―lost satisfaction‖ (Fink, 1995b, p. 228) and, thus, to
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represent what remains as an unsatisfying desire. The subject repeats an automatic
and law-like chain of signifiers, but also circles around the cause of its symptoms.
The signifier that describes that cause is excluded from consciousness. The subject
aims to get at an early trauma, but it cannot find the words to say it.

In Fink‘s

(1995b) words, ―Repetition thus involves the ‗impossible to think‘ and the ‗impossible
to say‘‖ (p. 225).

Lacan (1998a) shows the difference between tuche (τύχη) (the

real cause of repetition) and automaton (αυτόματο) (the automatic return of signs)
by arguing that behind the endless automatic repetitions of a symptom, which
situate the subject in ―alienation of its meaning‖ (p. 61), there is the real, which
presents itself in the form of an ―unassimilable … trauma‖ (p. 55).

This

―unassimilable … trauma‖ is gotten at in analysis by the analysand‘s free associations
to dreams and fantasies.

Dreams and the fundamental fantasy unveil an

unrepresentable desire for the primal object, which is imagined by the subject as the
source of total satisfaction. In dreams and fantasies, the subject situates the Other
as the one who has inhibited its pursuit of satisfaction.

The subject repeats a

symptom compulsively, because it aims to maintain the desire to articulate this
unassimilable thought.
Lacan has his own logic.

By using mathemes to demonstrate his

psychoanalytic logic, he shows that the real, as it manifests itself in the metonymies
of desire and as jouissance, precedes language and that it stands apart, ex-sists with
respect to our common understanding of reality.

The real is the disharmony, the

anomaly that leads to the impossibility of complete symbolization. It is that which is
not yet represented by signifiers but what remains to be represented when the
subject dialectizes the metaphors and metonymies of the unconscious. It is for that
reason that Lacan writes,
Mathematization alone reaches a real—and it is in that respect that it
is compatible with our discourse, analytic discourse—a real that has
nothing to do with what traditional knowledge has served as a basis
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for, which is not what the latter believes it to be—namely reality—but
rather fantasy. The real, I will say, is the mystery of the speaking
body, the mystery of the unconscious. (Lacan, 1998, p. 131)
Signs and symbols have limits. There is something above and beyond the realm of
meaning, something outside and in excess of language.

The real imposes

discontinuities and impasses in the signifying chain and accounts for the impossibility
of having pre-existing sets of laws and grammatical rules.
In his discussions of Frege‘s logic and Russell‘s paradox, for example, Lacan
(1961-1962) discusses how logicians arrive at an impasse when they reduce
signifiers to unambiguous representations and homogeneity. Lacan‘s logic radically
differs from the logic we find in analytic philosophy. 29 In Seminar IX, Lacan (19611962) tells us that Russell‘s question about the set of all the sets which do not
include themselves, more particularly, his question whether or not that set includes
itself, misses the point because a set functions as a signifier (chapter 9). Just as no
signifier can signify itself, a set cannot signify itself. In fact, Lacan tells us, in order
for a signifier to signify something, it has to ―be pos[it]ed as different [from] itself‖
(chapter 17). He shows that the impasse that arises from the logic of self-reference
is the result of the signifier‘s metonymic function.

As Lacan (1998b) writes, ―the

references or things the signifier serves to approach remain approximate—
29

Bertrand Russell, who was an analytical mathematician in the early 1900‘s, disproved Gottlob Frege‘s
ambitious efforts to establish a law of non-contradiction. Frege attempted to establish a mathematical
propositional law that would ensure that the knowledge one could derive from it was an indisputable
certainty. His infamous Basic Law V expressed the following: If all Fs are Gs then the class of F is
identical to the class of G. Frege‘s Basic Law V was translated mathematically in the following way:
(∀a (Fa = Ga)) ↔ ({x/Fx} = {y/Gy}). In other words, the set of Fs is the same as the set of Gs if every F
is a G and every G is an F. If we take, for example, the proposition, ―Something is a tree and is in this
garden,‖ the ―something‖ is an indeterminate x. We can substitute the x with an object that is associated
with the concept, ―tree in this garden.‖ Russell disproved Frege on the notion of set theory by identifying
a paradoxical problem. He showed that not all objects behave in accordance with this equation. Although
we can identify a collection of ―trees in this garden,‖ it would be problematic to identify objectively a set of
―good books in this library.‖ Russell also showed a paradox that was similar to Epimenides‘ liar‘s paradox.
Epimenides‘ statement, ―All Cretans are liars,‖ was paradoxical. Being Cretan himself, the question that
arose from that statement was, ―Is what he says true or false?‖ Russell‘s paradox recognized the problem
of self-reference and showed that arguments and functions are not as clear and non-contradictory as
Frege intended to prove. The statement, for example, A = ―the set of all sets that don‘t contain
themselves as elements,‖ raises the question, ―Is set A an element of itself?‖ This question is similar to
the Liar‘s paradox. If set A is an element of itself, then it isn‘t an element of itself by definition. However,
if set A is not an element of itself, then it is an element of itself by definition (Roberts, 1992, pp. 78-79).
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macroscopic …. [T]he signified misses the referent‖ (p. 20).

The signifier cannot

represent fully what it intends to represent and, consequently, the subject cannot
say fully what he intends to say.

§
Reflecting further on Lacan‘s anti-essentialist approach to his theories of
symptoms and identifications, and his substantial deviations from the neo-Freudian
understandings of ―wholeness‖ and the ―self,‖ one should be clear that the Lacanian
subject comes to be as a failure to be inscribed as a stable meaning within language.
The subject‘s discursive positions and identifications overlap with the metaphorical
and metonymical functions of words and meanings.

When Lacan (1998b) says that

the ―signifier … is characterized by the fact that it represents a subject to another
signifier‖ and that ―a sign is not the sign of some thing, but of an effect that is what
is presumed as such by a functioning of the signifier‖ (p. 49), he is saying that the
subject is not reducible to representations and meanings.

Meaning is unstable

because it is not found in any one single signifier, but in the play between signifiers.
The notion that the subject acquires an identity from the Other is not different from
contemporary psychological theories. But Lacan subverts these theories by locating
the Other as the locus of signifiers and not of signs. For Lacan, the subject is caused
by the splitting between the signifier and the signified.
The desiring subject and the Other are involved in a dialectical relationship.
They both ask each other the question: ―Chè vuoi?‖ ―What do you want?‖ (Écrits, p.
690/815).

The Other, therefore, calls the subject‘s existence into question.

The

subject encounters the trauma of being questioned whether it is legitimate enough
for the Other and, hence, whether or not its identifications with external images and
social ideals are justifiable.

The unconscious subject thwarts the possibility of

coherence and the subject never gets an ultimate confirmation from the Other about
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the unity of its identity.

The unconscious subject wants to be the signifier of the

Other‘s desire. The Other, as the locus of speech, cannot point to a single signifier of
his desire and so the unconscious subject is in conflict with its ego and with the
external discourses and images that promise self-coherence, unity, and satisfaction.
In the same vein, the subject questions the validity and power of the Law. When the
desiring subject situates itself in the interrogative dialectics of Chè vuoi?, it prevents
the Other‘s signifying system from being complete. After all, as is often the case,
one can have all kinds of phallic gratifications, from social recognition to wealth, and
still experience a profound discontentment and dissatisfaction with life.
In Seminar IX, Lacan (1961-1962) further elucidates that when the subject
identifies with the Other‘s trait, that trait constructs the subject‘s singular identity.
The trait that the subject identifies with is initially marked as an image, but is then
―effaced‖ from its status as an image and becomes transformed into a signifier.
Lacan goes so far as to say that the paradox of the unary trait is that ―the more it
resembles‖ the Other whom the subject identifies with, the more this resemblance is
effaced and supports ―difference as such‖ (chapter 10). When the subject identifies
with the Other‘s trait, the subject is not fused, merged, or amalgamated with the
Other; needless to say, the subject is not even in harmony or allied with the Other.
On the contrary, the subject who identifies with the Other‘s unique trait, whose value
is arbitrary but yet significant for the subject, fades in his or her unconscious
displacements of signifiers.
The unary trait is a unique value for the subject and thus functions as a One.
By identifying with a trait of a loved object, the subject initially covers up his or her
own emptiness and acquires a sense of being.

The unary trait also inscribes

particular conditions of jouissance which involve the loved object. What remains as
a leftover from the symbolization of the trait is experienced by the subject as a
particular corporal tension.

The unary trait marks the body as ―an enjoying
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substance‖—in other words, it corporizes, it transforms ―the body in a signifying
way‖ (Lacan, 1998b, p. 23).
Regardless of the subject‘s identification with the Other‘s single trait, the
subject attempts to enunciate its own wholeness and unity and demands absolute
love from the Other.

In its attempts to construct a whole, the subject finds itself at

odds with what remains failing, unrepresentable, incomplete, and unsymbolizable.
Language fails the subject. The Other as language is fundamentally flawed and thus
the subject finds out that there is no ultimate guarantor for its own completeness
and consistency.
The split subject, Lacan (1961-1962) tells us, desires to know. It desires to
know the trace which has appeared and has disappeared and has thus not been
structured as whole and fulfilling. Through the automatism of repetition (repetition
compulsion), the subject insists on something which is nothing other in its essence
than a signifier, as it is rooted in an original unary trait (chapter 13). The subject
fades in the function of the signifier and makes the same cycle of repetitions. The
subject circles around a torus-like ring in a repetitive attempt to master the hole at
its center (the real, jouissance), repeating the same symptoms over and over again.
As Lacan says, ―something happened at the origin which is the whole system of the
trauma … something which took on from that time the form‖ of the unary trait. The
subject repeats the same symptom by attempting to re-emerge from that trait and
the lost object of satisfaction.30 The subject becomes a pure sufferer and is sucked

30

Freud‘s case of Emma, a case study of a female hysteric, is a good example with which to demonstrate
how the unary trait gets transformed into a signifier. Emma was an anxious girl who was afraid of going
into stores alone because she thought that people were making fun of her clothes. Her anxieties were
related to two early memories. At age twelve, Emma went into a store alone and thought that the store
assistants laughed at her clothes. Emma became attracted to one of them. At a younger age, a
shopkeeper pinched her under her dress and thus Emma had a memory trace of someone who
experienced sexual attraction towards her for the first time. Emma‘s anxiety about going into stores alone
was retroactively related to the mark that the Other stamped onto her body for the first time, inscribing
her sexuality through the intervention of the signifier, which was the signifier of his desire for her (see
Lacan, 1997, pp. 73-74). Emma thus identified with the shopkeeper‘s sexual attraction towards her,
which elicited sexual jouissance, and was transformed into a signifier of desire (into a symptom) that gave
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in by that which ―it speaks‖ (ça parle).

Its living being is caught up in the

mechanisms of the signifier (chapter 6).
The nature of the unary trait is to be lacking. As Lacan states, only in the
absence of the mother‘s breast is the subject able to identify the breast as a partial
love object and substitute for its absence with words. The subject‘s memory trace of
the mother‘s breast is elevated to an unattainable object a—object cause of desire—
when it changes its status from that which supplies milk and satisfies the need of
hunger to that which brings forth an unsatisfied desire for absolute love and
wholeness. Oral demand thus situates the memory trace of the mother‘s breast as
an exclusive possibility of unity and wholeness. At the level of demand, the subject
poses the implicit question, ―What do I want?‖ when it speaks to the Other, but at
the level of desire, the subject wants ―nothing maybe‖ (chapter 14). The enunciated
―nothing‖ poses the initial question of the impossibility of determining how the
subject can really be satisfied by the object‘s partial nature.

Lacan, however,

specifies that this is the difference between enunciation and the enunciated. At the
level of enunciation, the subject reproduces the sign, the meaning of something the
subject wants, but at the level of the enunciated (i.e., what is stated), the sign shifts
to the level of the signifier where the subject is articulated in an indefinite sliding of
meanings.
Is the subject a sign?

Since the Other is impotent to provide ultimate

answers to the subject, the subject is ―the sign of nothing‖ (chapter 14).
subject is thus dependent on the Other for its desire.

The

It desires the Other for its

impossibility to say it all and for its possibility that the Other is hiding a precious
object that could supposedly be given to the subject to achieve a sublime
satisfaction.

As Lacan writes, ―The object of desire exists as this very nothing which

an account of that original mark from the Other (S1). One could argue that her anxiety to go into a store
reenacted her anxiety of losing the object that was the source of a supplementary jouissance.
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the Other cannot know to be all it consists in‖ (chapter 14). The Other‘s incapacity
to provide this precious object leads the desiring subject to exclude the Other for not
knowing. The neurotic, Lacan tells us, excludes the Other‘s ignorance by designating
him- or herself as a victim and by telling the Other, ―It is absolutely necessary that
you should know‖ (chapter 14).

The desiring subject posits itself as a real, as

impossible, in the face of the Other. More particularly, the hysteric posits herself as
the sign that could possibly complete the Other—a sign that marks the Other but is
of course constituted as impossible.
In Encore, Lacan (1998b) asks the question, ―To be hysterical or not—that is
truly the question.

Is there One or not?‖ (p. 102).

The hysteric desires the One

from the Other—the One which is ―the function of desire‖ (Lacan, 1961-1962,
chapter 10). By identifying with the Other‘s single traits, the hysteric aims at the
Other‘s castration and not at the Other‘s jouissance, though she contemplates what
this Other jouissance is, what makes the Other not-wholly inscribed within the phallic
function, and how the Other jouissance escapes the symbolic.

In Seminar XVII,

Lacan (2007) maintains that the hysteric identifies with the Other because she wants
the Other to be a master. She wants the Other to be the master of knowledge, ―but
at the same time she doesn‘t want him to know so much that he does not believe
she is the supreme price of all his knowledge‖ (p. 129). The One that the hysteric
identifies with is what counts to her as a phallic being, as an object of desire, as the
one who is valued as precious but yet an impossible individual. By wanting to be the
phallus, she demands love; she demands to be the one who can plug up the lack in
the Other. Yet she refuses to give her body as a sexual body and withholds pleasure
from the Other. In the case of Dora, for example, Dora‘s identification with Frau K‘s
adorable white body, her embodied trait, and her subsequent recourse to meditating
before the Madonna, constructed particular conditions of jouissance in regard to her
sexual being.

Dora played the part of a man by adoring Frau K‘s body at the
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symbolic level and the part of a woman by identifying with a man‘s interests in her.
In both sexual identifications, Dora examined her father‘s cause of desire in order to
acquire knowledge of the true essence of femininity.
The hysteric plays the parts of a man and a woman in a masquerade in her
attempts to incite the Other‘s desire for her. Her sexual masquerade camouflages
her desire to be the phallus for the Other and conceals her feminine jouissance. In
Écrits, Lacan (2006) maintains that ―in order to be the phallus—that is, the signifier
of the Other‘s desire—… a woman rejects an essential part of femininity, namely, all
its attributes, in the masquerade‖ (p. 583/694).
masquerade entails a loss of being.

The phallic function of her

In her relationship with a man, the hysteric

becomes the object cause of his desire and, by the means of triangular and at times
quadrilateral identifications, maintains her desire dissatisfied. As I will discuss in the
next chapter, the hysteric conforms to what she imagines the masculine Other
desires her to be for him.
In this chapter, I glossed over some fundamental differences between Lacan
and neo-Freudians on theories of hysteria. I argued that Lacan‘s theory of hysteria
is neither a description of characterological traits and fixations nor a list of
symptoms.

Hysteria is a structure in relation to the Other.

When the hysteric

complains about a symptom in analysis, the hysteric is then asked to decipher this
symptom at two levels:

At the level of its etiological meaning—a meaning that is

construed from the analysand‘s historical context, s(A)—and at the level of
unconscious desire in relation to the Other, S(A), as it is deciphered from the place
where the hysteric situates the Other in her fundamental fantasy. In the following
chapter, I discuss a case study of one of my own patients, who was a female
hysteric, and provide a Lacanian psychoanalytic interpretation in order to show how
the hysteric structures her desire in relation to an overbearing/oppressive male
Other.
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Chapter 4
A Lacanian Case Formulation of a Female Hysteric

The case of hysteria that I am going to describe is that of a woman in her late
20‘s whom I saw for therapy for 30 sessions.

I refer to this patient with the

pseudonym of Sofia. Prior to working with me, Sofia had been in therapy with two
other therapists for approximately two years. By reflecting on this case, I elaborate
on Sofia‘s relationship to the symbolic Other and issues of femininity. Regardless of
the patient‘s overt cooperation with her therapists, Sofia‘s case has much to teach us
about the complexities of providing an effective treatment of hysterical symptoms. 31
This case also provokes us to raise and reflect on the following questions:
What kind of sexual jouissance did Sofia fantasize about as a substitute for
her unpleasurable sexual experiences with boyfriends? What was love for Sofia and
what did she want from men?

How can we understand Sofia‘s resistance to male

perceptions of the female body? How did Sofia resist the hegemonic discourses of
gender and how did she identify with femininity and masculinity?

How did Sofia‘s

suffering become a site of resistance to patriarchal discourses of femininity? How did
Sofia‘s symptoms signify a longing for the lost relationship with the maternal?
31

The patient whom I describe here was far from being cured of her symptoms during my therapeutic
work with her. Sofia saw three doctoral clinicians in training for therapy for approximately three years.
Due to the therapists‘ end of practicum training, Sofia had to transfer to a new therapist each year. None
of her therapists practiced Lacanian analysis. Sofia‘s first therapist intervened based on the eclectic
theoretical approach; the second therapist was influenced by the object-relational approach; and I was
influenced by the psychoanalytic theories of Freud and Lacan, but did not practice Lacanian psychoanalytic
techniques, as they are described by Fink (2007, 1997), for example, scansion and punctuation. I
encouraged the patient to free associate to childhood memories, dreams, fantasies, and fleeting thoughts.
Whereas I interpreted some of the latent contents of her dreams and fantasies, more work needed to be
done for Sofia to realize her unconscious desires and transverse her fundamental fantasy.
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I first provide a description of the case and then respond to the above
questions by formulating the case from a Lacanian psychoanalytic perspective. My
purpose is to show readers that Lacan provides different answers to the above
questions than feminists do. In order to build a bridge between feminism and Lacan,
it is necessary to analyze a case of female hysteria in Lacanian terms so as to reflect
on the feminist interrogations of his theory.

4.1

Description of the Case

4.11 Presenting Problems

Sofia was a Caucasian female of American descent.

During the time of

therapy with me, Sofia was 28 years of age and a single mother of an 8 year-old
daughter.

She was a graduate student in business and worked part-time as an

assistant at a research center.
She sought therapy to discuss problems maintaining good relationships with
friends and boyfriends.

She avoided those friends who were more intelligent than

her because of her feelings of inadequacy during conversations.

She maintained

relationships with few friends, ―less intelligent‖ than her, but she often felt ―annoyed
by them‖ for not understanding her views on art, politics, and gender issues. Sofia
fervently wished to discuss issues related to the inequalities between the sexes. She
believed that women should feel more comfortable with their bodies and should not
wear Victoria‘s Secret products, e.g., ―sexy‖ underwear and sleepwear.

Sofia was

against Victoria‘s Secret advertisements, because, as she said, they portrayed
women as ―very thin‖ and ―sex slaves of men.‖ When she was an adolescent, Sofia
received Victoria‘s Secret catalogues and other women‘s magazines but, after her
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pregnancy, she stopped buying them because she realized that she should not
support their advertisements.
Sofia dated a man who was six years older than her, whom I refer to as
Gerald. Sofia had already been involved with Gerald for approximately three years
when she began therapy with me. Sofia described herself as being deeply in love
with him.

Gerald, however, did not identify himself as her boyfriend and did not

commit himself exclusively to her.

Sofia and Gerald often met and had sexual

relations, but soon after their intimate encounters, they argued over ―small issues‖
and separated for short periods of time. Sofia described him as a ―controlling man‖
who showed little affection or consideration for her and was insensitive to her
feelings. Gerald used to take care of Sofia‘s daughter or wash her dishes when he
wanted to have sex with her, but he also used to tell her that he dated other women.
Sofia was attracted to his ―knowledge, skills, and aloofness.‖

She longed for his

affection, but Gerald never told her that he loved her. Although she had numerous
verbal conflicts with him, she also made many efforts to maintain their relationship.
Sofia was both submissive to him and defiant regarding the limited nature of their
relationship.
Gerald asked Sofia once to shave her pubic hair before he would give her oral
sex. Gerald found that she had ―too much hair‖ around her genitalia. Gerald also
complained to Sofia that she did not dress up in as feminine a manner as he liked.
When I asked her what she thought of Gerald‘s requests, Sofia said she was against
Sports’ Illustrated issues, which portrayed women as shaved and thin, and which
influenced men to desire these sorts of women. Sofia became infuriated with Gerald,
explaining that she found his demands offensive. Sofia complained that, as a single
and working mother, she did not have the time to do extra shaving or dress up in a
more feminine way. Sofia added that she perceived herself as dressing in a feminine
manner, but did not have time to make herself look ―sexy.‖
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Sofia sometimes

complied with his demands after an argument, because she was fearful that if she
failed to satisfy his demands, Gerald would leave her for another woman.

When

Gerald was more available, Sofia refused to be submissive and had arguments with
him.
Sofia expressed ambivalence about maintaining long-lived and steady
relationships with men due to her concern with losing her ―independence‖ and with
being ―easily bored.‖

Sofia found Gerald‘s aloofness seductive.

When he was

inaccessible to her, she wished she was married and had a ―normal romantic life.‖
After an argument with Gerald, Sofia was tearful and wished to have a married life
with him. When both were intimate, Sofia found herself resisting the constraints of
their relationship.

Sofia believed that men oppress women by placing high

expectations on their appearances and roles in the family.
Sofia had had many boyfriends over the years. Since the age of 13, she had
had casual sex even with those who did not identify themselves as her boyfriends.
During her high school years, Sofia used to smoke marijuana, drink alcohol, skip
school, and associate with friends and boyfriends who behaved in similar ways.
After she gave birth to her daughter in her early 20‘s, she drank alcohol and
smoked cigarettes at night by herself in order to overcome feelings of intense
sadness, boredom, and psychological emptiness. While she was drunk on her own,
Sofia cried, listened to ―depressive‖ music, wrote poems and stories, and played
solitaire for hours.

Although she often regretted spending long hours engaged in

those activities, she found herself as if she was able to take away her ―social mask‖
and be herself while drunk. Sofia associated her playing solitaire with her tendency
to be alone for hours and lament her loneliness and social limitations.
When Sofia was around other people, she felt as if she was ―wearing a mask‖
for them.

Sofia‘s use of the word ―mask‖ was a metaphor to describe the

dissatisfactions and disappointments in her life, especially in being a single mother,
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working in a monotonous job environment, feeling misunderstood by others, and
being involved with an inconsiderate boyfriend. When she was with others, Sofia felt
she had to pretend that she was happy. In reality, Sofia was depressed and angry at
others. Sofia masked her own desires and portrayed an image of a woman who was
in control and met the expectations of others.

In therapy, she was often tearful

when she discussed her relationships with Gerald, friends, and parents, as well as
her failure to be a good mother to her daughter.

4.12 Family History

Sofia grew up with both of her biological parents and three siblings.

Sofia

was the first-born. She had a sister who was one year younger, a brother who was
two years younger, and another brother who was ten years younger than her.
Before her marriage, Sofia‘s mother had been a nun.

After marriage, the mother

stayed at home as a housewife and the father worked at an auto-body shop and
fixed cars. Her father owned his own business, but when Sofia was 11 years old, he
lost his business. Since then, her father had to work for someone else. He was not
happy with his work and complained that he was not successful. At the loss of the
father‘s private business, the family had to move into a smaller house and Sofia had
to change from private to public school.

Sofia explained that this was one of the

reasons why she had friends who were bad influences on her and started to drink
alcohol and smoke marijuana.
Sofia grew up in a house in which there were several conventional rules. She
was brought up in a strictly religious Catholic home and both parents were critical of
her and her siblings.

All family members had to go to church every Sunday,

regardless of whether they wanted to or not.
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Sofia reported that her mother‘s

dedication to religion impacted the family in such a way that her father and the
children passively obeyed her and went to church to make her happy. Sofia recalled
that, at the age of eight, her father called her to get ready to go to church with him,
which she did but felt ―empty and hollow.‖ She found church ―depressing.‖ Sofia
sensed that her father‘s choice to go to church was artificial; he was simply
complying with her mother‘s expectations, because he was, as she knew, not a very
religious man.

Since then, Sofia regarded religious beliefs as ―meaningless,‖

―useless,‖ and oppressive for enjoying one‘s life.
Sofia described both parents as the ―kind of people who would push and pull.‖
Sometimes they would be warm and understanding and other times angry and
demanding. Many times, her mother would try to pull Sofia close to her, but when
Sofia was affectionate to her, her mother criticized Sofia about her way of dressing,
lifestyle, and mothering skills.

Although Sofia found her father to be easier going

and more fun than her mother, she was disappointed with him many times.

Her

father often failed to grant Sofia‘s demands. For example, when Sofia asked him a
question about how to fix her car, he responded in a detached way, ―I don‘t know.‖
Sofia understood his response as ―ironic‖—since he repaired cars for a living—and
her father as ―indifferent.‖

When Sofia did not ask for help, her father offered it.

Sofia felt confused about whether or not her father loved her.
Sofia viewed her mother as ―cold‖ and as the kind of woman who had a
strong impact on her father.

In her associations to her mother‘s coldness and

influence on her father, Sofia recalled that when she was 4 years old, she had the
mental image of standing in front of the refrigerator, seeing the door of the freezer
open, and finding her parents in there. This mental image was transient and it was
associated

with

finding

her

mother

―cold,‖

―fake,‖

affectionate, overpowering, and controlling with her father.

104

―critical,‖

not

genuinely

Sofia gave many examples of her mother being fake, critical, and cold: One
example was that her mother cooked meals for the family, but never served them on
the table. Each family member was expected to make his/her own plate from food
that was prepared on the stove. Her father often raised it as an issue and demanded
that she serve him; his daughters ended up doing the serving for him.

Another

example was that her mother always gave her ambiguous and contradictory
criticism. Her mother made her feel even more worthless when she was compared
with her sister, who was the most compliant and obedient child in the family. As a
young child, Sofia was organized, like her mother, but she felt confused and
disappointed when her mother compared her with her sister and told her,
―disorganized people are more intelligent.‖ When Sofia misbehaved, her mother told
her, ―I expected this from you.‖ When she received compliments and hugs from her
mother, she felt that her mother was being insincere.

Her mother‘s hugs were

unusual for Sofia and when she squeezed her, Sofia felt discomfort, ―weird,‖ and
anxious at finding her unpredictably affectionate.

Sofia was used to seeing her

mother having outbursts for small issues. The mother occasionally used to threaten
her children that she would throw them out of the house when they misbehaved.
After the birth of Sofia‘s daughter, the mother told Sofia that Sofia was ―80%
of a good mother‖ towards her daughter, especially because Sofia did not take her to
church more. On one occasion, the mother gave her an article to read about how to
become a good parent and, on another occasion, she blamed her children for her
inability to connect with them. She often told Sofia that if Sofia did not have sex
with so many men, she would not have personal problems and would have better
relations with her mother.

Sofia expressed feelings of anger and hurt about her

mother in the sessions, especially because Sofia never discussed with her their
issues but just ―gossiped about superficial things.‖
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She also expressed feelings of

guilt for being too harsh in her descriptions of her mother and for not succeeding to
connect well with her.
At age 16, Sofia did something wrong and her parents told her that from then
on she would have to do her own laundry. At that time, Sofia felt alienated and hurt
as she thought that she did not belong to them anymore.
Sofia reported that her parents did not argue with each other, but that they
were not very intimate either.

Sofia described her mother as being sexually

reserved. When her father wanted to kiss her, she expressed distaste. At age 10,
Sofia overheard her parents arguing about sex. She recalled that her father wanted
sex and her mother was critical of him. When Sofia was an adolescent, her mother
used to complain to Sofia about her father wanting sex and Sofia used to interrupt
her, telling her that she did not want to hear that.
Sofia described her father as being ―a more normal person‖ than her mother
was before he got married. Unlike her mother, her father ―lived his life by smoking,
drinking alcohol, and having sex with other women.‖ Sofia found her father happier
and more loving. However, she also said that her father criticized her just as her
mother did. Sofia felt that she was not good enough or intelligent enough for either
parent and complained that she never had an intelligent conversation with them.
They shared nothing but ―small talk.‖
When Sofia was an adolescent, she heard from her sister that their father had
sexually abused Sofia‘s sister at a young age. Sofia reported that her sister never
told her the details of the abuse and that she never asked her for them.

Sofia

expressed disbelief and uncertainty as to whether or not this actually happened or
whether her sister misinterpreted their father‘s intentions. Sofia, however, recalled
that when she was young, she used to take baths with him naked. When Sofia was
eight years old, her father got angry with her for misbehaving and he pulled her
pants down. He did not spank her but, when Sofia had her pants down, left. Sofia
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talked about being confused as to why her father had pulled her pants down. Sofia
conjectured that he wanted to either abuse her or spank her, but left because he
changed his mind.
Sofia reported that her father never ―really punished‖ her. When Sofia was in
high school, she skipped classes and slept in. Her father was ―fed up‖ with her and,
one morning, he grabbed her by her ankles and dragged her out of bed, leading to
her hitting her head on the floor.

Sofia was very upset with the way her father

treated her. She complained that he criticized her without inquiring as to what might
be going on.
Sofia said that both parents gave more attention to her brothers.

Her

youngest brother suffered from asthma and was treated better than anyone else.
When Sofia was 12, the other brother got hospitalized for a suicide threat and was
diagnosed with severe depression. When he had a tantrum towards his parents, her
brother grabbed a razor and threatened to kill himself. The family was forced to go
for family therapy.

Sofia was resentful and angry towards her whole family.

She

skipped ―these meaningless meetings‖ and chose to go see a boyfriend instead.

4.13 Personal History
Sofia had been depressed since she was a child. She was pessimistic about
her life and felt empty. When she went to high school, Sofia lied a lot to her parents,
missed school, drank alcohol, used street drugs, and had relationships with boys.
Sofia associated with girlfriends who referred to themselves as ―tomboy hippie
chicks.‖ Several times, the principal of the school called her mother to inform her of
his concerns about Sofia.
Sofia lost control of her drinking and drug use at age 14. At that time, she
also had her first sexual experience.

She became promiscuous and found herself
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―losing control.‖ Like with her parents, Sofia got involved with boyfriends who would
―pull‖ her toward them and then ―push‖ her away inconsistently. Sofia was confused
about what her boyfriends expected from her. She often gave in to their demands,
but she also felt frustrated and hostile and argued with them. Most of her boyfriends
got her into ―trouble,‖ especially with drugs and alcohol.

They were verbally

abusive, which led her to be dependent on them and resentful.
At age 20, Sofia became pregnant from an ―irresponsible boyfriend‖ who
asked her to have an abortion.

Although she did not want the baby, she kept it,

because she decided to follow her family‘s religious beliefs for that decision. Sofia
then separated from her boyfriend, became depressed and lonely, and had constant
difficulties in rearing her daughter.
In sessions, Sofia discussed how she looked at sex as a control issue in
relationships.

She felt obligated to have sex with her boyfriends, since she was

involved with them, but also experienced difficulty reaching orgasm.

Sofia felt

abused by most of her boyfriends because they were drug addicts. She often slept
with boys without having intimate feelings for them.
When Sofia got involved with Gerald, she thought that she would finally have
a more mature and intimate relationship with a man. Gerald, however, did not want
to commit to her and often seemed to be domineering and irresponsible. Sofia also
described him as attractive and found that behind his domineering character he had
low self-esteem. At times, when Gerald was vulnerable to low self-esteem, he was
more considerate toward Sofia. Sofia wanted Gerald to love her. On one occasion,
she was surprised to hear from Gerald that he thought she only wanted him for sex.
Sofia reported that she was the one who simply gave in to his sexual requests. Sofia
was tearful when Gerald did not want to make an exclusive commitment to her.
Unlike her previous boyfriends, who were alcoholics, drug addicts, and
dropouts from school, Sofia found Gerald different.
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Sofia never really loved her

previous boyfriends, including the one with whom she had her child, but was in love
with Gerald.

Sofia found Gerald to be more affectionate and intelligent than her

parents were. Her love for him and struggle to maintain a meaningful relationship
with him were the main reasons Sofia came to therapy.

4.14 A Fantasy, a Dream, and a Tale
An important turning point in Sofia‘s therapy came when she was willing to
talk with me about a fantasy that she had had since she was 15 years old.

The

fantasy was about having a relationship with the singer Vince Neil. Vince Neil was a
popular singer of heavy metal music. Sofia adored the singer‘s appearance, music,
and lyrics.

In the early 1980‘s, although he identified as heterosexual, Vince Neil

looked like a woman with his long blond hair, slim body, form-fitting clothing,
necklaces, and make-up. Vince Neil sang about the enjoyment of life, the struggle to
enjoy one‘s life, and man‘s love for a woman.

In one of his CD‘s, there was a

painting of a split face, one half of which was happy and the other half sad. This
duality was related to Sofia‘s psychological state and to her statements, ―I seem to
adore my powerlessness and helplessness….I am more creative when I am
depressed.‖
Sofia fantasized that the singer had a brother and that his brother abducted
her. His brother beat her up, was verbally abusive, and then raped her. When Sofia
had sex with his brother, Vince showed up and saved her from him. Other times,
her masturbation fantasy involved having consensual sex with Vince‘s brother and
Vince caught them in the act. Vince watched them having sex and was disappointed
with Sofia. Sofia then begged Vince in tears to take her back. Sofia said, ―When I
am harmed by his brother I know that I should fantasize about my pain more, but it
is blurry how I feel.‖
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Similar versions of that fantasy also involved Gerald.

Sofia fantasized that

she was having sex with a man while Gerald watched them. Sofia then told Gerald
that she loved him but Gerald did not want to listen. Sofia followed him and begged
him to come back. Sometimes Gerald came back and had sex with her and other
times Gerald refused to come back to her. Sofia viewed Gerald as masculine, like
her dad, and unlike Vince Neil, but she also associated Gerald with her mom because
of his contradictory and inconsistent personality characteristics.
In one of her dreams, Sofia was possessed by the devil. Sofia was down in a
basement with a laundry machine and blacked out. She passed out in the arms of
the actress Glenn Close. Sofia asked Glenn, ―What is going on with me?‖ Glenn did
not respond.
possessed?

Sofia asked again, ―Tell me, what is going on with me, am I
I know I am.‖

Glenn responded, ―I recorded a CD for you!‖

Sofia

panicked and woke up.
Sofia described her dream as a nightmare and portrayed Glenn Close as a
―devilish woman.‖ Sofia was not sure if Glenn was also possessed in that dream as
she was.

She associated Glenn with obscure depictions of the feminine and the

masculine in her movies.

She described her as playing the ―seductive and clever

woman‖ as well as the very ―active, aggressive, and practical‖ one. Sofia associated
the basement and the laundry area with her memory of being asked by her parents
to do her own laundry at the age of 16. She also associated it with a couple with
whom she was friendly and whose daughter used to play with Sofia‘s daughter down
in their basement. Sofia‘s daughter sometimes had tantrums in that basement and
Sofia had difficulties calming her daughter down.

The couple criticized Sofia‘s

parenting skills, telling her that she needed to have stricter rules and set boundaries
with her daughter.
Finally, Sofia‘s loneliness and emotional pain were also associated with one of
the stories she wrote. In the story, the main character, called Ann, was anguished
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and hopeless because she had cancer. She was dying. She had kids and was not
able to take care of them.

Ann had an independent personality and refused to

accept her husband‘s help, even though he was a loving and affectionate man. Sofia
admired Ann‘s strength but also envied her for being able to cope with her despair
without the help of her husband. Sofia identified with Ann‘s pain, hopelessness, and
despair, but also looked up to Ann for her strength and independence from her
husband. Sofia felt she was not strong enough to be independent from others.

4.2

A Lacanian Case Formulation

4.21 The Paradoxes of Speech

The desired and unexploited
Woman

The abused sister
(ego’)

What is it to be a Woman?

(e.g., religious mother,
possessed Glenn,
suffering Ann)

What makes a man enjoy?
What makes a man desire a woman?

Sofia

Man (e.g., father)
(Other)

Figure 4.1 Quadrangular Schema

Sofia presented vague statements of who she was. She found inconsiderate
and uncommitted boyfriends to be both hurtful and attractive. She hated the idea of
men‘s control over women, but was involved with men.

She complied with men‘s

requests for sex, but did not find sex enjoyable. When her boyfriend, Gerald, was
―aloof‖ and ―inconsiderate,‖ she loved him more. She fantasized about being raped
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by a stranger and gazed at by her boyfriend.

By making these contradictory

enunciations in therapy, Sofia wondered about her identity.

Whereas she

consciously believed she knew who she was, by exploring the unconscious, she
realized that the sign that described her was an ambiguous question mark. In other
words, the sign was raised to the function of the signifier, which disconnected her
from her conscious representations of her identity.
The signifiers in Sofia‘s unconscious made her enunciations incomprehensible.
They made holes in the meaning that was determinant of her discourse (Écrits,
678/801). Her unconscious signifiers insisted and interfered in the cuts of her actual
discourse. In dreams and fantasies, Sofia was possessed by the devil; Glenn Close,
the actress, was transformed into a devilish bisexual figure; Vince Neil, the singer,
was transformed into a gaze; Sofia‘s fictional character of Ann, who suffered from
cancer, was transformed into a sublime woman; and Sofia loved Gerald when she
positioned herself at the specific distance from him that allowed her to maintain her
desire for him.
These were some of the unconscious signifiers in Sofia‘s mind.
signifiers

could

only

become

comprehensible

and

subvert

Sofia‘s

These

conscious

understandings of her identity by being engaged in the process of deciphering her
unconscious and of tying these signifiers together to create a new button tie. The
button tie that arose during therapy sealed a new kind of symbolic meaning by its
retroactive effect from the Other to Sofia.

Each signifier represented Sofia‘s

subjectivity for another signifier. For example, as I will discuss shortly, the signifier
S4, ―devil,‖ represented Sofia for the signifier S 3, ―lived,‖ and the signifier S3
retroactively gave meaning to the signifier S2, ―feeling alive in the same way as her
father lived before his marriage to his cold wife,‖ and so on. Sofia was involved in
the process of dialectizing isolated and opaque signifiers—signifiers such as the devil
which froze, subjugated, and annihilated her as a subject—in order to separate
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herself from their alienating effects and create new metaphors and assume ―a new
position in relation to the cause‖ (Fink, 1995, p. 79).
Sofia‘s certainty about her identity provided a meaning in the imaginary
realm. The imaginary meaning stemmed from times when domineering others and
the patriarchal Other supplied answers or reasons about her existence.

Being

engulfed by the Other‘s capricious desires and dependent on the Other‘s provision of
signs, Sofia was alienated in the Other (Écrits, 690/815; Fink, 2004, p. 123).
Listening to Sofia‘s description of her story of Ann—a story she shared with
me after she discussed her associations to dreams and fantasies—one can discern
that Sofia imagined the possibility of being independent from the Other‘s demands
and desires. Whereas in Sofia‘s experience the Other was patriarchal, overpowering,
cold, inconsiderate, and unloving, through the story of Ann, Sofia told us that she
wished to be an independent woman, even when the Other was loving and
considerate. However, Sofia also informed us that she did not have the strength to
be such a woman. She created instead the fictional character of Ann and wondered
about what it was like for a woman to suffer an unbearable disease, cope with pain
on her own, and be free from social expectations without relying on her husband‘s
help and approval or disapproval of her decisions.

Ann‘s husband was loving and

desirous of his sublime and strong wife. Sofia wondered, what was it to be a sublime
and independent woman? What made a man desire a woman?
As I show in Figure 4.1, Sofia was implicated in a quadrangular ―circuit of
desire‖ (Fink, 1997, p. 127). Sofia desired to know what aroused her father‘s desire
for her mother and what made her father satisfied. She identified with her father‘s
desire for her mother by identifying with his lack of knowledge about feminine
jouissance that was beyond the jouissance of the organ. Whereas the mother was
the object of her father‘s desire, her rival sister was the object of her father‘s sexual
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satisfaction.

In other words, her father sustained desire vis-à-vis her mother and

derived jouissance from her sister.
At the level of the symbolic, Sofia identified with her father‘s desire for his
wife and, subsequently, with masculine desire for a woman.

At the level of the

imaginary, Sofia identified with her sister, who was used and abused by their father.
Sofia thought her sister was more loved by their father than she was, and wished to
take her sister‘s place.

In her rape fantasy, Sofia retroactively returned to the

thought that she was raped by her father and that her father loved her more than
her sister. At the level of the real, Sofia enjoyed being the used and abused objet a
for a man. In other words, she was the real and unspeakable cause of desire for a
man whose jouissance was obscene.
§
Sofia presented the following signifiers and memories in therapy:
Alcohol:

Sofia consumed alcohol to fight off depression.

She recalled that

her father used to drink alcohol and be happy before he married her mother. Sofia
engaged in masturbatory fantasies and felt warmth and jouissance when drunk.
Through alcohol, she escaped from memories of cold and unloving relationships with
significant others.
Devil:

In one of her dreams, Sofia was possessed by the devil and was

offered a CD by the actress, Glenn Close. If one reads the signifier devil backwards,
it reads lived.

Sofia lived when drunk, alone, and free from the tyranny of the

superego. She felt alive in the same way her father was alive before marriage and
as opposed to her mother‘s restrictions and conservative religious lifestyle.
Glenn Close:

To Sofia‘s mind, the actress embodied masculinity and

femininity in obscure ways. She enjoyed like a man but was seductive and desired
like a woman. Sofia dreamt of an Other who seemed to have the final word about
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enjoyment and femininity. Sofia‘s dream was a nightmare because she came close
to an Other whose jouissance was still alien to her.32
Be beaten and be raped: Sofia fantasized of being both beaten and raped by
a man. She recalled that her father sexually abused her sister. Sofia wondered if
her father loved her less than he loved her sister. In her associations to her father
being an indifferent man and a passive follower of her mother, Sofia recalled that he
never disciplined her when she was a child and only beat her once when she was an
adolescent. Sofia constructed fantasies of being both beaten and raped, indicating
her wish to receive attention and love from an active male figure.

Rape signified

having sex with an aggressive and active man without her consent or sexual
satisfaction. In real life, Sofia had sex with men without satisfaction. Sofia allowed
herself to have fun with boyfriends, revolted against the norms of family and school,
got in trouble for deviating from rules, and situated herself as an insignificant
individual in relation to boyfriends.
In Sofia‘s unconscious, her symptom of being dissatisfied with having sexual
intercourse with boyfriends was a substitute for the symbolic prohibition of incest
between Sofia and her father. We may recall here that when Sofia was a young child
she took baths with him naked.
and being seduced by him.

We might conjecture that she imagined seducing

Sofia wished her father was an active and fun-loving

man, different from her mother, who was cold and religious.
The signifiers, being beaten and being raped, implied Sofia‘s initial wish for
seduction with her father—a wish which related to her thought of taking her sister‘s
place and a wish which ran counter to her mother‘s religious dogmatism.

Yet we

also know from Sofia‘s history that, regardless of her mother‘s religiosity, her mother
desired her father even though he did not hold the same religious views as her. Her
32

Lacan (1962-1963) writes, ―the anxiety of the nightmare is experienced properly speaking as that of the
jouissance of the Other … it is this being who weighs with his whole opaque weight of alien jouissance on
your chest, who crushes you under his jouissance‖ (chapter 5, italics mine).
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mother‘s desire was thus a phallic signifier. Even though Sofia consciously hated her
mother, she was unconsciously pulled back to the enigma of her mother‘s desire.
The question—―What does my mother want?‖—elicited phallic responses. In Sofia‘s
words, her mother was the one who ―pull[ed]‖ Sofia close to her and showed
affection, but when Sofia was close to her, her mother ―push[ed]‖ her away with
criticism.

Sofia received the message from her mother that she was not a good

enough child; she was not a good enough woman. By experiencing her mother as
cold and unloving, Sofia constructed this fantasy as a way to compensate herself for
the loss of her preoedipal jouissance.
Sofia fantasized that her male seducers beat, raped, and gave pleasure
without her will.

Her mother‘s religiosity and unloving personality as well as her

father‘s obscene jouissance and passivity embodied Sofia‘s void and lack of being in
the signifying system.

In order for Sofia to have access to this veiled phallic

signifier, Sofia became the object of men‘s desires and sexual demands.

Sofia

allowed herself to have sexual intercourse with inconsiderate and abusive boyfriends,
but also asked—who am I in relation to them?

Is it right to allow myself to be

satisfied by them?
Lacan writes, ―The demand for love can only suffer from a desire whose
signifier is foreign to it‖ (Écrits, p. 582/693). Lacan (1960-1961) makes clear to us
that we should not confuse the phallic object with the sign. 33 The phallic object is
the desiring Other, ―what the Other is missing in order to be the noetic A [Autre,
Other], the full-fledged A, the Other insofar as one can have faith in his response to
demand‖ (chapter 15).

Whereas Sofia refused to comply with the Other‘s explicit

demands on her—for example, she did exactly the opposite of what her parents and
other authority figures told her to be or do—she maintained an ambivalent

33

The difference between the sign, s(A), and the phallic signifier, S(A), is also discussed in Écrits (pp.
806-807/682-683) and Fink (2004, pp. 122-124).
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relationship with the Other as a phallic object.

The Other‘s desire petrified her.

Sofia defied the Other in order to get her to desire her. Hence, Sofia‘s own desire
was determined by the Other‘s desire.
Be gazed at: Sofia fantasized about Vince Neil, the singer who looked like a
woman, and Gerald, the boyfriend who had similar personality traits to her mother,
imagining them gazing at her while she had sex with another man. For Sofia, the
mOther was masked by those men whom she declared she was in love with—Vince
Neil and Gerald. That of course did not mean that her boyfriend, Gerald, and the
singer, Vince Neil, were pure semblances of her mother in character. Rather, they
shared particular traits with Sofia‘s mother.
They rescued her from the abuser. They got disappointed and rejected her
when Sofia consented to get off with that man. In Sofia‘s unconscious mind, as in
any hysteric‘s unconscious mind, the Other was split between desire and jouissance
(Soler, 2006).

In her fantasy, Sofia consented to get off with the Other of

jouissance; she was gazed at by the Other of desire; and she preferred to be with
the Other of desire.
Sofia situated Gerald as the Other of desire and positioned herself as the one
who wanted both to fill the Other‘s lack and preserve it. As it was with her mOther,
in her relationship with Gerald, Sofia went back and forth between having him
present in and absent from her life. Sofia was interested in being a precious object
for the Other so as to fill the Other‘s lack and compensate for the Other‘s limitations.
Sofia discussed the limitations of both of her parents. Her mOther‘s lack was
skewed, however, when Sofia told us that her father desired her mother. Her father
complied with her mother‘s rules and wanted her mother even more when she
refused to have sex with him. Sofia emphasized her mOther‘s lack when she saw
her father as a passive follower of her mother without him having a good reason for
it. In Sofia‘s unconscious mind, her mOther was the one who was both powerful and
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inadequate; her father was the one whose sexual jouissance was dangerous who had
to restrain that jouissance.
Sofia‘s repetitive masturbation fantasy of having sex with an active,
aggressive male while being gazed at by a male who had female traits, was a reenactment of her childhood primal scene and Oedipal fantasy.

Sofia‘s childhood

memory of hearing her parents argue about sex—more particularly, her father
wanting sex and her mother being critical of him—played a significant role in Sofia‘s
construction of her fantasy. We can decipher Sofia‘s fantasy in the following ways:
a) Sofia thought her father should have forced her mother to have sex; b) Sofia
identified with her mother who was forced by her father to have sex; c) Sofia
thought her father should have abused her (made love to her forcefully) instead of
her sister; d) Sofia thought her mother should have caught them in the act, which
would have been a punishment to her mother; e) Sofia thought her mother should
have rescued Sofia from her Oedipal wishes.
There were two versions of Sofia‘s fantasy.

In one version, the Other who

gazed at Sofia rescued Sofia from the man who raped her and, after the rescuing,
the Other left her because he was disappointed in her. In another version, the Other
rescued Sofia and had sex with her.

If we think of the Other primarily as the

mOther, we may deduce here that Sofia had an ambivalent relationship with her
mOther. She saw the mOther as split between the desiring Other and the maternal
and Sofia fluctuated between separation from and symbiosis with her.
Thinking of the Other as split between desire and jouissance, Sofia fantasized
about the desiring Other stopping her from having sexual satisfaction with the male
Other whose jouissance was obscene.

In other words, by fantasizing about the

desiring Other stopping her from getting off with the rapist, Sofia sustained an
unsatisfied desire in the man whom she loved but enjoyed being the used and
abused objet a for another man.

As I explained earlier, we can deduce here that
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Sofia identified with her mOther‘s phallic desire for her father—a desire which ran
counter to her religious beliefs—and her father‘s splitting of desire and jouissance
which did not converge on a single woman.

Her mOther‘s desire for her father

played a significant role in how her father also sustained his desire and lack of sexual
satisfaction. Sofia questioned her mother‘s religious beliefs and her awry desire for
her father.34 Sofia became interested in her father‘s awry desire for his critical and
serious wife and in her father‘s sexual jouissance with her sister and other women.
Sofia fantasized that she was gazed at by a desiring male. Under the domain
of his gaze, Sofia vanished in the phallic ghost of his desire and was reduced to an
object.

Her boyfriend‘s gaze—the boyfriend here is her mOther‘s substitute—

provoked Sofia‘s lack of being and transformed Sofia into a desired object. It killed
off Sofia‘s living sexual jouissance.

Concurrently, Sofia fantasized about being a

perverse masochistic objet a for another man—a man who was her father‘s
substitute.

In other words, in fantasy, Sofia made her mOther lay down the law

effectively—the law that required her to give up her Oedipal jouissance.

By

positioning herself as masochistic and as being gazed at by the desiring mOther in
fantasy, Sofia transformed her indifferent and detached mother and boyfriend into
active enunciators of the law and constituted herself as the object cause of their
desires. Sofia imagined that her mother desired to have a more active and dynamic
husband and that her father desired to have a wife who was sexually submissive.
Like Dora—I am referring specifically to Lacan‘s interpretation of Dora as being the
copula between Frau K and her father—Sofia was the copula between her parents.
She constituted herself as the precious object who could sustain the Other‘s desire
and fill up the Other‘s lack.

34

Lacan (1962-1963) writes that the mother‘s desire ―is identical to the function of the law. It is insofar
as the law prohibits her that it imposes desiring her: for after all the mother is not in herself the most
desirable object.‖ (chapter 8)
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Female Genitalia:

Sofia got frustrated with Gerald when he asked her to

shave her pubic hair. Regardless of her frustration, she complied with his demand.
When Sofia was an adolescent, she looked at female models in magazines.

Her

positive attitude towards these magazines changed when the father of her child
abandoned her and when Sofia had to bear the parental responsibilities on her own.
From Sofia‘s discourse, however, we can decipher that even though she expressed
anger at the status quo notion that women should look a certain way, she continued
to be fascinated (seduced) by the images of these models. In Sofia‘s mind, these
models were masquerades of femininity, but Sofia wanted men to adore her without
her being reduced to a feminine image.
According to Lacan, the hysteric grapples with the question, what is it to be a
woman? The hysteric asks this question at the symbolic and not at the imaginary
level. Lacan (1993) says that the hysteric wonders about the essence of femininity
at the unconscious level, and more specifically, asks herself the question, what is a
feminine organ?

She seeks out the fundamental signifier that would describe her

being—what am I? Am I a man or a woman? Lacan states that the question of the
feminine organ concerns its possibility of being either empty or full. The feminine
organ is a fabricated signifier with no particular signified. In one‘s unconscious mind,
to fill the feminine organ with a signified would mean that, in its essence, it is empty.
The biological feminine organ, the organ in the real, does not lack anything.
In Lacan‘s theory, there is no lack in the real, only in the symbolic.

In

contradistinction to feminist views, Lacan encourages us to distinguish between the
social biases regarding the vagina and the cause of those biases (Écrits, p. 614/729).
In order to examine fantasies about the feminine organ, its possibility of a minus or
a plus value, we need to understand Lacan‘s theory of the phallus. One‘s realization
of his/her sex depends on the symbolic phallus, on the signifier of desire that
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separates the subject from a symbiotic relationship with the maternal.35

The

symbolic phallus is destined to have meaning effects on the subject‘s being and
instate sexual difference.
We can now turn to a discussion of the functions of the imaginary and the
symbolic phallus in Sofia‘s subjectivity.

Sofia‘s father castrated Sofia symbolically

when he refused to desire Sofia and when he insisted on desiring her mother
regardless of her coldness and disgust for his sexuality. Sofia knew that her father
was a man who used to enjoy his life before marriage. As I also mentioned earlier,
Sofia‘s mother also played a significant role in Sofia‘s castration with her criticism.
Thus, Sofia identified with lack-in-being in relation to her parents and responded to
that lack in particular ways.
Lacan conceptualizes imaginary castration, symbolized as negativized small
phi (-φ), to represent the loss of something essential in an image. By seeing her
father‘s penis at a young age, his penis that represented a source of precious but
prohibited jouissance, Sofia grew up with ambivalent thoughts about the nature of
her feminine organ. For Lacan, unlike Freud, Sofia‘s unconscious question about her
female genitalia was not about whether or not she was deprived of a real male
organ.

Rather, Sofia‘s unconscious question concerned the mutilation and

prohibition of jouissance. To Sofia‘s mind, the feminine organ was a minus-value,
but it was a minus-value only insofar as its jouissance was concerned. Her feminine
organ was anaesthetized in her sexual involvements with men.

35

By looking at her

In Écrits, Lacan underscores the feminist view that the mother plays the most important role in the birth
of the subject. Lacan does not reduce his concepts of symbolic Father and imaginary Mother to biological
parents. Lacan rather refers to the symbolic Father as ―the effect of a pure signifier, of a recognition, not
of a real father, but of what religion has taught us to invoke as the Name-of-the-Father.‖ The symbolic
Father interrupts the child‘s symbiotic relationship with the devouring maternal object. Christianity
teaches us that in order for the subject to bind itself ―for life to the Law,‖ ―the symbolic Father, insofar as
he signifies this Law,‖ must be ―the dead Father‖ (p. 556/464). As Lacan elaborates further in the
Seminar, Book VII, the murder of God in the Christian belief system signifies the prohibition of jouissance
(satisfaction of the drive). The dead God is the one who provokes the subject to desire his Law. The
symbolic Father is thus the signifier of desire which instates lack between the subject and the Other. In
order for the subject to desire and submit to the Law, he/she has to give up some of its autistic living
jouissance.
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father‘s erectile organ, ―not as itself, or even as an image, but as a part that [was]
missing in the desired image‖ (Écrits, p. 697/822), Sofia identified with her mother‘s
disgust at her father‘s sexual jouissance.

In the locus of the Other, she identified

with the missing signifier that named genital pleasure as the ultimate goal of a
sexual relationship between a man and a woman.
In the Seminar, Book VIII, Lacan provides the following matheme to describe
the hysteric‘s fundamental fantasy:
a
_____ ◊ Α
(-φ)

Figure 4.2 Hysterical Fundamental Fantasy

In this formula, we see that objet a is over the imaginary castration complex (the
negativized lowercase phallus, -φ) which indicates that the hysteric veils her
castration complex in fantasy; she covers up what is missing in her sexed image.
Sofia‘s experience of being offended by Gerald‘s request to shave her pubic hair
when Sofia and Gerald were involved in lovemaking showed that Sofia felt the threat
of castration—the threat of coming closer to the realization that her organ as a
sexual entity was lacking. In Sofia‘s mind, the pubic hair covered up the feminine
organ that had already disappeared from the real and had been transformed into a
signifier.36
Sofia was numb to sexual pleasure. She gave up her own sexual jouissance
and identified instead with the signifier of the Other‘s lack.

Sofia was more

interested in the mother who deprived a man of sexual satisfaction than in the father
who was able to satisfy a woman sexually.

36

The function of the mOther occupied

Cf. a similar discussion in Lacan‘s (1961-1962) analysis of Zucchi‘s painting on Psyche casting her little
lamp onto Eros (chapter 16).

122

Sofia‘s mind so much that it deprived her of potential satisfaction with a man. Sofia
was interested in the enigmatic desire of her father for her mother, especially when
she knew that he usually liked having sex with women. In other words, Sofia was
not interested in what her father enjoyed but rather in what he desired. She was
interested in what her father lacked, because she wanted to be the phallic signifier of
his desire (Φ) and not the object of his jouissance.
Sofia phallicized herself; she embodied the phallus of the Other‘s desire. In
her own eyes, Sofia wanted to be desirable and not sexually available. By being the
phallus for the Other—by identifying with what the Other wanted but could not have
or, in other words, by identifying with her mother‘s depriving her father of sex and
with her father‘s desire for her mother—Sofia attempted to answer the question of
what a man desired from a woman. Sofia thus identified with her father‘s desire and
her father‘s lack-of-being. Sofia desired as if she were in his position, as if she were
a man who desired this other mysterious woman who did not give in to his sexual
demands easily.

In order to maintain her phallic role in her relationship with the

man she loved, Sofia ensured that man‘s desire remained unsatisfied and that she
remained a permanent object of his desire.
It is clear to us by now that Sofia‘s fascination with models embodied
masculine desire for women. Although she was angry with men who were seduced
by the looks of those models, Sofia embodied the pain of sexual dissatisfaction in her
ego in order to castrate the masculine Other.

She was interested in showing the

masculine Other that his fascination with the image of a woman was superficial and
that he needed to produce adequate signifiers to describe femininity with its
mysteries.

Sofia identified with the object of Gerald‘s desire.

In her mind, the

image of a female model occupied the place of the Other‘s desire and not the place
of the Other‘s jouissance. Sofia nourished Gerald‘s desire so she could be someone
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special for him and Gerald could continue to desire her without leaving her as her
previous boyfriend—the father of her child—did.

4.22 Metaphorical and Metonymic Functions in the Dream

We can further elucidate Sofia‘s unconscious desire by discussing the
metaphorical and metonymical functions in her dream. Lacan shows the functions of
metaphor and metonymy in Écrits (pp. 428-429/515-516). The metonymic structure
combines signifiers without engendering a new meaning.

It instates the subject‘s

lack of being and denotes its irreducible nature at the level of the signified.

The

metaphoric structure substitutes one signifier for another and engenders a new
meaning by constituting the substituted signifier at the level of the signified.
Sofia‘s dream of being possessed by the devil and being given a CD by the
possessed actress Glenn Close showed the following:
The manifest signifier, devil, as it appeared in the dream (S3), was the
metaphoric result of the latent signifier, lived (S2).

The signifier, lived

(S2), was fixed under the bar of the signified—fixed in a symptom—that
was inaccessible to Sofia‘s consciousness. Therefore, the thought of being
possessed by the devil was a substitute for the repressed thought of living
without guilt and dissatisfaction in the same way as her father lived before
his marriage to his religious wife.
The actress Glenn Close embodied metonymic combinations of masculine
and feminine traits.

For Sofia, Glenn Close embodied the unspeakable,

mysterious, admirable, irreducible, and unrepresentable woman. She was
the desired woman, the woman in control, the independent woman, the
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woman of jouissance, and the woman who was unbounded by oppressive
norms.
Sofia‘s dream revealed her lack of being, the metonymic structure of her
subjectivity, in the following way:
At the manifest level, Sofia was preoccupied with the thought:
S3
___
s3

I am possessed by the devil
____________________________
Glenn Close is possessed by the devil

→

At the latent level, Sofia unconscious thought was:
S2
___
s2

I am alive
_____________________________
A Woman reassures my ability to live

→

Sofia‘s metonymical structure was:
f (S2→S3) S2 ≅ S2 (—) s2
Figure 4.3 The Metonymical Structure

In the logic of combinatory structures of representations among the signifiers
devil and Glenn, Sofia slipped into a metonymical desire that sustained itself
by her want-to-be. Her desire to know a woman who could reassure her own
living existence was located as a ―minus‖ at the level of the signified. As we
saw earlier, Sofia constituted her desire not in a couple but in a quandrangle.
Sofia was interested in the man‘s desire for a woman because she wanted to
sustain the Other‘s symptom.

Sofia wanted to be the cause of knowledge,

inspire the Other to produce knowledge, and sustain the Other‘s desire for
knowledge (Fink, 1997; Soler, 2006). Sofia wanted to know if such a woman
existed and if she could embody the possibility of being the woman she was
not in relation to her beloved boyfriend.
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4.23 Being Sad, Being the Phallus, and Seeking Love

Sofia felt Gerald‘s desertion and unfaithfulness as a castration of her being.
Her fear of castration resonated in the annihilation of her embodied integrity—body
image and psyche. With Gerald‘s rejections, her entire being was threatened. She
felt empty and hollow.

Sofia was in the darkness of despair, humiliation, pain,

indignity, and trauma. When she was alive, it was as if she was possessed by the
devil. In order to feel alive, she had to be intoxicated. In Sofia‘s symbolic world, the
Other was overbearing with its dissatisfied desires. In order for her to escape from
the Other‘s monotonous, empty, and judgmental discourse, she got involved with
various men. Sofia had had impulsive sexual intercourse with them since the time of
her adolescent years.

Her relationship with the symbolic Other was stagnant with

painful dissatisfactions.
Sofia‘s dream and fantasies revealed her fragmented states of embodiment.
Her dream of being possessed and passing out and her fantasy of being beaten and
raped indicated how Sofia did not know who she was and how she felt when
someone hurt or harmed her. In waking life, Sofia felt numb when she had sex with
a man. She felt as if she was a scrap in men‘s hands. Her fragmented body was
exposed beyond the mirror image in which Sofia recognized herself.
image founded her embodied unity, equilibrium, and balance.

The mirror

As opposed to her

alienating ego, which was the sedimentation of idealized images, Sofia experienced
the fragmentations of her body. For Lacan, the fragmented body, as it is ―regularly
manifested in dreams when the movement of an analysis reaches a certain level of
aggressive disintegration of the individual‖ (Écrits, p. 78/97), and as it is well
depicted in Hieronymus Bosch‘s paintings, is the fantasmatic body of disconnected
organs and limbs; it is the disjointed, anaesthetic, and spasmodic body.
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In the Seminar, Book X, in chapters 3 and 4, Lacan states that when the split
subject identifies with the specular image of another, the subject is captivated in an
imaginary unity and wholeness. The subject has a sense of unity when the mirror
image is recognized by the symbolic Other.

The symbolic Other authenticates the

subject with a unary trait. That authenticated image is assumed or assimilated by
the subject, but the assumed image does not remain stable or fixed over time. By
relating to the symbolic Other, the subject engages in a dialectic of having a
particular image and not having it. As Lacan (1962-1963) writes,
[A]t the locus of the Other, authenticated by the Other, there is
profiled an image of ourselves that is simply reflected, already
problematic, even fallacious; that it is at a place that is situated with
respect to an image which is characterized by a lack, that there is
profoundly orientated and polarized the function of this image itself,
that desire is there, not simply veiled, but essentially placed in relation
to an absence. (chapter 4)
The subject, who comes close to the realization of unconscious desire, looks
for what he could really be. The more the subject has access to his desire, the more
he deviates from his assumed image.

According to Lacan, this deviation is often

experienced as bodily fragmentation.
Sofia experienced the fragmentation of her body when she came close to
realization of her Oedipal desires. She also experienced this fragmentation when she
felt unloved by the Other.

Sofia‘s desires were unconscious and not articulated.

When Sofia avoided realizing her unconscious desires or when Sofia did not have an
adequate relationship with a responsive symbolic Other—with an Other who was able
to understand, listen, and respond to Sofia‘s unconscious desires and wants—she
became depressed.

To Lacan‘s mind, depression results from moral cowardice to

explore the unconscious (Soler, 2006).

The sad subject gives up the search for

knowledge of the unconscious and gives into the jouissance of depressive symptoms.
Sofia clinged to her fantasy of being beaten, raped, and gazed at, which is as
if her desire was directed toward a trace or shadow of an unattainable object. Lacan
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(1997) refers to this unattainable object as das Ding (the Thing), which is
―characterized by primary affect, prior to any repression‖ (p. 54).

Das Ding is the

unforgettable maternal, the maternal beyond the phallus (Φ), who is lost forever.
The function of das Ding is the ―beyond-of-the-signified‖ and ―what remains silent.‖
It tears out and opens a gap between the sign and the subject. Das Ding refers to
the fact that language is tainted by the real. As Lacan further writes,

It is to the extent that the function of the pleasure principle is to make
man always search for what he has to find again, but which he will
never attain, that one reaches the essence, namely, the sphere or
relationship which is known as the law of the prohibition of incest. (p.
88)
Das Ding is the remainder of a cut between desire and demand. It shows that part
of our experience is unrepresentable and therefore a part of the subject escapes
through the cutting effects of the signifier.

It denies fantasies of unity, harmony,

and simplicity; it rather introduces impossibilities, faults, mistakes, and failures. By
being possessed by a gap and empty space, das Ding threatens to break our illusions
of having harmonious sexual relationships.
Following the Thing that was part of herself, Sofia was lost in depression. Her
own desire was not voiced enough and the Thing within herself incarnated the
threats of her own bodily fragmentation. Her relationship with the Other could not
make her life more fulfilling. Object a—the object cause of the Other‘s desire, the
object that the Other lacked, and that could never be obtained—was Sofia‘s position
of truth.

By situating herself as an abject object in relation to parents and

boyfriends—and when she situated herself as an abject object in relation to
boyfriends, she did it in the name of love—Sofia realized the real absence of object
a. As Fink (1995) puts it, ―object (a) appears in the position of truth…the truth of
the hysteric‘s discourse, its hidden motor force, is the real‖ (p. 134). The hysteric is
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commanded by the real, ―by that which does not work, by that which does not fit.‖
Her

discourse

―does

not

set

out

to

carefully

cover

over

paradoxes

and

contradictions…but rather to take such paradoxes and contradictions as far as they
can go‖ (p. 134-135).
Sofia longed to fill the lack in the Other by situating herself as the phallus for
the Other‘s desire. By identifying with the Other‘s lack, Sofia annihilated herself and
such annihilation was felt as a gaze coming from the Other. In her fantasy, Sofia got
herself seen by Gerald while she had sex with another man.

She ended up being

reduced to an object of his desire. Sofia incited the Other‘s gaze and disappeared in
the Other‘s whims regarding her.

The Other‘s gaze altered Sofia‘s sense of

satisfaction about her image. By being the object of the Other‘s desire—the object
that motivated a man to desire knowledge about the true essence of femininity—
Sofia tried to obtain absolute, complete, and total love from the Other.

Yet, by

getting herself seen, Sofia also provoked disruptions in her relationship with Gerald
(Copjec, 1994). She incited Gerald‘s lack. In fantasy and real life, she made it clear
to Gerald that he could not concretize her, own her, or confine her to patriarchal
social ideals.
Paradoxically though, by desiring a man‘s desire, by ―playing the part of a
man‖ (Morel, 2002, p. 89), and by being alienated in feminine masquerade in order
to be the phallus for a man, Sofia‘s jouissance was restricted to patriarchal
ownership.

Sofia‘s jouissance, which was tied to her hysterical symptom of

maintaining an unsatisfied desire in her relationships with others, was restricted to
the limits of patriarchal discourses. In the field of the Other, Sofia‘s libido lost its
living and animated state. She remained in a passive position without expecting to
receive fulfilling satisfaction from her loved ones.

Sofia situated herself in the

miseries of structural impotence, castration, and death.
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By desiring to plug the lack in the Other, without her wanting to be what the
Other lacked but only wanting to motivate the Other to desire feminine love beyond
the limits of the phallic One, Sofia‘s drive was restricted to the symbolic Other. Sofia
attempted to master libidinal excesses and identified with her mother‘s phallicization
of her real body.

Sofia‘s real body became a site of suffering by being phallic.

Sofia‘s drive was limited to the symbolic order and lost its erogenicity.37

Her

jouissance tied to her hysterical symptoms was sustained by the fantasy of a
boyfriend who gazed at her from a distance and desired her. Sofia was thus caught
up in the logic of an internal contradiction between wanting to be the object of
Gerald‘s desire, in order to obtain a sense of phallic potency in relation to him, and
not really wanting to be his object of jouissance, in order to liberate herself from a
vicious circle of dissatisfaction.

Sofia sought and desired to find love to solve the

problem of her inadequacy and become a living Woman beyond castration.

37

Lacan differentiates the subject as drive from the subject as demand and as desire (Écrits, 722725/851-854; Miller, 1996; Fink, 1997, pp. 207-217). Lacan (1998a) explains that, in hysteria, the oral
drive links to the economy of desire. The hysteric derives jouissance from desexualized digestive zones,
as we see, for example, in reactions of disgust and vomiting. In hysteria, the eroticization of the mouth is
excluded and other desexualized zones become prominent sources of jouissance (pp. 172-173).
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Chapter 5
Feminist-Lacan Dialogues

The feminist tradition explores women‘s lived experiences of distress within
patriarchal norms.

Anglophone feminists challenge the psychoanalytic theory of

gender, claiming that it empowers patriarchy and reinforces norms which position
women so as to be dominated by masculine ideals.

Whereas feminists challenge

traditional assumptions about subjectivity and make an important contribution to
changing the roles of women in relation to men, they fall short of achieving their
emancipatory potential because of their inadequate theorization of what constitutes
subjectivity.

As I discussed in chapter 1, Anglophone feminists misread Lacan‘s

theory of the symbolic Other and underestimate the importance of unconscious
desire in the constitution of subjectivity.

With their misreading of Lacan‘s

psychoanalytic theory, feminists promote a view of identity that is consciously
understood within sociopolitical and patriarchal discourses.
theories, the unconscious is understood superficially.

Thus, in feminist

Insofar as Anglophone

feminism commits to an epistemology that undervalues the unconscious, it makes it
difficult to see how neurotics sustain their dependence on and domination by the
patriarchal Other.
In this chapter, I will describe the reason why feminists cannot use the
Lacanian psychoanalytic model in their epistemology. In other words, I will describe
what it means to say that Lacanian psychoanalytic knowledge derives from analytic
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practice and not from the analysis of sociopolitical discourses. Whereas analysts, on
the one hand, listen to the effects of retroactive signifiers on a given discourse—
effects which relate to the subject‘s unconscious desires, fixations in symptoms, and
particular modes of jouissance—feminists, on the other hand, rely on the subject‘s
use of conscious speech and see symptoms as resulting from sociopolitical
discourses. Feminists expose the Other‘s lack and transform the Other by naming its
discursive practices. When they name a discourse, they bring something new into
the signifying order.

Throughout this dissertation, however, I have shown that

naming and rearranging the signifying chain do not change the relationship between
the subject and the Other. Lacan‘s psychoanalytic theory indicates that by producing
new meanings in the subject‘s own existence, we still have not understood how the
subject‘s structure of desire remains the same and how we end up destroying one
oppressive Master in order to raise up a new one. Lacan (2007) makes this clear to
us when he argues,
Psychoanalysis is not something that can be transmitted like other
forms of knowledge. The psychoanalyst has a position that sometimes
manages to be that of a discourse. He doesn‘t thereby transmit a
body of knowledge, not that there is nothing for him to know, contrary
to what is foolishly asserted. This is what is called into question—the
function in society of a certain form of knowledge, the one that is
conveyed to you. (p. 198)
One way to approach the question of why Lacanian theory cannot be situated in the
political—or to reframe this question, why when we change discourses, we are still
not liberated from oppression—is to go back to the work of Ferdinard de Saussure
(1959) and see more closely how Lacan takes up Saussure‘s cardinal distinction
between language and speech—a distinction which is similar to that between
empirical psychology and metapsychology.
Saussure distinguishes language from speech by saying that language
consists of the normative grammar and is, thus, concrete, homogenous, self-
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contained, and unified, and that speech is the individual‘s execution of language, the
act of the individual‘s utterance.

Unlike language, speech is heterogeneous.

The

individual passively learns to speak the signs of language, which consist of ―the
union of meanings and sound-images‖ (p. 15).

The individual‘s act of speaking,

however, is differential. In speech, the signified (word-image) stands apart from the
signifier (word-sound) (p. 12). The sign, as it is defined in the dictionary, is fixed.
In speaking, the individual alters the relationship between the concept and the
sound-image of that concept, because this relationship is dependent on the
individual‘s psychophysiology. Speech is not reduced to ―a simple naming-process‖
(p. 114).

For example, Saussure tells us that the speaker‘s enunciated word of

―Gentlemen‖ changes its substance and meaning every time it is intonated at
different times and in different contexts. As Saussure writes, ―Each time I say the
word Gentlemen! I renew its substance; each utterance is a new phonic act and a
new psychological act‖ (p. 109).

The word expresses different ideas ―without

compromising its identity‖ (p. 108). Saussure concludes that, in the act of speaking,
the bond between the concept (signified) and the word-image (signifier) is arbitrary
(p. 67).

He also provides various examples to show the multitude of different

languages that express the same concept with different words.
Saussure, however, contends that even though the bond between the signifier
and the signified is arbitrary in the individual‘s act of speaking, the system of
language is ―unchangeable‖ (p. 84). If, for example, we were to rebuild a city by
using new materials, we would still find ourselves in a familiar context, which is that
of a city. Thus, Saussure argues that the conditions of language are distinct from
the word entities (pp. 108-109).

―Changes affect only isolated elements,‖ not the

whole system of language (p. 88). Saussure explains that the linguistic system is
always the same as regards the establishing of the value of a sign.

A sign has a

value when it is situated in a chain of signification. In other words, we establish the
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value of a sign when we compare it with other similar signs and contrast it with
dissimilar signs (p. 115). In that respect, Saussure understands the value of a sign
as purely differential and negative. The sign, as a fixed entity, has a positive value.
When we look up a word in the dictionary, for example, we get a definition.

In

speech, however, a concept is not understood by its positive content but by its
relation with other terms in the signifying system. We understand a term by what it
is not.

As I mentioned earlier, a signifier does not have a single signified.

Each

speaker forms his or her own ―associative relations‖ of a sign based on his or her
memory and history (p. 123). Thus, whereas a sign may acquire a fixed value at the
social level, it nevertheless generates diverse associative relations in the speaker‘s
own mind. Thus, each speaker makes his or her own associative relations to a given
concept.
Lacan was influenced by Saussure‘s theory but also deviated from it and
extended it when he described the signifier as autonomous in relation to the sign and
as dominating over the signified.

For Lacan, the signifier is not an element of a

unified sign and cannot be studied by linguists or sociopolitical discourse analysts.
Unlike Saussure, Lacan (1998b) argues that the signifier cannot be limited to
phonemes and cannot be collectivized (p. 18). Lacan also dissociates the primacy of
the signifier from the speaker‘s own physiological and neurological functions, arguing
that the signifier exists ―apart from any given set of human subjects‖ (Fink, 2004, p.
76). Lacan (1998b), thus, explains that Saussure incorrectly viewed the relationship
between the signifier and signified as arbitrary and incorrectly assumed that it can be
studied by linguists (pp. 18-19).

One, for example, cannot study what causes a

signifier to have a particular meaning effect.

As Lacan (1998b) further writes,

―Meaning effects seem to bear no relation to what causes them‖ (p. 20). Whereas
the signifier stuffs the signified, the signified always ―misses the referent‖ that it is
supposed to represent (p. 20). The signified itself then also functions as a signifier
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as soon as it is dialectized with other signifiers. Lacan, thus, tells us that between
the signifier and the meaning effect ―there is something barred that must be crossed
over‖ (p. 18). This bar, as Fink (2004) explains, is the phallus, which, as I described
in chapter 2, is the signifier of desire—the signifier that designates the gap between
a word and the desired image that the word represents. The phallus does not depict
positive and visible properties.
desire.

It rather represents a reason for the subject to

As a signifier, the phallus generates meaning and fixes the subject to an

imaginary identification.

The image associated with a word, however, only partly

represents what it is supposed to represent, because there is always something
lacking in that image.
Whereas Saussure understood that there is not a close bond between the
signifier and the signified in the act of speaking, he nevertheless conceptualized the
speaker‘s enunciation of a word as generating a kind of meaning that can easily be
understood by the listener.

Lacan, however, is neither a structuralist nor a

poststructuralist theorist. He does not study how a word evolves over time and in
different social contexts or how the Other must name and rearrange its signifying
chain. The Lacanian approach to analysis involves a kind of listening which defers
understanding of conscious meanings from the analysand‘s speech and diverts the
analysand from producing stories that make too much sense but are indeed
meaningless and empty.

For Lacan, the subject comes to be an effect of the

signifier—the signifier structures the subject‘s desire and jouissance—and generates
meaning effects that are not statically determined by the Other‘s discourse.
For example, as I laid out my case formulation of Sofia in chapter 4, Sofia
was represented by the signifier ―devil,‖ which retroactively gave meaning to another
signifier, ―feeling alive in the same way as her father lived before his marriage to his
cold wife,‖ and the alienating meaning effects of that signifier were not determinant
by the Other‘s fixed descriptions of devil, but, rather, by the Other‘s desire—in this
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case, by her father‘s desire for her mother, the mother refusing to give in to his
requests to have sex with him.

As I also discussed in chapter 2, the reason why

subjects repeat symptoms and do not radically go beyond the Other is because their
symptoms mask an unrepresentable desire.

Neurotics, whose desires remain

unsatisfied, desire only in relation to prohibition (i.e., the law).

Their desires

transgress prohibitions but not for the sake of radically altering those prohibitions.
Transgression makes neurotics even less autonomous in relation to the Other. This
is because they situate the Other as irreducible and have the fantasy that there is an
unfailing, harmonious, fulfilling, and satisfying Other.
Going back to Saussure‘s point that the conditions of language are distinct
from the word entities and that ―[c]hanges affect only isolated elements,‖ not the
whole system of language (p. 88), Lacan agrees with Saussure‘s argument that the
conditions of language remain the same, no matter how many times we change the
meaning of words or ideologies of a given concept. It is for that reason that Lacan‘s
psychoanalytic

techniques,

which

intend

to

shift

the

analysand‘s

structural

relationship in relation to the symbolic Other, do not focus on the analysand‘s
communication of meanings, but rather, on how the subject is affected by the
metaphorical and metonymical consequences of the relations between his or her
unconscious signifiers.
Because Lacanian psychoanalytic theory is not an analysis of meanings but
rather an analysis of metaphors and metonymies in the subject‘s unconscious, one
may also see why Anglophone and some Francophone feminists are still not sure
whether the hysterical woman contests or conserves patriarchy. Feminists leave this
question open without providing a rigorous response to it. In fact, feminists keep on
criticizing Freud‘s theoretical errors and reductionism, but when it comes to
answering the question they themselves raise, they cannot respond.

When one,

however, concentrates on Lacan‘s psychoanalytic theory and rereads Irigaray‘s ethics
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of difference from a Lacanian psychoanalytic perspective—in other words, when one
realizes that Irigaray‘s notion of an ethics of sexual difference can be more clearly
understood when one is familiar with Lacan‘s theories of sexuation and hysteria—one
recognizes that the female hysteric both contests and conserves patriarchy, and that
the feminine subject, on the other hand, is she who is not spoken by the Other, does
not mime the Other‘s deficiencies and disorders, but is able to go beyond
boundaries, restrictions, and oppositions; she is able create and discover her own
plurality and infinity.
Lacan makes a fundamental distinction between desire and jouissance, and
hence, a fundamental distinction between the hysteric and the feminine.

The

hysterical position aims at the endless circle of desire and dissatisfaction and
preserves masculine desire for an unfailing (m)Other.

The hysteric‘s symptoms

enunciate the Other‘s failure to represent femininity sufficiently.
feminine remains unsatisfied.

Her desire to be

The feminine position, on the contrary, aims at the

domain of the impossible, which is beyond the phallic signifier and the masculine
Other, and which celebrates the dimension of enjoyment. By being not wholly in the
phallic function, the feminine subject supersedes the Other‘s finite and dichotomous
logic and desires that which gives her satisfaction and that which effaces the phallic
void. She is able to be constituted in relation to her pure desire—not the Other‘s
desire—and derive from that a pure form of surplus jouissance.

The feminine

subject, who is the analyzed subject, understands how she was spoken by the effects
of the Other‘s speech.

Her understanding, however, is not a matter of conscious

understanding but a kind of analytic working through.
Lacan has repeatedly shown us that the hysteric is notorious for calling the
masculine Other‘s discourse into question and exposing its lack and incompleteness.
The hysteric positions herself primarily as a dissatisfied subject and situates the
Other‘s knowledge as deficient. As Cixous and Clément (1986) indicate, the hysteric
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is able to destabilize the patriarchal system and expose its powerlessness and lack.
The hysteric becomes a ―heroine‖ in exposing the limitations of the Other‘s
knowledge and resisting masculine theories and masculine representations of
women.

Lacanian psychoanalysts have also pointed out that the hysteric has

facilitated the evolution

of psychoanalysis and science by challenging their

representations of truths. The hysteric thus contests and disrupts fixed discourses
because she desires more knowledge about her own existence.

The knowledge,

however, that she desires is the knowledge that the Other does not have and cannot
give her. As I pointed out in chapter 3, Irigaray‘s (2002) research study of hysterical
enunciations has shown that although the hysteric produces a discourse which
interrogates the Other‘s message regarding its incompleteness and ambiguity, she is
still alienated in the Other‘s enunciations and still constructs the Other as a closed
and finite system rather than as an open and incomplete one.

She thus always

constructs herself in relation to a more powerful and more knowledgeable Master.
She becomes alienated in her own demand that this masterful Other provide the
ideal sign (the phallus) that can explain how she can be a cause of desire for others.
As Irigaray explains, the hysteric is the one who mimes masculine language and
masculine ideals.
The question for feminists that remains is how they can use Lacan in their
epistemology.

As I also mentioned earlier, Lacan‘s theory is above all a

psychoanalytic discourse and not a sociopolitical one.

Lacan‘s analytic discourse

cannot simply be used by other discourses, since it has its own specificity and
structure.

Before I answer this question, even insufficiently, the major step that

feminists need to make is to read Lacan more closely and stop misinterpreting his
logic. To my mind, it is more important and productive for feminists to ask how they
can use this theoretical paradigm, which is substantially different from their own,
than to go on interrogating its premises and nomenclatures.
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As far as feminist

commentaries on Lacan‘s work are concerned, we can say that they are still
backwards.

Feminists keep on criticizing Lacan for being patriarchal, because he

uses the word phallus, and for being essentialist, because he uses the word
jouissance. The result of this backwardness is that we now have a proliferation of
feminist literature against Freud and Lacan and an ambivalent attitude towards
psychoanalytic theory. Feminists desire to use and know Lacan‘s theory. They use
him when they attempt to formulate the dialectical relationship between the subject
and the Other. They end up, however, misinterpreting some of his most important
concepts, including the phallus, the real, and the symbolic Other.

Thus, they use

Lacan‘s theory in the same way as they use Foucault‘s theory. For Lacan, discourse
always produces a rem(a)inder, which represents that which it excludes.

Lacan

teaches us that no matter how many signifiers we add to our signifying chain, the
chain is always incomplete. As I discussed in chapters 2, 3, and 4, the subject thus
structures its identity around this lack in the signifying order.

As Copjec (1994)

says, the subject is ―the effect of the inherent failure of discourse‖ (p. 211).
Because feminists desire to use Lacan in their epistemology, and because
they don‘t do the hard work required to read Lacan closely, feminists end up calling
Lacan‘s discourse into question and demand that he provide them adequate answers
about what it means for a woman to have certain desires and jouissance. Feminists
express

dissatisfaction

with

Lacan‘s

theoretical

explanations

substantial arguments why they want to deviate from it.

without

making

They protest against

Lacan‘s terms and, at the same time, they use his concepts superficially to explain
female sexuality. The kind of protesting they do ends up retaining Lacan and neoLacanians as Masters who should provide a better theory with which to explain
femininity and the subject‘s liberation from the Other‘s domination.
If feminists, however, engage with Lacanian theory more rigorously, there will
be an evolution in both epistemologies.

If feminists were to speak the Irigararian
139

feminine language—the language that is similar to Lacan‘s concept of the analyst‘s
discourse—they will succeed in questioning subjects‘ enunciations, and they will not
locate truth at the level of the ego.

Anglophone feminists criticize psychoanalytic

theory in a passive way and speak instead the hysteric‘s discourse.

Speaking a

feminine language on issues related to oppression is the same technique that
Lacanian psychoanalysts use with their analysands to question their unconscious
desire and the etiologies of their symptoms. If feminists use Lacanian theory, they
will succeed in motivating subjects to ask more questions about themselves.

It is

well known that the oppressed live and act without asking etiological questions about
themselves and are, thus, stuck rebelling against and complying with the Other‘s
demands and desires without realizing their own paradoxical and conflictual desires
in relation to the Other. They suffer by being represented by the Other‘s alienating
effects of language.
Furthermore, if feminists engage with

Lacanian

psychoanalytic theory

rigorously, neo-Lacanian psychoanalysts will also be incited by feminists to further
elaborate Lacan‘s own concepts, which at times seem to be treated as pre-given and
theoretically static.

Neo-Lacanians will provide deeper theoretical clarifications to

questions, including the question that is often raised by feminists in regard to how
the subject relates to the Other in various sociopolitical settings.
Feminists, as I said earlier, do expose the Other‘s lacking nature. What they
fail, however, to do is to speak a feminine language.

I conjecture that feminine

language has the same structure as Lacan‘s analytic discourse. When one shifts to
the analyst‘s discourse—and again, one makes this shift after one undergoes an
analytic working through and realizes that the Other is lacking and does not have a
final answer to give to the subject about how he or she can be happy—one becomes
the subject of the drive, a pure desiring subject who is not inhibited by the Other‘s
demands and desires.
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The feminine subject is not spoken by a symptom and is not in a state of
suffering. When, again, I say that she is not spoken by the symptom, I mean that
she is not castrated or represented through the retroactive effects of master
signifiers. The feminine subject is the one who has dialectized master signifiers and
is no longer inhibited from pursuing her satisfaction. She enjoys and seeks out her
satisfaction without being inhibited by an unsatisfied desire. Her whole body enjoys.
The feminine subject loves and enjoys by her act of speaking.

Instead of being

pinned down by the castrating effects of signifiers, she speaks of love and enjoys.
Thus, in order to speak a feminine language, one also has to be positioned as
the cause of desire, as objet petit a. To be the cause the desire, and not the effect
of the Other‘s desire, means that the subject does not have a fixed structure in
discourse.

It means that the subject has managed to symbolize its own lack and

goes beyond the repetitions, fixations, and closures of discourses. Feminine subjects
might ask:

what if there is no representation to describe the desires and aims of

men and women? What if there are no correct representations for femininity? What
if all the representations we have for sexual difference are correct and incorrect at
the same time? What kinds of desires and fantasies do subjects maintain when they
identify strongly with one ideological discourse?

What if we simply punctuate the

paradox of having a desire for an unsatisfied desire when subjects identify with fixed
discourses?

What if we then call the subject‘s own fantasies and desires into

question?
Feminists need to realize that the Lacanian Other is not the same as the
Foucauldian Other. Lacan is not a deconstructionist. With Lacan, we learn that the
Other is both powerful and deficient.

For Lacan, the Other is powerful and

persevering because its discourse revolves around an unnamable hole; the Other
shows us that something true still remains to be said. As Stavrakakis (1999) points
out, the subject‘s desire is then inhabited by the Other‘s desire to master meaning
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and become a full and meaningful identity. The subject and the Other cover over
their irreducible negativity with utopian fantasies that the dialectic of desire in which
they are both involved will someday bear fruit by giving them the sign of absolute
meaning, unity, and harmony. Stavrakakis (1999) thus suggests that one needs ―to
locate the exact points within linguistic or discursive representation in which the real
is surfacing‖ (p. 84).
In order to locate the real of a certain discursive representation and
encourage subjects to identify with that real to constitute their own pure desire,
Žižek (1989) and Stavrakakis (1999) point out that we need to call into question
ideological discourse and elevate it to the level of the signifier, which means to
interrogate utopian and idealistic fantasies that come with it; it means to expose its
dystopia and lacking nature, to make subjects ask questions when they are
represented by a discursive image, so that they put their desire for knowledge about
their unconscious into motion.
One of the limitations of this dissertation is that I have not said exactly how
feminists can use Lacan to further their own epistemological purposes.

Feminists,

however, need to read Lacan so they can see for themselves where Lacan‘s own
epistemology will take them.

In this dissertation, I have responded to the most

important questions that feminists have raised about Lacan. Much more could, no
doubt, be said in response to Lacan‘s feminist critics had I been able to work from
the whole of Lacan‘s opus, but much of it is still not even available in English. This
too, then, constitutes one of the limitations of my dissertation.
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Appendix A:
A Brief History of Hysteria

The concept of hysteria has a very rich history. It is the oldest category in
medical, psychological, and social history.

Historians, such as Veith (1965) and

Micale (1995), have described the shifting descriptive and explanatory paradigms of
hysteria and the ways in which the concept has entailed a series of dramatic images
and treatment modalities.

These paradigms shifted from the gynecological,

demonological, and neurological theoretical models to psychological theory. Hysteria
took its name, around the 5th century B.C., from the Greek word hystera, which
means uterus. For millennia, hysteria has been associated primarily with women.
An Egyptian medical papyrus, which is believed to date back to around 1900
B.C., recorded that the female womb sometimes became dislocated and independent
from other parts of the body.

Egyptian doctors developed treatment methods to

fight the disease, including the placement of aromatic substances on the vulva so as
―to entice the womb back down into its correct position‖ (Micale, 1995, p. 19). The
Greeks adopted the same notion, but they also explained it with the theory of ―an
unsatisfactory sexual life.‖

When a woman was deprived of sexual relations, her

uterus was capable of destroying her body, causing symptoms of ―dizziness, motor
paralyses, sensory losses, and respiratory distress‖ (p. 19).

The Greek remedies

included the placement of aromatic substances on the vulva, but also the
recommendation of immediate marriage.

Ancient Roman doctors also understood

hysteria as a disease of the womb, which caused ―disruptions in female reproductive
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biology, including amenorrhea, miscarriages, premature births, and menopause‖ (p.
20). They identified their most frequent cases of hysteria in widows and virgins and
they recommended marriage as treatment.
The above ideas were enormously influential in medical history for millennia.
A paradigm shift happened during the rise of Christian civilization. In St. Augustine‘s
writings, we find human suffering explained as a manifestation of evil and
punishment from God.

Explanations of hysteria shifted from medical to religious

discourses. Women with hysterical symptoms were called witches. In the historical
record, we find numerous attempts to detect such women, and evidence that they
were tortured and executed.
During the Renaissance, the French physician Charles Lepois argued that the
cause of hysteria is neither related to the womb nor the soul but to the influence of
passions on the mind.

Lepois also argued that the words and actions of the

physician had a profound influence on the hysteric.

In the late 17 th and 18th

centuries, British physicians developed a neurological model of disease based on the
notions of ―humors‖ and chemistry.

They proposed the theory that in hysteria an

excess of ―animal spirits,‖ released from the brain, entered the blood stream and
circulated through the body (p. 22).
In the late 18th and 19th centuries, we see the reintroduction of the uterine
theories.

Physicians explained hysterical symptoms as caused by female sexual

deprivation as well as sexual overindulgence. The reasons for this shift are unclear.
It is also significant that the Parisian psychiatric humanitarian, Philippe Pinel,
classified hysteria under the heading of ―Genital Neuroses of Women.‖ This period
was marked by ―a great multiplications of texts, theories, and therapies‖ (p. 23);
previous theoretical paradigms were discussed in light of new medical discoveries
regarding the role of the brain and the role of the womb.
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Mesmer, an Austrian physician, hypothesized the existence of a magnetic fluid
in the body and argued that hysteria resulted from disequilibrium of this fluid. His
treatment of the disease was based on the idea that the physician‘s hands had the
power to redirect the fluid within the body and bring equilibrium. Mesmer‘s patients
were mostly salon ladies and some men.

Although the medical academicians

accused Mesmer of charlatanism, his theory influenced the discovery of the
therapeutic effects of hypnosis.
After Mesmer, the most important medical figure in the 19th century for
hysteria was the French clinical neurologist Charcot.

Charcot rejected the genital

etiology of hysteria and insisted that men were also susceptible to the disease,
though less frequently than women.

In his theory, hysteria was caused by a

dysfunction of the central nervous system based on hereditary predisposition and
environmental factors.

The descriptions of this dysfunction involved symptoms of

epilepsy and syphilis. Charcot held out little hope for its cure and ―his therapeutics
was limited to the alleviation of symptoms‖ (p. 25).

At the famous hospital of

Salpêtrière, he experimented with the use of hypnosis to treat patients, especially
women, who manifested symptoms of fainting, paralysis, convulsions, and wild
screaming.

Another therapeutic technique that he employed was to ignore the

hysterical behavior and concentrate instead on the present circumstances of these
patients. Charcot found that his patients were suffering from many forms of stress,
including sexual feelings, religious conflicts, and traumas from exploitation or neglect
by their families. As hysterics seemed to be easily suggestible to explanations and
hypnotic effects, several other doctors challenged Charcot‘s experiments and
characterized him as the ―sinister‖ doctor ―who manipulated his patients like
puppeteers‖ (Showalter, 1997, p. 37).

Although Charcot did not limit hysteria to

women in his diagnostic schema, it seemed that he equated it with stereotypes of
female personality. With his assistants, he saw hysterics as vain, preoccupied with
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their appearance, deceitful, and self-dramatizing. These traits were seen by one of
Charcot‘s assistants as ―varieties of female character … One might even say that
hysterics are more womanly than other women‖ (Showalter, 1997, p. 34).
Charcot‘s theories and experiments on hysteria gave rise to psychoanalytic
theory. In Studies on Hysteria, Freud and Breuer challenged the nineteenth-century
theories of hysteria as an organic physical illness and argued instead that it needed
to be understood as a psychic disorder. They proposed that hysteria was the product
of a traumatic event, the memory of which got repressed and transformed into
bodily symptoms (such as coughs, convulsions, and paralysis).
trauma was converted into somatic symptoms.

In other words,

In 1896, Freud developed the

seduction theory, in which he contended that infantile sexual abuse caused hysteria.
As such, ―hysterical symptoms were the derivatives of memories which are operating
unconsciously‖ (Showalter, 1997, p. 40). By late 1897, however, Freud abandoned
the seduction theory and contended instead that ―hysterical patients were expressing
fantasies based on their unconscious Oedipal desires‖ (p. 40).
The rise of the psychological paradigm of hysteria led to a sequence of
publications that elaborated the idea of the hysterical neurotic character. 38 Hysteria
was defined by a set of highly negative character traits, mostly including
―eccentricity,

impulsiveness,

emotionality,

hypersexuality‖ (Micale, 1995, p. 24).

coquettishness,

deceitfulness,

and

Various researchers and psychoanalysts

elaborated the characteristics of hysterical character and attributed it to pre-Oedipal
dependence on the mother and Oedipal conflicts.

38

For example, in the 1950‘s, the

Drawing the formulations of hysteria from psychodynamic theories, there is an elusive, disparate, and,
at times, very confusing distinction among the terms hysterical personality, hysterical neurosis, hysterical
character, hysteroid personality, conversion hysteria, anxiety hysteria, hysterical psychosis, etc. These
distinctions are generally based on the level of specific symptoms as well as on the severity of the pregenital and genital fixations that intervene in the patient‘s daily functioning. In the journal Psychological
Issues, Alan Krohn (1978) wrote a monograph on hysteria and traced past formulations from objectrelational, self, ego, and other theories, which have either been more faithful to Freudian theory or less
faithful to it. McWilliams (1994) also draws her description of hysteria from various analytic traditions,
including from drive, ego, object-relational, and self theories.
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researchers Chodoff and Lyons investigated the hysterical traits that were agreed
upon by many authors, and listed seven major characteristics:
1)

egoism, vanity, etc.; 2) exhibitionism, dramatization, lying,
exaggeration; 3) unbridled display of affects, labile affect,
inconsistency of reactions, etc.; 4) emotional shallowness; 5)
sexualization of nonsexual situations; 6) intense fear of sexuality,
frigidity; 7) demandingness and dependence (Krohn, 1978, p. 64).

Several theorists started to develop new approaches to define hysteria, relying on
conversion

reactions

(psychosomatic

symptoms)

and

characterological

traits.

Because, however, conversion symptoms were considered to be common in some
eras and cultures, theorists believed that the definition of personality traits was more
reliable. Some sporadic studies showed the remarkable ―unsatisfactoriness of basing
a diagnosis of hysteria on symptoms,‖ which challenged not only the conversion
manifestations of hysteria but also the appearance of personality traits (Krohn, 1978,
p. 68). Krohn (1978) cites a study by Purtell, Robins, and Cohen that was conducted
in 1951, which intended to investigate further the nature of hysterical symptoms.
Their participants were 21 female patients who at the beginning of their study were
diagnosed with hysteria.

Their symptoms included psychosomatic complaints,

childishness, and self-dramatization.

During the research study, however, it

emerged that 14 of the 22 patients showed some signs of psychotic symptoms
(hallucinations and delusions).
The confusion of hysterical symptoms with psychotic symptoms raised several
doubts about the existence of hysteria.

When, in the 1950‘s, the diagnosis of

schizophrenia became popular, some psychiatrists proposed that ―all five cases in the
Studies of Hysteria were actually misdiagnosed schizophrenic illnesses‖ (Micale,
1995, p. 60). Some also hypothesized that in Breuer‘s famous case of Anna O, the
patient suffered from toxic psychosis, probably because of her use of morphine.
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Libbrecht (1995), in her book, Hysterical Psychosis:

A Historical Survey,

explores in detail the history of clinical psychiatry with its struggle to diagnostically
differentiate hysteria from psychosis as well as to theorize the mix of hysterical and
psychotic symptoms, which may emerge at different periods in the life of a patient.
These symptoms include hysterical personality traits, somatic conversion, delusions,
and hallucinations.
classification system.

Libbrecht cites several theorists who struggled with the
Some patients were classified as ―hysterical in the end,‖

although many of them were once ―diagnosed as schizophrenic over the course of
their lengthy history as residential patients‖ (p. 197).

In the 1960‘s, there was a

proliferation of articles in Europe and America on the study of hysterical psychosis, in
the attempt to include both hysterical and psychotic phenomena.
description

of

hysterical

psychosis

was

that

A common

―hallucinations,

delusions,

depersonalization, and grossly unusual behavior‖ were ―sharply circumscribed and
very transient‖ in patients with hysterical characters. It was hypothesized that the
so-called psychotic symptoms in hysteria were pseudo-psychotic, in which the
delusions seemed to be rectifiable and the hallucinations were thoughts rather than
perceptions; these experiences occurred as a mechanism for coping with certain
unbearable living conditions.

Other theorists also noted that while hysterical

psychotics ―can be hypnotized, schizophrenics cannot‖ (p. 191).

In time, the

diagnosis of hysterical psychosis was replaced with the DSM‘s classifications of
reactive psychosis and borderline personality disorder. 39 Libbrecht (1995) points out
that eventually psychiatrists, and subsequently the DSM committees, gave some
attention to hysterical phenomena only within the psychosis paradigm.
39

Several

The shared psychotic disorder (folie à deux) may also be included here. It refers to the patient who
develops delusions and/or odd beliefs as a result of a close relationship with a delusional individual. The
content and nature of these beliefs depend on the beliefs of the partner. The phenomenon of folie à deux
has also been termed ―mass hysteria,‖ which is most observable in large groups (or crowds), and is
characterized by outbreaks of inexplicable and strange behaviors. This phenomenon was prevalent in the
Middle Ages and was explained by the notion of possession. Groups of people were afflicted by a
compulsion to run out in the streets, dance, shout, and rave. Mass hysterical reactions have existed even
in modern times. One common example is sports or rock band fans, who yell, scream, and become very
aggressive when they congregate in mobs.
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authors/clinicians reported that they felt uncomfortable making a rigid distinction
between neurosis and psychosis (p. 196) and had difficulty phenomenologically
describing the manifestations of severe hysteria.
As Micale (1993) argues, since hysteria was broken down ―into its constituent
symptomatological parts‖ and lacked a strong theoretical and etiological theory to
hold it together, it failed to retain its basic clinical unity in the predominant
psychiatric paradigm.

The symptoms of hysteria became ―reassembled in new

combinations and distributed to many other medical categories‖ and ―more nuanced
psychiatric classifications‖ (p. 525). The major problem that exists in contemporary
medical epistemology seems to be that the disappearance of hysteria is mainly due
to the failure to understand it through the lens of analytic discourse. Whereas Freud
theorized hysteria by making the effort to decipher the unconscious and allowing his
patients to free associate and speak about their memories, not only by his
observations of their manifest symptoms, the DSM-IV fails to give us a clear
differentiation of the diagnostic categories, resulting in the assignment of patients to
one or more specific disorders based on ambiguous and arbitrary values.
The

dominant

inadequate.

psychodiagnostic

epistemology

today

is

problematic

and

The current DSM‘s medico-psychological paradigm leads us to

understand patients‘ symptoms superficially and to attempt to fix their ―abnormal‖
behaviors/thoughts and lessen their most observable symptoms as quickly as
possible.

Most clinicians today make a diagnosis on the basis of socially desirable

and adaptive behaviors. Consequently, psychotherapists are solely focused on the
elimination of symptoms, without taking into much consideration how these
symptoms correspond to a deeper structure.
It is thus evident that the category of borderline personality disorder has not
been conceptualized thoroughly, since the diagnosticians have located it on the
border of neurosis and psychosis (I provide Freud‘s psychoanalytic distinction of
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hysteria and psychosis in Appendix B).

Failing to theorize the patient‘s relational

structure to the Other, we also fail to connect his or her manifested symptoms (such
as

self-mutilation,

suicide

threats,

intense

anger,

unstable

self-image,

and

alternation between extremes of idealization and devaluation of others) with
signifiers and with deeper theoretical formulations of his or her positions in regard to
trauma and the fundamental fantasy.
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Appendix B:
The Freudian Theory of Bisexuality and Femininity

Among these is a suspicion that this phase of attachment to the
mother is especially intimately related to the aetiology of hysteria,
which is not surprising when we reflect that both the phase and the
neurosis are characteristically feminine, and further, that in this
dependence on the mother we have the germ of later paranoia in
women (Freud, 1990d, p. 324).40
Some portion of what we men call ‗the enigma of women‘ may perhaps
be derived from this expression of bisexuality in women‘s lives (Freud,
1990e, p. 359).
In ―Femininity,‖ Freud (1990e) asserts that the sexual development of women
is enigmatic.

In approaching this riddle, Freud warns that the theory of female

sexuality is far from clear. Freud vacillates between two contradictory arguments:
one argument is that women are predominantly passive and more likely to be
bisexual or have masochistic tendencies than men;41 the other argument is that the
truly feminine is heterosexual and normally active.

Both arguments relate to

women‘s mothering role and partnership with men.
With Freud, one finds a starting point from which to distinguish between the
two sexes from a structural and socio-political perspective. Since Freud‘s inquiry on
the enigma of women, however, the problem of femininity has remained in feminism
40

In his 1932 essay, Freud examined the issue of the girl‘s preoedipal phase and the effects that this
phase has on her sexuality. He was encouraged to undertake this task by the work of women
psychoanalysts, such as Lampl-de Groot, Deutsch, Brunswick, and others, who served as mother
substitutes in the transference. For more information about how Freud was influenced by these women
psychoanalysts, see Hamon (2000).
41
Freud (1990e) adds that masochistic men also exhibit ―very plain feminine traits‖ (p. 345).
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to this day.

Feminists protest against the Freudian theory of women‘s wish for a

penis, which leads them to question whether or not psychoanalysis is valid. We can
argue, however, that protesting against the phallus is not proof that women do not
have a masculinity complex.

Following Soler‘s (2006) argument, although

Anglophone feminists protest against the psychoanalytic notion of the phallus, they
fail to provide an alternative theory that would elucidate the distinction between the
sexes. Although feminists challenge the biological and social reductionisms of what a
woman is or should be, the enigmatic question that still remains in Anglophone
feminist texts is what Hamon (2000) asks, ―Why do women love men?‖ If women
feel abused by male power and maternal responsibilities, why then do they love men
sexually and look forward to assuming maternal responsibilities?

The subsequent

question that arises in feminist and neo-Freudian texts is whether or not the essence
of femininity is linked to masochism insofar as women give into men‘s desires.
In this section, I intend to discuss Freud‘s conceptualization of femininity and
women‘s possible inclinations to hysteria, paranoia, and masochism.

I will survey

some of his earlier and later essays, so that the reader better understands the
development of Freud‘s thinking on femininity in relation to the preoedipal and
Oedipal positions. I will also briefly describe Freud‘s case formulations of Schreber
and Dora, as well as Brunswick‘s case of female paranoia, in order to elucidate the
psychoanalytic differences among the terms normal femininity, hysterical neurosis,
and psychosis.
§
Freud formulates sexual difference and clinical diagnostics based on the
Oedipal configuration. In Freud‘s view, femininity is understood as a succession of
events in a little girl‘s development, including penis envy and change of love-object
(from the mother to the father).
Oedipal position.

Femininity is understood in accordance with the

Freud (1990d) considers the Oedipal phase as more significant
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than the preoedipal when he argues that the Oedipal relation is ―the nucleus of the
neuroses‖—whether obsession or hysteria (p. 323).

Depending on the Oedipal

configuration, one becomes normal or neurotic and one develops a certain sexual
identity.42
In his 1931 essay, Freud (1990d) recognizes the significance of the preOedipal phase in girls and gives credit to women analysts—Lampl-de Groot, Deutsch,
and Brunswick—for serving as mother substitutes in the analytic transference and
exploring the pre-Oedipus. Nevertheless, Freud does not go into many details about
the pre-Oedipal phase. Freud considers the failure to resolve the Oedipal complex to
be the cause of a wide range of clinical problems and psychopathology: penis envy,
inhibition, masculinity complex, inferiority, perversion, obsession, and psychosomatic
symptoms.
Freud (1990d) hypothesizes that the child‘s unresolved dependence on the
mother early in life situates it either as hysteric or paranoiac later in life. In regard
to the child‘s fixations on the mother, he gives credit to Ruth Mack Brunswick‘s
analysis of a case of female paranoia. Brunswick formulates this case in terms of the
patient‘s preoedipal fixations and failure to achieve the Oedipal position (see Hamon,
2000, pp. 179-215; Freud, 1990d, p. 324).
Freud and Brunswick conceptualize the preoedipal phase as the child‘s
attachment to an omnipotent (phallic) maternal figure, who is seductive toward and
active with her child.

Freud (1990d) observes that the child is sexually passive

insofar as it is suckled, fed, cleaned, or dressed by the mother, but the child also
strives to turn these sexual satisfactions into activity. The child wants to master the

42

Freud (1990e) asserts that, because girls do not have a penis, they envy the penis. In the absence of
castration anxiety, girls do not form a strong superego as boys do. Girls take refuge in the Oedipal
situation to resolve their penis envy and ―remain in it for an indeterminate length of time‖ (p. 357). Girls
realize they are castrated by seeing the genitals of boys, but their recognition that they do not have a
penis does not necessarily mean that they accept their castration as a fact. They long for the penis
unconsciously. They resolve their Oedipal complex when they accept that their wish for a penis can be
replaced by giving birth to a baby.
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mother‘s omnipotence and identifies with the mother‘s activity. For example, when
the little girl plays with dolls, she identifies ―with the active side of femininity,‖ with
the active mothering role (p. 334).

The mother does everything for the child and

possesses everything that is desirable.

Conversely, the child views the mother as

devouring and hostile. The child sees the omnipotent mother not only as nurturing
but also as threatening because of all the demands and prohibitions she places on it.
A child‘s early experiences with the phallic mother determine whether the
child achieves the Oedipal position and becomes differentiated and autonomous from
the mother.

The passage from the preoedipal to the Oedipal phase is a passage

from dependency and passivity vis-à-vis the omnipotent-phallic-active mother to
independence and activity thanks to identification with the mother (Brunswick, 1990;
as cited in Hamon, 2000, pp. 219-220). In normal cases, when the child gradually
accepts its mother‘s castration and takes care of itself in the same way as her
mother had taken care of it, the child substitutes activity for passivity. Based on this
theory, one might conclude that in psychosis this substitution does not occur, and
that in hysteria it does not reach its full course.
In Brunswick‘s case of female paranoia, for example, we see that the patient,
in adulthood, maintained an undifferentiating, symbiotic, and dependent relationship
with her neglectful, abusive, and threatening sister. The sister was the predominant
maternal figure for this patient. The patient came to see Brunswick for analysis to
complain that she suspected her husband of being sexually involved with her
stepmother (her father‘s second wife). Overwhelmed by her stepmother‘s voice, she
was hearing buzzing noises in her head and was convinced that neighbors and
strangers that she passed on the street were laughing and glancing at her.
In

her

associations

to

delusions,

dreams,

and

childhood

memories,

Brunswick‘s patient situated her sister as both omnipotent (phallic) and devouring.
The patient recalled that when she was 2 years old she was fascinated by her sister‘s
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pubic hair. Brunswick interprets that the patient was fascinated because she thought
that there was a penis hidden behind it. It was also apparent in one of her dreams,
in which she saw herself possessing a penis and urinating like a man, that the
patient had the impression that she and her sister lacked nothing.

Her sister‘s

sexual pleasure was also overwhelming when the patient realized that she was not
able to give her sister everything her sister wanted. When the patient was young,
she engaged in masturbatory activities with her sister, by which they both
experienced sexual pleasure each time. In this memory, the patient was positioned
as a special partner for her sister. Her sister, however, was promiscuous and had
many male lovers. At a later age, the patient felt that her sister neglected her as a
love-object. The patient found herself helpless to win back her sister‘s love, but she
continued to long for the female object and to believe that neither she nor her sister
were castrated.
The experience of being a helpless, traumatized, and passive child in relation
to her sister was repeated in her transferences to others, including her analyst and
stepmother, who were positioned by the patient as taking her sister‘s omnipotent
place. The patient was envious of her analyst‘s male patients and of her husband
who received more affection from her stepmother than she did. The therapist and
stepmother were objects of jealousy and substitutes for her sister (Hamon, 2000, pp.
179-215).
At first glance, her relationship with her husband might seem to be a
―normal‖ love relationship between a man and a woman.

But when we study her

delusional jealousies in detail, as Brunswick did, we see that the patient‘s jealousy
regarding her husband‘s infidelity had its source in feelings of hatred toward men,
especially of those men who had stolen her sister‘s love from her.

Brunswick‘s

patient imagined that these men had something better to offer her sister than she
did. In the same vein, the patient imagined that her husband was better able than
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her to seduce her stepmother and other women whom she loved, including her
therapist.
Was Brunswick‘s paranoid patient feminine?

To give an answer from a

Freudian perspective, we have to examine some of Freud‘s contradictory statements.
Freud makes statements here and there in his writings that dependency on the
maternal situates the subject in a truly feminine position—a position that is
characteristic of hysteria and paranoia. In his 1932 essay, however, Freud is clearer
about what constitutes true or normal femininity. For Freud (1990e), the castration
complex is the linchpin of becoming a woman. To become a woman, a little girl has
to accept the idea that she and her mother do not have penises. The little girl has to
turn to a man‘s love with the expectation of getting the penis from him. As Freud
states, a woman‘s wish for a penis is replaced by having a baby with the man she
loves. The baby symbolically takes the place of a penis. Since Brunswick‘s patient
did not accede to the Oedipal position and did not perceive herself or her motherobject as castrated, she was not feminine.
Freud, however, argues that the paranoiac is fixated on the preoedipal
mother and becomes both feminized (veiled feminine) and homosexual.

He

understands paranoid outbreaks as defenses against homosexuality. Homosexuality
in the paranoiac originates from a symbiotic love-hate relationship with the
preoedipal phallic mother.43
In Schreber‘s case, for example, a case of male paranoia, Freud (1956a)
asserts that Schreber‘s emasculation wish at the age of 51—his wish to be
transformed into a woman and submit to the act of copulation—was delusional.
Schreber had the delusion that if he were a woman, he would redeem and save the
43

Freud does not consider homosexuality to be the cause of paranoia. Rather, he understands paranoia
as a defense against homosexuality. It seems to me that Freud (1990b) considers homosexuality normal
when the subject achieves the Oedipal position at his or her early ages and is not neurotically conflictual
about his or her sexual orientation. Freud (1990e), however, also describes women‘s homosexuality as
involving a masculinity complex, when these women are neurotics. Women with a masculinity complex
are defiantly rebellious regarding the idea that they are castrated.
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world.

His delusion was an outburst of his homosexual feelings towards his

physician, Flechsig, who in turn was associated by him with God. Freud argues that
the manifestation of homosexuality later in life presumes the ―condition that the
object of their choice must possess genitals like their own‖ (p. 446).

Since some

paranoiacs oscillate between homosexual and heterosexual fantasies, paranoiacs
perceive both sexes as having male genitals.
Freud argues that Schreber‘s homosexual love for Flechsig was a repetition of
an infantile transference love—a love that was first directed to the mother and then
shifted to the father.

In his 1922 essay, Freud (1956b) explains further that

homosexuality for the paranoiac has its origin in a preoedipal fixation on the
maternal object. Because of this fixation, the paranoiac cannot tolerate feelings of
jealousy toward rivals, e.g., siblings or the father, and so the paranoiac transforms
rivals into love-objects.

The development of persecutory paranoia comes from a

primal relationship, which is mixed with love-hate feelings.

The paranoiac

transforms the loved ones into hated persecutors and the hated rivals into loveobjects.

The transformation of hated rivals into love-objects is a way to avoid

rivalry. Hence, Schreber‘s feminization was due to ―an indignant repudiation—a true
masculine protest‖ (Freud, 1956a, p. 426).

Schreber‘s emasculation wish and

homosexual love for Flechsig were caused by his fear that Flechsig, a powerful divine
man, might persecute and abuse him.44

As Schreber writes in his autobiography,

―Flechsig … tried to commit soul-murder upon [me]‖ (p. 428). As we will see shortly,
this form of masculine protest is different from what we find in hysteria.
The paranoiac‘s fixation on the mother is a narcissistic fixation. This fixation
makes it difficult to love another woman because he cannot get beyond the
autoerotic stage. For the paranoiac, other love-objects must love him in the same
44

Freud (1956a) explains further how the paranoiac negates and projects in various ways. The
paranoiac‘s statement, for example, ―I (a man) love him,‖ is contradicted by a delusion of persecution that
asserts, ―I do not love him—I hate him.‖ The persecutor here is someone who was once loved by the
paranoiac (p. 449).
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way as his mother loved him.

Therefore, the paranoiac‘s attachment to the

preoedipal mother is a symbiotic love.

Schreber‘s aversion for other women also

belied the fact that when he discovered that women were castrated, he feared that
women might castrate him as well.

He also feared his father.

By renouncing

women, he avoided rivalry with his father and the possibility of castration by his
mother. It was for that reason that he transformed his male rivals into love objects
and identified with the feminine, preoedipal, maternal object. We need to keep in
mind here that Schreber‘s emasculation fantasy was not a fantasy of castration but
rather a delusion of re-creating a whole humanity with his physician, Flechsig.

In

other words, with his emasculation delusion, Schreber still maintained the idea that
he was not castrated and that he was all-powerful.
As I mentioned earlier, feminization is not only a symptom of paranoia but
also of hysteria.

In the case of Dora, a case of female hysteria written in 1905,

Freud did not discuss the effects of Dora‘s attachment to her mother.

As I said

earlier, throughout his work, Freud considered the Oedipal phase, and not the
preoedipal, to be the nucleus of the neuroses (hysteria and obsession). In the early
1930‘s, regardless of his conjecture that a daughter‘s unresolved dependence on her
mother has an effect on her relation to her father as a love-object, Freud elaborated
more on how the daughter relates to her father when he discussed the little girl‘s
different possible paths of sexual development. In the case of Dora, we read that
Dora was more attached to her father than she was to her mother and that Dora
presented her mother as ―an uncultivated woman and above all as a foolish one‖
(Freud, 1997a, p. 13). In analysis, Freud focused on Dora‘s Oedipal complex. At the
end of the analysis, Freud discovered that Dora was not heterosexual but bisexual;
Dora was not only in love with men but also with women. Hence, she identified with
both femininity and masculinity.
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I will describe the case briefly: Dora was 18 years old and she was brought
to Freud for treatment by her father.

Since the age of 8, Dora suffered from a

variety of psychological and psychosomatic symptoms: chronic asthma, migraines,
nervous coughing, catarrh, aphonia, depression, suicidal ideation, irritability, and
loss of consciousness.

There was no evidence of organic cause for her physical

ailments.
Dora‘s symptoms were connected with the circumstances of her life:

Her

father had formed a close relationship with a married couple, Herr K and Frau K.
Dora was convinced that her father was having an affair with Frau K and complained
to both her parents that Herr K had made sexual advances towards her.

Both

parents, however, were unsupportive and suspicious of Dora‘s accusations against
Herr K.

In turn, they accused Dora of having sexual fantasies and making up

stories. Dora disclosed to Freud that Herr K had ―suddenly clasped [her] to him and
pressed a kiss upon her lips.‖ Freud also tells us that ―Dora had at that moment a
violent feeling of disgust, tore herself free from the man,‖ and left him (p. 21). This
event occurred when Dora was 14 years old.

Up until the age of 18, Dora was

secretive about this incident and maintained her friendship with Herr K.

Whereas

Dora reproached her father for having an affair with Frau K, she was protective of
their affair. For example, Dora did not visit Frau K when she knew that her father
was there with her. She also was devoted to Frau K and took care of the K‘s children
as if she were their mother.
Freud interpreted Dora‘s symptoms symbolically.

During the treatment,

Freud insisted that Dora was in love with Herr K as she had been in love with her
father during the Oedipal phase.

But because Dora had not resolved her Oedipal

conflicts, she was not able to free herself from these conflicts and situate herself as a
woman in relation to a man.

In Freud‘s words, Dora was not able to free herself

from disease (masculinity complex) and turn to life (normal femininity).
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Freud

noticed, for example, that during Herr K‘s absences, Dora experienced loss of voice
and frequent attacks of coughing. This was an indication to Freud that Dora gave up
speaking because ―speech had lost its value since she could not speak to him‖ (p.
33). For Freud, Dora‘s physical symptoms signified her struggle between her love
for men and her repudiation of sexuality. This was clear to Freud when he analyzed
her hysterical appendicitis attacks—attacks that had no organic basis and involved
the symptoms of abdominal pain and foot numbness.

Dora told Freud that she

experienced her first appendicitis attack nine months after Herr K‘s sexual advances
towards her. Before Herr K tried to kiss her by the lake at age 18, he told her, ―You
know I get nothing out of my wife‖ (p. 90).

Freud‘s interpretation was that Dora

fantasized both childbirth and making a false step with Herr K. Freud also insisted to
Dora that she was unconsciously in love with him.
Only when Dora broke off the analysis did Freud realize that Dora was also in
love with Frau K.

Dora used to praise Frau K‘s ―adorable white body‖ and never

spoke ―a harsh or angry word against the lady‖ (p. 54). Dora started to complain
about her father‘s affair when she felt that Frau K had betrayed her.

After the

termination, Freud admitted that the fault lay in his failure ―to discover in time and
to inform the patient that her homosexual (gynaecophilic) love for Frau K was the
strongest unconscious current in her mental life‖ (p. 110). Freud arrived at another
interpretation on how she derived secondary gains from her symptoms:

Dora

wanted to frighten and punish her father in order to make him give up Frau K. Some
of the symbolic connotations of her symptoms were that Dora was attached to her
father and identified with masculinity. In addition, she also felt vengeful toward her
father and was fascinated with femininity. Dora‘s fascination with femininity became
even more manifest when Dora shared with Freud her experience of going to a
gallery alone and looking at the pictures that appealed to her.
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Dora was ―rapt in

silent admiration‖ for two hours in front of the Sistine Madonna, the virgin mother (p.
88). In other words, the divine beauty of that feminine statue fascinated her.
In 1908, Freud (1997b) added a new section to his case history, entitled
―Hysterical Phantasies and their Relation to Bisexuality.‖

In that essay, Freud

established the thesis that a ―hysterical symptom is the expression of both a
masculine and a feminine unconscious sexual‖ fantasy (p. 118).

Hysterical

symptoms are bisexual in nature and serve the fulfillment of unconscious masculine
and feminine sexual wishes. Freud mentioned the example of a woman who pressed
her dress to her body with one hand (identification with femininity) while she also
tried to tear her dress off with the other hand (identification with masculinity). This
woman was torn in her fantasies between yielding to a man sexually and rebelling
against her sexual feelings.
Returning to Dora‘s case, Dora‘s identification with masculinity was apparent
to Freud when she adopted her father‘s physical symptoms from the age of eight
onward, e.g., coughing, hoarseness, catarrh, and so on. These symptoms expressed
several meanings in succession. For example, they expressed her love and sympathy
for his chronic illnesses, identification with his high socioeconomic status regardless
of his poor health, and revenge for his unwillingness to give up his affair with Frau K
for the sake of his daughter. Her oral conversion symptoms were also related to her
father‘s oral sexual techniques. Dora repressed the idea that to satisfy Frau K her
father resorted to oral sex, because of his impotence (Lacan, 2006, p. 180/221).
Dora recognized her female body in an alienating way by identifying with her father‘s
bodily image and desire for Frau K. By taking her father‘s desire as her own desire,
Dora‘s oral zone lost its erogenicity and became a site of conversion. Her psychical
conflicts were transformed into somatic symptoms, e.g. coughing, hoarseness, and
aphonia.

Dora was subjected to bodily fragmentations caused by her father‘s

disparate desires and conflictual wishes.
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When Herr K expressed his passionate affection for Dora and declared that he
got nothing out of his wife, Dora changed position in relation to the K‘s. From then
on, Dora wanted to stop all relations with the K‘s and demanded that her father also
stop his affair. She resented her father for offering her to Herr K in exchange for his
affair with Frau K.
nothing to him.

She also resented Herr K for telling her that his wife meant

Herr K had once previously repeated the exact same words to a

governess. Dora hated Herr K when she realized that Herr K treated her just like a
governess.

Here, of course, Dora identified with being a woman mistreated by a

man.
Since Frau K was the object of her father‘s desire, Dora became fascinated
with what a man desires in a woman.

Following Lacan (2006), Dora realized the

impasse ―of accepting herself as a man‘s object of desire‖ and, for that reason, Dora
idolized Frau K‘s femininity and the Madonna. Her solution was to offer herself as an
object of an irreducible, transcendent, and divine desire and not as an object of a
man‘s desire (p. 181/222). Dora did not consent to Herr K‘s sexual advances. In
other words, Dora identified with femininity not in relation to sexuality with a man
but in relation to her inability to understand the enigmatic nature of femininity. Her
unconscious wish to understand her father‘s desire led to passivity in her relations
with others and to psychosomatic symptoms. 45
The expressions of bisexuality and passivity in hysteria differ from those in
paranoia.

What Brunswick‘s paranoid patient and Freud‘s hysterical Dora had in

common were their conscious love for men but their unacknowledged homosexual
love for women and aversion toward men. However, both patients‘ symptoms were
structured in different ways.

45

Lacan (2006) assures us that Dora‘s pregnancy fantasy after Herr K‘s sexual advances functioned as an
identification with masculinity (p. 183/224). We can deduce that Dora identified with masculinity by
identifying with her father‘s desire to have genital sex, instead of oral sex, with Frau K and procreate.
Hence, her pregnancy fantasy, converted to appendicitis, was her father‘s unfulfilled desire for a baby with
Frau K.
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According to Freud, the underlying mechanism that operates in psychosis is
repudiation, also called foreclosure (Verwerfung). Foreclosure occurs when the ego
rejects an ―incompatible idea together with its affect and behaves as if the idea had
never occurred to the ego at all‖ (Freud, as cited in Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, p.
166).

Any idea that is abolished internally returns from without.

The psychotic

simultaneously repudiates unpleasant ideas with their affects. In Brunswick‘s case,
for example, the patient, as a child, foreclosed the idea that her sister was castrated.
Instead, her sister remained in her mind as an intact whole just like her.

When

Brunswick‘s patient was confronted with her sister‘s overwhelming sexual jouissance,
she situated her sister as all powerful. Brunswick‘s patient foreclosed the idea that
her sister was lacking and the idea that she herself could not give her sister the
sexual jouissance she wanted.
We see the same mechanism functioning in Schreber‘s case.

Schreber

situated himself and Flechsig as omnipotent in order to repudiate the idea of
castration and rivalry.

Schreber‘s love for Flechsig was transferred onto Flechsig

from Schreber‘s father, who was also positioned as omnipotent when Schreber, as a
child, was not able to signify his separation from his mother. Schreber maintained
an undifferentiated relation with his mother by foreclosing the idea that his father
was able to castrate him and frustrate his symbiotic relation with his mother.

His

avoidance of rivalry with Flechsig, as with his father, forced Schreber to assume a
feminized, passive position in relation to him.
In contrast, the mechanism that operates in the neuroses (hysteria and
obsession) is repression. Repression involves keeping something it at some distance
from consciousness.

Whereas in foreclosure, ideas that are abolished internally

return from without, in repression, incompatible ideas return from within in the form
of slips of the tongue, bungled actions, psychosomatic symptoms, and so on (Fink,
1997).

In Dora‘s case, for example, we see that Dora had fallen in love with her
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father at first and Frau K afterwards without knowing it. The idea that she loved her
father and Frau K was kept unconscious.

In consequence, Dora replaced her

bisexual love feelings with symptoms that affected her whole life.
In order for a child to be neurotic/normal and not psychotic later in life, the
child needs to signify its body and sense of self as different from the body of the
mother and as different from the mother‘s conception of herself.

Freud (1990d)

remarks that a neurotic woman represses her original relation to her mother; she
pushes her conflictual relation to her mother into her unconscious.

With the

discovery of castration and the realization of her organic inferiority, the little girl is
more inclined to repress the conflict between the first sexual experiences she had in
relation to her mother and her frustrations with her castrated mother.
attachment to her father reflects her relation to her mother.

Her

In other words, her

attachment to her father is built on her original relation to her mother. A woman‘s
husband, Freud (1990d) writes, is ―meant to be the inheritor of her relation to her
father, but in reality he [becomes] the inheritor of her relation to her mother‖ (p.
328). Hence, a woman‘s neurotic struggle with her husband or with men in general
reflects her struggle with her mother. For this reason, a woman is more inclined to
develop a masculinity complex, renounce her whole sexual life, and defiantly
overemphasize her clitoral masculinity in her unconscious.

§
A crucial question that arises in Freud‘s writings is whether or not the essence
of femininity is linked to masochism/passivity. Freud (1990c) vacillates between two
conflicting ideas on masochism. First, he argues that masochistic males and females
are situated in a ―characteristically feminine position‖ (p. 286). The manifest content
of their masochistic fantasies involves mistreatment, while the latent content
includes castration, copulation, and giving birth.
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Their masochistic behaviors are

child-like, i.e., helpless and naughty.

From this point of view, masochism is

understood as giving expression to ―feminine nature.‖ Second, Freud conceptualizes
masochism as a symptomatic expression of all patients regardless of their sexuality.
Patients take pleasure in pain and for that reason they repeat their symptoms.
The

Freudian

psychoanalytic

interrelationship

between

femininity

and

masochism remains questionable to this day, especially when we come across
Freud‘s developmental theory of female sexuality. Freud‘s (1990e) postulation that
the essence of femininity is to have ―a preference for passive behavior and passive
aims‖ connects with his theory of the libido. For Freud (1990a), although men and
women are bisexual (active and passive in nature), 46 their libido is ―of a masculine
nature.‖ The clitoris, the leading erotogenic zone in female children, ―is homologous
to the masculine zone of the glans penis‖ (p. 136). The clitoris is a penis-equivalent.
When the little girl derives masturbatory pleasure from her clitoris, she is like a little
man. Freud defines the libido as masculine, because in a biological and sociological
sense, it is associated with activity, aggressiveness, intensity, and muscular power.
When the little girl realizes that her mother possesses neither the penis nor
the masculine character-traits that are associated with the possession of penis, i.e.,
privilege and power, she reaches the conclusion that her mother is castrated. She
understands that neither she nor her mother has the phallus but, instead, her father
has it. In order for the little girl ―to pass from her masculine phase to the feminine
one,‖ she has to accomplish a double task: the switch of erotogenic zone—from the
clitoris to the vagina—and the change of love-object—from the mother to the father
(1990e, pp. 347-8). In other words, the little girl has to drop her initial love that
was directed toward her phallic mother and has to renounce the pleasure associated
with her mother from stimulation of the clitoris. In order for the little girl to desire

46

Freud (1990a) argues that pure masculinity and pure femininity cannot be found in the psychophysiological sense.
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the paternal phallus she needs to recognize both that she is castrated (she does not
have the male genital) and that her mother had deprived her of a penis. Her shift to
femininity is a shift from an active and virile phase to a passive phase. The little girl
acknowledges her own lack and expects to get the phallus from her father. As Freud
(1990e) writes, ―The turning-away from her mother is an extremely important step
in the course of a little girl‘s development …. [T]here is to be observed a marked
lowering of the active sexual impulses and a rise of the passive ones‖ (p. 336). With
this statement, we are left to assume that the feminine subject is predominantly
passive and tolerates the dominance of the masculine in masochistic ways.
On

the

issue

of

activity-passivity,

however,

there

are

also

other

psychoanalytic interpretations that underscore the idea that femininity is associated
only with passivity. In collaboration with Freud, Brunswick (1990) 47 wrote an article
called, ―The Preoedipal Phase of the Libido Development,‖ which seems to more
clearly describe Freud‘s theory of psychosexual development in relation to the
activity-passivity binary. In that article, Brunswick informs us that Freud retracted
―the statement that the Oedipus complex contains the nucleus of the neuroses‖ (p.
43).

It seems to me that the reason why Freud changed his mind (about his

previous assertion that the Oedipal predominates over the preoedipal in the
etiological explanations of neuroses) was because Freud was not clear how the
conversion of activity into passivity, and vice versa, in the Oedipal and preoedipal
phases works, especially during the 1920‘s.
Brunswick explains that certain developmental strivings are passive whereas
other strivings are active and therefore there is not a clear distinction between
activity and passivity at any given stage of development. Brunswick states that, in
normal development, as the child gets older, his/her active strivings increase in
number and intensity. This, however, does not mean that all passive strivings are
47

Brunswick began to write this article in 1930 in collaboration with Freud.
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converted to active ones.

The child identifies with the mother‘s activity gradually.

For example, the child learns to role play his/her mother‘s activity toward other
children, toys, and animals. Unlike Freud‘s early theory that the child‘s libido in the
preoedipal phase is active, Brunswick asserts that the infant is primarily passive and
that activity gradually takes precedence over passivity gradually.

Brunswick also

states that every time the child successfully identifies with the mother‘s activity, the
child finds its mother less necessary.

The active child, regardless of its biological

sex, begins to increasingly resent its mother‘s demands and prohibitions. The child‘s
resentment and aggression towards the mother are by-products of protecting its own
activity.
Following Freud (1990d, 1990e) and Brunswick (1990), there is no neat
parallelism between male and female sexual development. 48

Both theorists argue

that sexual development in girls is more complex than in boys. The main reason for
this complexity is that when a girl realizes that her mother is castrated, she feels
doomed and that she will ever acquire a penis. Both theorists assert that the girl‘s
identification with the mother‘s castration positions the girl in a passive relation to
her father, since the girl passively expects passively the phallus from her father.
However, the distinctions between activity and passivity are unclear. As we
have already learned from Brunswick‘s case of female paranoia, the patient‘s fixation
on her phallic maternal substitute (her sister) and her failure to achieve the Oedipal
position situated her as passive in relation to her omnipotent sister. Therefore, in
―normal‖ development, the girl‘s shift from her mother to her father as love-object
also implies that the girl resents her mother‘s overpowering activity in relation to
her, since the mother is the primary caregiver. She seeks to actively differentiate
48

To demonstrate the significance of the Oedipus complex that has for the girls more than for the boys,
Freud (1990d) rejected Jung‘s term, Electra complex. Freud stated that Jung‘s terminology implies that
the girl‘s position is analogous to the boy‘s position in relation to the parents. Freud did not see why the
term Oedipal in girls should change to Electra; instead, he wanted to emphasize that there is a qualitative
difference of the Oedipal complex between the sexes and that the phallus is predominant in both sexes
and in both phases, preoedipal and Oedipal (Freud, 1990d, p. 326; Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, p. 152).
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herself from her mother.

Therefore, the girl‘s passive expectation of the phallus

from her father requires an active differentiation from her mother.
In my reading of Freud (1990e), the girl‘s active differentiation from her
omnipotent preoedipal mother does not necessarily mean that the girl hates or
reproaches her mother. Instead, in order for a girl to differentiate from the mother
and substitute activity for passivity, she has to identify with the active mother. In
other words, from a Freudian perspective, when the girl accepts that she lacks the
penis and realizes that her mother is not the one who can give it to her, the girl
plays the part of her mother, becomes feminine, identifies with her mother‘s
activities in order herself to become an active mother and an active individual inside
and outside the context of the family.49
On the contrary, Freud (1990e) states that if the little girl regards her
castration as a misfortune, to the point that she becomes envious because she does
not have a penis, she becomes entirely dissatisfied with her sexuality and becomes
contemptuous and hostile towards her mother.

Envy for the penis leads her to a

struggle about her sexuality as well as to passive dynamic relationships with men
and women, which is characteristic of the clinical structure of hysteria. In Freud‘s
mind, ego identification with either parent always comes down ―in the end to a
refusal of castration‖ (Hamon, 2000, p. 109). A woman‘s recognition of her
castration makes the father into a love object, because he has the phallus, but also
makes the castrated mother into a love object, because she is loved by the father.
To look at the issues of activity-passivity more closely, we may briefly turn to
Freud‘s theory of masochism.

Freud (1990f) explains that sexual excitations and

aggression are turned inward after the individual has suffered painful experiences,

49

Freud (1990e) writes, ―[Playing with dolls] served as an identification with her mother with the intention
of substituting activity for passivity‖ (p. 356). ―Women can display great activity in various directions,
men are not able to live in company with their own kind unless they develop a large amount of passive
adaptability …. I shall conclude that you have decided in your own minds to make ‗active‘ coincide with
‗masculine‘ and ‗passive‘ with ‗feminine‘‖ (p. 344-345).
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and these experiences are reflected in the fantasies at each developmental stage.
Freud states that, in ―erotogenic masochism,‖ ―the libido meets the instinct of death‖
and a portion of the death instinct remains inside the individual (Freud, 1990f, p.
287). Erotogenic masochism is present in all of the developmental phases for both
sexes: the oral stage, as manifested in the ―fear of being eaten up by the totemanimal (father)‖; the sadistic-anal stage, as manifested in the ―wish to be beaten by
the father‖; the phallic stage, as shown by fantasies of castration; and the genital
phase, as shown by fantasies of ―being copulated with and of giving birth, which are
characteristic of femaleness‖ (p. 288).

We should note here that Freud mentions

only the father as the cause of these masochistic fantasies. We may infer that Freud
considers the differentiation of the child from its primary caregiver (mother) to be
traumatic and the mediator (the father, who has the phallus) between the child and
the mother to be a castrator. We may also infer that the child‘s love for the father
during the Oedipal phase is ambivalent.
For Freud, the differentiation between the mother and the child occurs only
when the child experiences its mother as defective, as lacking the phallus, and its
father as a threat and as more privileged than its mother.

Although activity and

passivity are not as clear as one may think—since for Freud, both sexes have a
combination of active and passive qualities—we are often left to conclude that in
order for a girl to become feminine, she has to acknowledge her castration, the
superiority of the male, and her sexual drive as having passive aims.

She has to

acknowledge that her vagina is to be penetrated by the male organ. With Freud, one
may infer that a woman‘s passive pursuit of sexual pleasure situates her as having
low self-esteem and difficulty separating from the maternal. A woman is someone
who endures pain in the service of others and gives preference to passive aims
(Freud, 1990e, p. 345).
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According to Freud, it is crucial to clarify, however, that the essence of
femininity is not masochistic.

Freud (1990f) refers to feminine masochism to

describe men‘s regression to infantile behaviors, dependency on the mother, and
helplessness. In her reflections on Freud, Soler (2006) points out that a masochist‘s
regressive behaviors are not the same as a woman‘s relationship with a man. The
masochist‘s desire to suffer and make himself into a piece of trash is not the same as
a woman‘s desire to impress a man and make herself loveable to him. For Freud,
the true masochist, who has a need for punishment and a need for pain in order to
feel erotic excitation is associated with the death instinct (the return of the living
being to the inorganic state).
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